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The credit default swap is
probably the most important
instrument in finance.
Alan Greenspan, May 2006Chapter 1
Introduction
Credit derivatives have revolutionized the way in which financial institutions, investors,
regulators, and academics view credit risk. Single-name instruments such as credit default
swaps (CDS), credit linked notes, or total rate of return swaps allow trading the default loss
risk of an individual reference asset separately from this asset. Multi-name products which
can be separated into basket and portfolio derivatives permit the transfer of a synthetic credit
portfolio among the market participants. A common feature of all credit derivatives lies in
their dependence on the general credit risk of a reference asset which may include rating
downgrades, failure to pay, or bankruptcy. Due to the evolution and the standardization of
the market for credit derivatives in general and CDS in particular, trading the derivative
position has become a substitute for trades in the actual credit risk exposure. The Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision (2004) reflects this development by recognizing CDS
positions as credit risk mitigation for bond or loan exposures in the standardized and
the internal ratings based approaches of the Basel II framework. However, the presumed
correspondence between the reference exposure and its synthetic counterpart, the credit
derivative, is only given if both instruments are subject to the same risk factors and exhibit
an identical sensitivity to these risk factors.
The contribution of this thesis is to study the impact of different risk factors on bond
prices and CDS premia and to explore the extent to which the different factors or sensitivities
cause diverging price behavior. In particular, we focus on the contractual differences
between bonds and CDS and on the instrument-specific liquidity as two potential reasons
for divergence, and our results challenge the conventional wisdom of a simple one-to-one
relation between the bond and the CDS market.
First, the bond and the CDS market are typically subject to a different liquidity. Even
though investors in financial markets have a concise understanding of what constitutes
liquidity, a theoretical definition of liquidity for arbitrary instruments is a daunting task. This
1
2is partly due to the complex nature of liquidity with its 4 dimensions time, price, magnitude,
and regeneration. In addition, liquidity only plays a role if the market participants have a
trading motive, an advantage from trading, and access to an alternative instrument which
trades at a comparative advantage to the illiquid instrument. The approach to explain
liquidity premia endogenously through market frictions and trading motives has been widely
explored in the literature on equilibrium models, see e.g. Amihud and Mendelson (1986),
Basak and Cuoco (1998), Duffie et al. (2000), and Sauerbier (2005).
All above models, however, suffer from the fact that the endogenous liquidity discount
depends on parameters such as the endowments or the risk preferences of the agents. These
are unobservable in practice and difficult to infer implicitly from prices. Most empirical work
therefore avoids an explicit equilibrium modeling of liquidity and uses a purely econometrical
or intensity-based reduced-form approach to determine the impact of illiquidity on asset
prices.
For assets which are identical except for their liquidity such as on-the-run and off-the-run
Treasury bond issues or Pfandbrief issues with different issue sizes, liquidity premia can
directly be measured as the price differences. For default-risky assets such as corporate
bonds, credit risk and liquidity have a simultaneous price impact and can interact with one
another. Thus, the first contribution of this thesis is that we disentangle the simultaneous
effect of credit risk and liquidity. This allows us to identify the different liquidity of the
two markets as a cause for price divergence between the bond and the CDS market. We
focus on the bond yield spread in excess of a default-free interest rate curve and on the
CDS premia for a wide range of industry sectors and sovereign issuers with a rating between
AAA and CCC. We employ two methods to explore this point. First, we demonstrate that
bond yield spreads and CDS premia react differently to firm- and instrument-specific and
market-wide measures of credit risk and liquidity in an econometric analysis. Second, we
develop a reduced-form model that allows us to separate observed bond yield spreads and
CDS premia into a credit risk and a liquidity premium component. We then analyze the
estimated premia time series and identify the degree of co- and countermovement in the two
markets. Our results show that bond and CDS liquidity premia move in opposite directions
if we correctly adjust for the impact of credit risk. Consequently, ignoring either bond or
CDS liquidity leads to overestimates of the two markets’ correspondence.
Our second contribution is that we explore the price divergence between the bond and
the CDS market caused by the impact of the delivery option on CDS premia. A CDS
contract typically specifies an issuer and a debt type, e.g. senior or subordinate, instead
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of a single reference asset. If an event such as bankruptcy or failure to pay occurs for this
issuer and debt type, the investor who has used the CDS contract to lay off credit risk (the
protection buyer) has the option to choose one of the bonds on which default has occurred
and deliver it to the investor who has taken on credit risk through the CDS contract (the
protection seller). In return, the protection buyer obtains a fixed payment. This choice
option constitutes an additional risk source for the protection seller which is not incurred
by a direct investment in a specific bond, and the delivery option value is reflected in a
higher CDS premium. We extend the existing literature on the CDS delivery option by
developing an explicit representation of the minimal post-default bond price. We estimate
the parameters of its distribution from a unique sample of defaulted bonds from the Euro
area. Subsequently, we extend our reduced-form model for strategic delivery of the cheapest
bond and determine the resulting decomposition of bond yield spreads and CDS premia into
a credit risk, a liquidity, and a delivery option component. Our results show that the delivery
option has a significant impact on CDS premia and, if ignored, becomes subsumed in the
credit risk premium. Therefore, neglecting the delivery option also leads to overestimates of
the two markets’ correspondence.
The outline of this thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 describes the payment structure and
the contractual features of a standard CDS and discusses the market organization and the
evolving standardization. Chapter 3 introduces the data used in our empirical analysis,
explores the relation between bond yield spreads and CDS premia and documents their
different sensitivities to firm- and instrument-specific as well as market-wide measures of
credit risk and liquidity. Chapter 4 presents the reduced-form model that allows us to
separate bond yield spreads and CDS premia into a credit risk and a liquidity component,
and Chapter 5 extends the model to a formal covariance structure for credit risk and liquidity
and to the impact of the delivery option. Chapter 6 contains concluding remarks.
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Chapter 2
Credit Default Swaps
A CDS is a bilateral contract which allows two counterparties to trade the credit risk of
at least one underlying reference obligation. The counterparty who buys credit protection
agrees to make periodic fee payments over the life of the swap. These fixed payments
constitute the fixed leg of the swap. In return, the counterparty who sells credit protection
agrees to make a payment if a “credit event” occurs for the reference obligations. This
contingent payment is the floating leg of the swap.
In this chapter, we discuss the payment structure and the standard features of a CDS
contract in Section 2.1. We give an overview over the organization of the CDS market and
the main counterparties in Section 2.2. The standardization which the market has undergone
and legal issues are described in Section 2.3. In each case, we focus on issues that affect the
valuation of CDS contracts.
2.1 Payment Structure, Standard Contract Features,
and Valuation
Due to its simple structure, the single-name CDS is the most frequently traded credit
derivative contract. It allows the protection buyer and seller to trade the credit risk of
the underlying reference entity, typically a company or a country, separately from other risk
sources which affect bonds.
The basic contract form is as follows. At date t0, the protection buyer and seller agree on
a fee s, called the CDS premium,1 which the buyer pays to the seller. Payments take place
on fixed dates t1, . . . , tn if no credit event on the underlying reference obligations occurs until
the maturity of the CDS contract at tn.
2 In this case, the protection buyer receives nothing.
1The premium is quoted annualized and in basis points (bp) per unit of nominal value for which the
credit protection applies.
2Payments are usually made in arrears, only for contracts with very short maturities or for very high
5
6Credit events include events such as bankruptcy by the reference entity and failure to pay
on or restructuring of specified reference obligations such as bank loans or bonds. If a credit
event occurs at time τ < tn, the credit event is documented by a legal notice, and the CDS
automatically terminates. As her termination payment, the buyer pays the premium accrued
since the last payment date ti to the seller. She announces which asset from the delivery
basket she will transfer to the seller through a “Notice of Physical Settlement”, transfers her
claim on the asset to the seller, and obtains its face value in cash.3 The equivalent value in
cash of the protection seller’s payment obligation therefore equals the face value F minus
the post-default market price of the delivered asset R. The cash flows of a credit default
swap are illustrated in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Credit Default Swap Cash Flows
The figure shows the cash flows in a CDS contract from the protection buyer’s
perspective. The inception date is denoted by t0, the payment dates by t1, . . . , t4,
and the default date by τ . s is the CDS premium, F the face value of the contract,
and R the market value of the delivered asset after default.
Timeline
P a
y m
e n
t s
Floating Leg
Fixed Leg
t0 t1 t2 t3 t4 τ
-sF -sF -sF -sF
+ F - R 
-s(t4, τ) F
As in a standard interest rate swap contract, the CDS premium s is generally determined
such that the value of the CDS contract at t0 equals 0 both for the protection buyer and
CDS premia a single upfront payment is made at the inception date t0.
3The British Bankers’ Association estimates that 73% of CDS contracts specify physical delivery, see
British Bankers’ Association (2006). As an alternative to physical settlement, about 23% of CDS contracts
specify cash settlement. We further discuss this settlement procedure in Section 2.3.
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the protection seller. Therefore, the buyer and seller need to determine the expected present
value of the fixed and the floating leg in order to find this value of s. Since τ and R are
unknown at t0, the value of s contains information regarding how the buyer and seller price
the probability and severity of a credit event. For only about 3% of all contracts, the CDS
contract specifies “Binary” or “Digital Settlement” where the contingent payment is fixed
as a predetermined amount. This specification allows buyer and seller to exclusively price
the probability of a credit event.
After the inception date, changes in the credit quality of the reference entity typically
change the market value of the CDS. Unwinding the existing position through early
termination then involves payments from the buyer to the seller if the credit quality has
increased and from the seller to the buyer if the credit quality has decreased. Alternatively,
the counterparties can assign their contract leg to a third counterparty or enter into an
offsetting transaction. Usually the buyer and seller will not be default-risk free themselves.
The counterparty risk may affect both the initial value of s and the payment upon early
termination. In the following, we abstract from this feature.
In short, the standard CDS contract can be thought of either as an insurance contract
against the credit risk for a given reference entity or as a synthetic vehicle for taking on
this risk. The simple structure also facilitates the pricing of a CDS, i.e. the determination
of the premium s. Duffie and Singleton (2003) argue that in a frictionless market (costless
short selling, no transaction costs, no taxes, immediate payments, termination of all contracts
upon default), the spread of a default-risky floating rate note issued at par over a default-free
floating rate note also issued at par with the same maturity must equal the CDS premium
of a contract written on that note if there is no arbitrage. Shorting costs and transaction
costs can be integrated, but bonds with fixed coupons or trading away from par cannot be
priced in the simplified no-arbitrage setting. An excellent overview of CDS valuation models
which avoid this issue is given by Das and Hanouna (2006).
2.2 Market Organization, Size, and Participants
CDS contracts are mainly traded in the over-the-counter (OTC) market, see Gu¨ndu¨z et al.
(2007). In particular, Meng and ap Gwilym (2006) claim that existing electronic trading
platforms such as those distributed by Creditex or MarketAxess are mostly used for setting
quotes. Traders usually set indicative bid and ask quotes via these systems, and actual
trading takes place over the telephone with the contracts subsequently confirmed by the
legal departments. This makes it difficult to obtain reliable data on the CDS market.
8A particular problem refers to measuring the size of the CDS market. Due to its
contractual nature, there is a risk of double-counting when a market participant effectually
terminates her exposure as buyer or seller by entering into an offsetting contract with a
third counterparty. The most frequently used sources are the British Bankers’ Association’s
(BBA) surveys. They have been published since 1998 every second year and describe the
evolution of the credit derivatives markets. In the following we refer to the market data
compiled in British Bankers’ Association (2004) and British Bankers’ Association (2006).
Figure 2.2 shows the outstanding end-of-year nominal volume for the single-name CDS
market.
Figure 2.2: CDS Market Volume
The figure shows the outstanding end-of-year nominal volume for the single-name
CDS market in billion USD. Data Source: British Bankers’ Association (2004) and
(2006).
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From an initial volume of 210 billion USD, the single-name CDS market has grown to 6,668
billion USD at the end of 2006. The BBA estimates a further increase to 9,600 billion USD
for 2008. The entire market for credit derivatives is estimated to grow to 33,120 billion USD,
and synthetic Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDO) which consist of a CDS portfolio are
projected to amount to another 5,300 billion USD. If we contrast these numbers with the
International Swaps and Derivatives Association’s (ISDA) estimate of 15,000 billion USD
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for the nominal volume of the cash bond market in 2006, it becomes clear that single name
CDS are of similar importance in trading credit risk as the secondary bond market.
Geographically, credit derivatives trading is concentrated in London at slightly below 40%
of all trades by volume. The next-largest trading place is New York while Europe excluding
London has a market share of 10%. With regard to the underlying reference entities, trading
has historically been concentrated in investment grade entities with a rating between A
and BBB. We present the evolution of the underlying obligation’s rating distribution in
Figure 2.3.
Figure 2.3: Rating Distribution
The figure shows the distribution of CDS across the rating of the underlying assets
by market share relative to the outstanding nominal volume. Data Source: British
Bankers’ Association (2004) and (2006).
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Overall, the average rating of the underlying assets has migrated downwards. The percentage
of assets in the investment grade segment has fallen from 65% in 2004 to 59% in 2006 and
is estimated to fall further to 52% in 2008. In contrast, the BB-B rating segment has grown
from 13% to 23% and is expected to increase to 27% in 2008.
In Table 2.1, we summarize the distribution across the market participants in the credit
derivatives market for 2006. We separate positions as protection buyer and seller, i.e. long
and short credit risk positions.
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Table 2.1: Market Participants
The table shows the percentages of market share in the credit derivatives market with regard to
nominal volume for different participants who act as protection sellers (long risk), protection buyers
(short risk), and the net risk position as of the end of 2006. A negative value suggests that the
market participant is a net protection buyer. Data Source: British Bankers’ Association (2006).
Seller Buyer
Market Participant (Long %) (Short %) (Net %)
Banks Trading Book 35 39 -4
Loan Portfolio 9 20 -11
Insurers Mono-line 8 2 6
Reinsurers 3 2 1
Other 4 2 2
Corporates 1 2 -1
Hedge Funds 32 28 4
Pension Funds 4 2 2
Mutual Funds 3 2 1
Others 1 1 0
As Table 2.1 shows, banks are the largest participants in the credit derivatives market. On
average, they operate as net protection buyers. The loan book in particular is combined with
credit risk protection which allows banks to transfer credit risk to another counterparty. The
banks’ trading book remains the most important single participant, and this is probably due
to the banks’ dual role as intermediary in the OTC market and as end user. Insurers are the
largest net protection sellers, they use the credit derivatives market to take on credit risk
synthetically. Second only to banks, hedge funds have become a major participant in the
credit derivatives market with high volumes in both buying and selling credit risk protection.
In particular, they demand more credit risk protection than banks do for the loan book. Due
to their different strategies, however, they are engaged more symmetrically. An example are
basis trades where hedge funds enter in opposite positions in the CDS and the bond market
if CDS premia and bond yield spreads, respectively asset swaps, differ sufficiently. Bu¨hler
and He (2007) show that these strategies are especially profitable when CDS premia exceed
bond yield spreads. Pension and mutual funds as well as non-financial corporates are less
heavily engaged in the credit derivatives market. As the Deutsche Bundesbank Monthly
Report December 2004 finds, the increasing trading activities of hedge funds have caused
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fluctuations in single-name CDS premia. Pension and mutual funds mostly invest in CDS
indices and CDO and therefore have no direct impact on the single-name CDS market.
2.3 Market Standardization, Accounting, and Legal
Issues
Apart from the advantages which are associated with credit derivatives, some problematic
issues arise. In particular in the early phase of the CDS market, market opacity due to
the OTC nature raised concerns regarding the functioning of the CDS markets. These
were partly redressed through the ISDA publication of the “1999 ISDA Credit Derivatives
Definitions” jointly with the “1999 ISDA Master Agreement” and the 2003 definitions update
which was published on February 11, 2003 and adopted with effect from June 20, 2003. The
definitions are used in almost all single-name CDS contracts, leading to a high degree of
standardization and thus liquidity in the CDS market. They provide standard answers to
structural credit considerations including the reference entity, the credit event, the reference
obligations, the protection period, the deliverable obligations, and the settlement procedure.4
Reference Entity In spite of its apparent simplicity, defining the appropriate reference
entity whose credit risk is transferred can be intricate. A large corporate conglomerate can
consist of subsidiaries who each have different debt issues outstanding. CDS contracts often
specify either the subsidiary or the ultimate parent firm only, suggesting that the default
risk and the post-default market value of the defaulted obligation may deviate significantly
from the required credit risk profile. An example given by Pollack (2003) is the default of
the US-based firm Armstrong World Industries, Inc. Armstrong World Industries filed for
bankruptcy under chapter 11 in December 2000 while its parent firm Armstrong Holdings
did not default. Market participants were holding CDS contracts which listed Armstrong
Holdings as the reference entity but specified an obligation of Armstrong World Industries as
the reference obligation. The protection sellers argued that a credit event had not occurred
since Armstrong Holdings did not file for bankruptcy or default on the reference obligation.
At a more fundamental level, CDS contracts can also be written on reference entities
which have no deliverable debt outstanding, making the standard protection virtually
worthless. Concerns regarding this situation were raised in April 2006 when investors
speculated about a buy-back of Air France’s convertible bonds. Since this was the only
4For examples, we refer to Francis et al. (2004).
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bond issue outstanding, no bonds would have been deliverable under the CDS contract after
the buy-back. Consequently, CDS premia significantly decreased, see Scott (2006).
Provisions for mergers, demergers, and other corporate restructuring events were added
by the ISDA in reaction to the National Power PLC demerger in 2000. To put it simply,5 the
provisions state that a successor holding 75% or more of the original debt becomes the sole
successor of the original reference entity. If each successor holds less than 25% of the original
debt and the original reference entity still exists, the contract provisions are unchanged. If the
original reference entity has been dissolved, the new entity which holds the largest amount
of original debt becomes the sole successor. If the fraction of debt lies between 25% and 75%
for at least one reference entity, a new CDS is assigned to each successor.
Credit Event A credit event is triggered by:
• “Bankruptcy”, including insolvency and the appointment of administrators, liquida-
tors, and creditor arrangements,
• “Failure to Pay” on one or more obligations within a certain defined grace period and
subject to a materiality threshold,
• “Restructuring” of claims due to deterioration of creditworthiness or the financial
condition of the reference entity.6
The grace period which may be contained in the failure to pay credit event definition
ensures that payments which are missed because of administrative or technical errors do
not automatically trigger a default. The standard grace period is usually adopted from the
prospectus of the obligation on which the failure to pay has occurred.7 If the obligation does
not specify a grace period, the ISDA definitions assume a grace period of three business
days. Restructuring constitutes the most strongly discussed credit event. The current
market convention excludes restructuring events which do not result from a deterioration
in the creditworthiness of the reference entity. Standard criteria which lead to a credit event
through restructuring encompass a reduction of the interest rate, the principal amounts, the
seniority of the debt issue, or a postponement of payment dates. In addition, restructuring
5For a detailed discussion, see Richa (2007).
6The credit events obligation acceleration, obligation default, and repudiation/moratorium are also
potential credit events. However, since April 2002, it has become market convention for corporate contracts
on G7 reference entities not to use these credit events. Obligation default in particular is almost never
included as a credit event.
7For senior unsecured bonds, the standard is a 30 calendar day grace period for coupon payments and a
15 calendar day period for principal payments.
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of bilateral loans is excluded from the definitions by requiring more than three holders of
the reference obligation and consent to restructuring by two thirds in order to qualify as a
restructuring event.
Reference Obligation CDS contracts can be written on almost any financial instrument.
In practice, ISDA gives 6 obligation categories. The broadest is “Payment” under which any
present, future, or contingent payment is summarized, whether borrowed or not. Other
categories are “Borrowed Money”, “Bond”, “Loan”, “Bond or Loan”, and “Reference
Obligation Only”. The exclusion of undrawn credit facilities from the 2003 definitions
ensures that a restructuring of undrawn facilities does not trigger a credit event. Overall,
borrowed money which includes deposits and reimbursement obligations is the most widely
used category. Obligation characteristics such as “Not Subordinated”, “Specified Currency”,
or “Listed” further restrict the number of obligations which can trigger a credit event, but
these are not customarily specified, see Francis et al. (2004).
Protection Period The 2003 ISDA definitions have changed the standard effective
starting date of the credit protection from three business days after the trade date8 to the
first calendar date after the trade date. Credit events on the trade date remain uncovered by
the CDS contract. The termination of the CDS contract can be either due to the scheduled
termination date, early termination through a credit event, or early termination by bilateral
agreement. March, June, September, and December 20 have evolved as the standard
quarterly scheduled termination dates as of mid-2003. The time between the effective
date and the next reference date is added to the quoted contract maturity. Therefore, a
CDS contract entered into on a non-reference date with the standard 5-year maturity can
effectually provide credit protection for up to 51
4
years.9 The above-mentioned grace period
decreases the value of credit protection since the standard contract specifies that the grace
period for a “potential” failure to pay must have elapsed until the termination date of the
CDS contract to trigger a credit event. If the termination date lies within the grace period,
the “potential” failure to pay does not constitute a credit event except when a grace period
extension is included in the contract provisions. Francis et al. (2004) argue that this inclusion
is rare for standard contracts and mostly observed for emerging markets CDS.
8The trade date is the date on which the CDS contract was first orally or in writing agreed upon.
9CDS contracts with a 1-, 3-, 7-, and 10-year maturity are also traded, but the 5-year maturity constitutes
the most liquid segment, see e.g. Meng and ap Gwilym (2006) and Gu¨ndu¨z et al. (2007).
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Deliverable Obligation With regard to the basket of deliverable obligations, for a typical
European corporate CDS all obligations are deliverable which rank pari passu or senior to the
reference obligations that can cause a credit event. If no reference obligation is specified, the
deliverable obligations must not be subordinate to any unsubordinated debt of the reference
entity. In addition, the obligations must usually be denominated in EUR or one of the G7
currencies and be fully transferable from one holder to another, i.e. not a consent-requiring
loan or a government savings bond. Contingent obligations such as callable bonds are usually
excluded while non-mandatory convertible exchangeable bonds are deliverable,10 and the
maximum maturity is mostly specified at 30 years. Under the restructuring credit event, the
maximum maturity is even shorter. The “Modified Restructuring” which prevails in the US
and the European “Modified Modified Restructuring” specifications limit the final maturity
date of the deliverable obligations to no later than 30 months for all deliverable obligations
(US), respectively 60 months for restructured bonds and loans (Europe), after the maturity
date of the restructured obligation. The modifications were added as a consequence of the
2000 Conseco, Inc. restructuring of its short-term credit facilities, see Pollack (2003). Only
a single loan with a maturity of less than one year fell under the reference obligations, thus
triggering a credit event, but the delivery of long-term debt with low market values was
technically allowed under the ISDA agreement.
Settlement The standard physical settlement consists of three steps. When a credit event
occurs, both buyer and seller may deliver a “Notification of a Credit Event” to the other
counterparty. The legal limit until which this notice can be delivered is 14 calendar days
after the scheduled termination date of the CDS contract - potentially years after the credit
event has taken place. Additionally, the counterparty who serves the credit event notice may
also have to deliver a “Notice of Publicly Available Information”, confirming the source of
information for the credit event. In the second step, the protection buyer delivers a “Notice
of Physical Settlement” to the seller within 30 calendar days from the credit event notice in
which she specifies which instrument she will deliver. The delivery of the physical settlement
notice is the beginning of the physical settlement period which may last up to 30 calendar
days. The third step consists of the actual delivery no later than 5 business days after the
end of the physical settlement period. As an alternative to physical settlement, the CDS
10The ISDA supplement on convertible, exchangeable, or accreting obligations specifies that any
determination of whether an obligation is not-contingent should focus on whether the right to receive principal
is contingent. The supplement was added following the 2001 Railtrack default when Nomura attempted to
deliver convertible Railtrack bonds and Credit Suisse First Boston declined to accept the bonds under the
CDS contract. A detailed discussion is given by Pollack (2003).
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contract can specify cash settlement. In this case, buyer and seller conduct either a market
auction or a dealer poll to determine the market value R for a given deliverable asset. After
the market auction, the seller pays the difference between the price at which the asset is sold
and the face value to the buyer. For the standard dealer poll, a calculation agent has to poll
one or more dealers for quotes on the reference obligation and determines the value from the
quotes.11 Harding (2004) notes that the seller usually acts as the calculation agent, but the
buyer or a third party can also be specified in the CDS contract.
The standardization of the CDS market in general and the credit events in particular
has directly affected the financial reporting of CDS contracts. We only discuss the reporting
procedure for CDS under the International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS); the GAAP
treatment is similar. The premium payments on a CDS qualify as interest payments for the
buyer and are treated as interest income for the seller. Until 2005, a CDS could either
fall under IAS 39 as a financial instrument or, according to the exceptions stated with
regard to financial guarantee contracts or insurance contracts, under IAS 37 or IFRS 4, see
Felsenheimer et al. (2006). Since the 2005 IFRS novation, all CDS contracts are reported as
financial derivatives or financial guarantees under IAS 39. The impact on the balance sheet
and on the profit-and-loss account, on the other hand, depends on the contract’s status as
derivative or guarantee.
As a derivative, a CDS contract has to be reported as either an asset or a liability and
must be disclosed at fair value. It thus enters the balance sheet at its initial value (which
equals 0), and changes in the fair value must be recognized in the income statements in the
period in which they occur. This fair value can be determined either through published price
quotations if these are available for the CDS (i.e., if the maturity is a standard maturity)
or through a valuation technique. If there is an asset against which the CDS is used as a
hedging instrument, then changes in the fair value of the CDS contract are offset by changes
in the asset. However, Hurdal and Yarish (2003) argue that this proceeding leads to a
problem if the hedged asset is a bank loan or a comparable asset which is valued under
accrual accounting rules. These assets enter the balance sheet at the origination value and
are typically only revised immediately prior to a default. Therefore, if the CDS contract
gains value as the creditworthiness of the reference entity deteriorates while a deterioration
of the market value of the loan is not recognized. These net gains or, in the case of an
11Depending on the specification, the determination can either be “Market Value” (arithmetic mean of
all quotes except for lowest and highest) or “Highest Value” (highest quote). If more than one date or
deliverable obligation are specified, arithmetic means across the dates and the obligations are computed.
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increase in the creditworthiness, net losses would further increase earnings volatility due to
the accounting rules only, which firms typically want to limit.
If, on the other hand, the CDS contract is recognized as a financial guarantee, this
mismatch does not arise. For a financial guarantee, IAS 39 states that valuation occurs in
accordance with IAS 37 such that changes in the fair value are not reflected in the balance
sheet. Instead, the reported value equals 0 if the probability of a credit event is smaller
than or equal to 50% and, upon an impending default, the amount most likely to be paid
by the protection seller.12 This accounting procedure reasonable matches the standard for
bank loans since impairments for the hedged exposure can be implicitly netted against the
CDS contract.
The decision whether a CDS is a financial guarantee or a financial derivative is directly
linked to the standard contract features. The general rule is that a CDS is classified as a
financial guarantee if in the case of a credit event, (1) the protection buyer incurs a loss in
the reference obligation, (2) the CDS payoff profile compensates for the loss on the reference
obligation, and (3) the CDS contract is only triggered if due payments on the reference
obligation do not take place. Therefore, Auerbach and Klotzbach (2005) argue that since
almost all CDS contracts specify bankruptcy and restructuring as additional credit events,
CDS contracts must in general be treated as financial derivatives. Felsenheimer et al. (2006),
on the other hand, suggest that all three standard credit events should be recognized under
the above conditions, excluding only obligation default, obligation acceleration, repudiation,
and moratorium. Therefore, protection sellers in general and protection buyers who use
CDS contracts to hedge an existing credit risk exposure in an economically meaningful way
should be allowed to treat CDS contracts as financial guarantees.
In spite of the far-reaching market standardization, a number of issues regarding
the processing of CDS contracts within an institution, selling CDS contracts from one
counterparty to another, and contract settlement have arisen since the adoption of the
2003 definitions update. Instead of an even more detailed standard framework for CDS
contracts, most of these issues have either been resolved through private efforts of the
involved counterparties or directly by the ISDA via the publication of “Protocols”. These
documents provide a uniform set of rules for the protection buyer and seller which allows
them to amend the existing contract to a situation where the standard contract features
result in unexpected difficulties detrimental to both counterparties. By adhering to the
12In most cases, this amount equals the expected payment of the protection seller conditional upon the
credit event.
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protocols, the participants announce that they accept the protocols as an addendum to the
master agreement.
As described by the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (2007), the New
York Federal Reserve Bank urged 14 major banks in September 2005 to solve issues relating to
the backlog of CDS contract confirmations from the legal departments. This action had been
caused by complaints that banks were unable to process the credit derivatives confirmation
documents; it took more than 40 business days to confirm a basic CDS transaction in a
legally binding way. The issue was resolved by the banks without further actions from the
regulating authorities by the strengthening of back offices and the development of electronic
confirmation platforms such as Deriv/Serv.
A second issue relates to the early termination of a CDS contract through sale by
one counterparty to a third counterparty. Numerous financial institutions had used this
way to offset credit risk exposures in 2003 and 2004, leading to a situation where the
eventual counterparty was unknown to the remaining original counterparty. This resulted, as
documented by the Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group II (2005), in uncertainty
regarding the counterparty risk and thus in disagreements about collateral requirements, and
belated payments on the CDS contracts. The 2005 ISDA “Novation Protocol” has resolved
this issue as described by the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (2007) through
specifying that written consent for assigning contract positions to a third counterparty has
to be obtained from the original counterparty by the end of the business day on which the
transfer takes place.
A third and final issue regards the physical settlement procedures. If the volume of the
outstanding CDS contracts is large relative to the volume of the deliverable obligations, price
distortions are likely to arise. For specific cases such as the Delphi, Inc. and the Dana, Inc.
default, the ISDA has published ad hoc protocols which allowed buyer and seller to switch
to cash settlement in a standardized way in spite of the original contract provisions.
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Chapter 3
CDS Premia, Bond Yield Spreads,
and the Basis - An Econometric
Approach
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the empirical relationship between bond yield
spreads and CDS premia on the same reference entity. As Duffie (1999) shows, there is a
clear theoretical link between CDS premia and yield spreads if the two quantities are viewed
as a pure measure of credit risk. If they are affected by additional risk sources – such as
liquidity – these risk sources may partially obscure the relationship. Many studies provide
evidence that other factors than credit risk affect yield spreads and CDS premia. As an
extreme case for the corporate bond sector, Elton et al. (2001) and Collin-Dufresne et al.
(2001) find that only 25% of the yield spread can be attributed to default risk or explained
by financial variables associated with it.
For the CDS market, Aunon-Nerin et al. (2002) and Tang and Yan (2007) explore the
determinants of corporate CDS premia other than default risk. While the former authors
claim that stock market liquidity measured as market capitalization does not matter, the
latter study finds a liquidity premium in CDS transaction premia between 4 and 17 bp
that accounts for approximately 26% of the entire CDS premium. Jankowitsch et al. (2007)
provide an analysis of the impact of the delivery option on CDS premia and argue that its
effect is about half as large as that of default risk. Dunbar (2007) develops a reduced-form
model that includes a risk factor for market liquidity. He argues that neglecting liquidity risk
when pricing CDS leads to an underestimation of the issuer-specific credit risk component.
In order to determine whether the link between the bond and the CDS market is similarly
clear-cut as the argument of Duffie (1999) implies or whether, as above studies suggest, a
more complex model is warranted, we analyze the relationship between CDS premia and
yield spreads. Since the premia are not stationary, we cannot employ the standard ordinary
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least squares (OLS) regression framework. We instead focus on the cointegration relationship
between the time series in the first part of our analysis. In the second part of our analysis,
we show that both mid CDS premia and bond yield spreads are systematically affected by
measures of market-wide and firm-specific credit risk and liquidity. Since the sensitivity of
the two variables to the market-wide and firm-specific measures differs, the basis, defined as
the difference between the mid CDS premium and the yield spread, also shows a significant
sensitivity to credit risk and liquidity. Therefore, even though a combined position in a CDS
and a bond is theoretically default-free, the position can be subject to significant credit-risk
and liquidity induced variations in the market value.
3.1 Data
In this section, we describe the data set. Further details regarding the data collection
procedure are given in Appendix 3.5.
3.1.1 Default-Free Reference Interest Rates
We first specify a proxy for the default-free interest rate. Obvious candidates are government
rates or the interest rate swap rate. Grinblatt (1995) and Duffie and Singleton (1997) analyze
the differences between the US Treasury and the swap rate term structure of interest rates
and attribute these to a higher liquidity of Treasury bonds and different reactions to credit
risk shocks. Hull et al. (2004) estimate that the default-free interest rate which makes CDS
premia and yield spreads comparable lies between the Treasury and the swap rate with an
average of 10 bp below that of the swap rate. They argue that bond traders often regard the
Treasury zero curve as the appropriate zero curve while derivatives traders use the swap zero
curve since it corresponds to their opportunity costs of capital. As there is no clear agreement
in the literature regarding which interest rate to use, we have collected data both for the
German government rate and the Euro swap rate. For the German government rate, we
compute the interest rate curve for maturities between 1 day and 10 years using the estimates
provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank on a daily basis. These estimates are determined by
means of the Nelson-Siegel-Svensson method from prices of German government bonds which
represent the benchmark bonds in the Euro area for most maturities. To compute the Euro
swap rate curve, we collect daily interest rate swap rates for the Euro area from Bloomberg
with maturities from 1 to 10 years and apply a cubic spline interpolation scheme. As the
standard default-free interest rate, we use the German government rate. Since the differences
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to the results using swap rates were limited, we only discuss them in selected cases.13
3.1.2 CDS Premia
All CDS and bond data is collected from Bloomberg. CDS ask, bid, and mid premium quotes
for reference entities from 9 industry sectors and the sovereign sector were made available
to us through the Bloomberg system by a large international bank. As the starting and end
point, we use June 1, 2001 (there were no CDS quotes available prior to this date) and June
30, 2007 which yields a total of 1,548 trading days.
We only choose Euro-denominated CDS with a 5-year maturity in order to obtain a
sample which is homogenous with regard to the delivery option and highly liquid. This
homogeneity has been discussed by Meng and ap Gwilym (2006) and Gu¨ndu¨z et al. (2007).
In total, we obtain a set of 458 reference entities on which CDS contracts fulfilling the above
criteria exist. For these reference entities, we determine the effective maturity between 5
and 51
4
years, see Section 2.3, as described in Appendix 3.5.
3.1.3 Bond Yield Spreads
For each reference entity, we collect the coupon, payment, and maturity dates of all senior
unsecured Euro-denominated14 straight bonds which were outstanding between June 1, 2001
and June 30, 2007. We exclude all bonds with more than 10 years to maturity at a given
date since the modified-modified restructuring clause only allows for delivery of restructured
assets with a time-to-maturity of up to 5 years in excess of the maturity of the restructured
asset that triggered the credit event (see Section 2.3). We then download the time series
of daily mid price quotes and the yields computed from mid price quotes for each of these
bonds from June 1, 2001 to June 30, 2007. If the matched time series of CDS premia and
bond yields has less than 20 observation points with one CDS bid and one ask quote and
at least two bond quotes on consecutive trading days, we exclude the reference entity from
the sample. The final sample consists of CDS contracts on 171 reference entities and 1,308
bonds for which mid price quotes, respectively yields from mid price quotes, are observed.
The average length of the observation time series equals 806 trading days with a total of
137,816 CDS ask, bid, and mid quotes each and 552,399 bond yields. We determine the
13The resulting term structures were very similar. The swap rates were on average 12.46 bp higher than
the government rates, the mean absolute difference equals 13.39 bp. A graph of the constant 1-year maturity
and constant 5-year maturity time series is provided in Appendix 3.5.
14We limit the currency to EUR for bonds issued after January 1, 2002, and to the currency of countries
with a fixed exchange rate between their national currency and EUR from June 1, 2001 to December 31,
2001 for bonds which were issued earlier.
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yield spreads over the default-free interest rate as described in Appendix 3.5 to obtain a
synthetical maturity which is identical to that of the CDS (5 to 51
4
years).
3.1.4 Firm-Specific Measures
As firm-specific measures of credit risk, the reference entity’s rating and variables derived
from traded stocks and stock options are explored. First, we use Standard&Poor’s (S&P)
and Moody’s ratings. In their empirical analysis, Aunon-Nerin et al. (2002) find that the
rating is the major determinant of CDS premia. Its explanatory power lies at 40% for their
entire sample and increases to 66% for their sovereign subsample. However, the use of rating
data as a dynamic measure of credit risk can also be problematic. First, rating agencies
claim that their ratings are a through-the-cycle evaluation, and second, information on a
borrower’s creditworthiness may be reflected in CDS premia before the rating is adjusted.
An example supporting this concern by Hull et al. (2004) shows that CDS premia partly
anticipate rating changes while only reviews for rating downgrades contain information that
significantly affects the CDS market.
Equity data is used in two ways. First, we directly employ stock returns as a measure
of the individual firm’s financial perspectives. While Kwan (1996) observes that bond yield
changes are explained up to 60% by Treasury yield and stock return changes, Collin-Dufresne
et al. (2001) find that the explanatory power decreases to only 5% when yield spread changes
are the dependent variable. The impact of stock return changes is negative in both studies.
Campbell and Taksler (2003) also analyze the relation between yield spreads and stock
returns and find that mean daily excess stock returns have a negative impact on yield spreads.
Second, we use the historical volatility of stock returns and the option-implied volatility
to measure credit risk as an alternative to a firm’s rating. Even though we do not necessarily
expect all these variables to have a simultaneous effect, the volatilities may provide more
accurate information on changes in a firm’s creditworthiness in the short run. If possible, we
employ both the stock return volatility and the option-implied volatility since the former is
a backward-looking measure of credit risk while the latter is forward-looking. The option-
implied volatility may thus be associated more closely with yield spreads and CDS premia.
This hypothesis is supported by Cremers et al. (2004) and Benkert (2004) who show that
implied volatilities have an additional explanatory power in excess of historical volatilities
and the rating. Overall, we obtain 233,780 daily stock return and 54,099 option-implied
volatility data points.
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3.1.5 Market-Wide Measures
We also explore the effect of the state of the economy, market-wide credit risk, and market-
wide liquidity to analyze whether CDS premia, yield spreads, and the basis are affected more
strongly by the general state of the economy than by firm-specific conditions.
Interest Rates
It is a well-documented finding that the level and slope of the interest rate curve have a
significant impact on the level and the changes of CDS premia and yield spreads. From a
technical point of view, Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) argue that a higher spot rate increases
the risk-neutral drift of the firm value and thus decreases the default probability and yield
spreads. In contrast, Leland and Toft (1996) discuss that if leverage and the default boundary
are determined optimally, credit spreads can also increase if the default-free interest rate
increases. With regard to the slope of the term structure of interest rates, Litterman and
Scheinkman (1991) and Chen and Scott (1993) show that most of the variation of the term
structure of Treasury bonds can be captured in changes of the level and the slope of the
term structure. Therefore, both may affect the firm value and thus credit spreads.
Empirically, Duffee (1998) documents that yield spread changes react negatively to
increases in the level and the slope of the Treasury curve. CDS premia also depend
negatively on the interest rate level and slope as Aunon-Nerin et al. (2002) and Benkert
(2004) show. Joutz et al. (2001) present evidence that the relation between credit spreads and
the term-structure variables depends on the time-to-maturity and the rating. In addition,
their cointegration analysis shows that Treasury yields are negatively related to credit spreads
in the short run while the relation in the long run is positive.
Economically, the direction in which the interest rate variables affect CDS premia and
yield spreads is not clear since contrary effects prevail. On the one hand, the effect described
by Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) leads to a negative correlation with the level of the interest
rate. In addition, default-free interest rates function as key rates in monetary policy. In
recession phases, central banks lower interest rates to boost the economy and increase them in
booms to prevent an overheating of the economy. Therefore, low interest rates coincide with
recession phases which are marked by high CDS premia and yield spreads. Collin-Dufresne
et al. (2001) also argue that a higher Treasury slope provides a measure of uncertainty about
the economy and about the expected future short rates.
On the other hand, Leland and Toft (1996) demonstrate that increases in the default-free
interest rate have an intricate effect on the optimal default boundary. If the notional debt
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value and the debt coupon are chosen optimally, the optimal default boundary can increase
for a higher interest rate, and the credit spreads increase for intermediary maturities. In
addition, higher interest rates make financing for firms more costly, and in particular firms
who depend on short-term financing such as commercial papers or, like financial companies,
have a higher interest expenditure ratio, may be more sensitive towards their financing cost
due to the fact that they have mostly short-term liabilities and long-term assets which are
both subject to interest rate risk.15 This effect causes a positive association between CDS
premia, respectively yield spreads, and interest rates.
Instead of the government or swap rate, we use the European Interbank Offered Rate
(EURIBOR) as the “risk-free” interest rate in order to avoid endogeneity in the empirical
analysis. We obtain the official daily EURIBOR interest rates from the International
Capital Markets Association (ICMA) website. Overall, the time series of interest rates
with maturities of 1 to 4 weeks and 1 to 12 months at a daily frequency from June 1, 2001
to June 30, 2007 contains 23,103 observations.
Corporate Bond Indices
The use of corporate bond indices as a measure of bond-market-wide credit risk is motivated
by the flight-to-liquidity and the flight-to-quality effect described by Longstaff (2004) and
Vayanos (2004). If market-wide credit risk increases, investors tend to move funds out of
more risky and into virtually default-free investments, thus increasing the latter’s price and
lowering the price of default-risky debt.
Empirical evidence for the relation between market-wide indices and the bond yield
spreads for a single firm is given by Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) who document a positive
association between changes in the implied volatility of the S&P 500 index and yield
spread changes. Gebhardt et al. (2005) demonstrate that market-wide bond index returns,
determined from price changes, coupon payments, and accrued interest, are among the most
important determinants for the variation of individual bond returns. Ericsson et al. (2008)
extend the evidence regarding the impact of market-wide indices to CDS bid and ask quotes.
The results of Schueler and Galletto (2003) suggest that not only CDS premia and yield
spreads are affected by bond and stock market indices, but that these also have an impact
on the basis.
In order to extend the authors’ anecdotal evidence, we include the JPMorgan Aggregate
Index Europe, and the S&P Global Corporate Bond Indices which are available for all rating
15The Deutsche Bundesbank reports that the outstanding nominal lending volume to banks increased from
EUR 2,239.71 billion in June 2001 to EUR 3,043.27 billion in June 2007.
CDS Premia, Bond Yield Spreads, and the Basis - An Econometric Approach 25
classes between AAA and B with a constant 5-year maturity. We describe the indices in
more detail in Appendix 3.5.
Financial Market Liquidity Indicator
As a measure of market-wide liquidity, we use the European Central Bank (ECB) Financial
Market Liquidity Indicator which aims at simultaneously measuring the liquidity dimensions
price, magnitude, and regeneration by combining 8 individual liquidity measures for the Euro
area. The time series was made available to us by the ECB, and we describe the index in
more detail in Appendix 3.5.
3.2 Descriptive Data Analysis
Before we analyze the relationship between CDS premia and yield spreads, we provide a
basic description of the properties of our data set.
3.2.1 Distribution Across Rating Classes and Industry Sectors
The majority of studies on the relationship between CDS premia and yield spreads either
focusses on sovereign or corporate reference entities. Andritzky and Singh (2007) perform a
case study for CDS premia and bond yield spreads for the default of Brazil, Chan-Lau and
Kim (2004) analyze the relation between sovereign bond indices, sovereign CDS premia, and
national stock indices. Longstaff et al. (2005), Blanco et al. (2005), and Zhu (2006) only
consider corporate names. Even for the corporate sector, many studies only differentiate
between rating classes and not between financial and non-financial reference entities.
We believe that this distinction is relevant since financial firms are the major
counterparties in the CDS market. Acharya and Johnson (2007) show that there is evidence
of informed trading of banks in the CDS market. Because the trader’s information regarding
a financial underlying is better than for a non-financial one, CDS premia from the two sectors
are likely to have a different level and a different sensitivity to the explanatory variables.
Du¨llmann and Sosinska (2007) explore this hypothesis and find that changes in CDS premia
for financial reference entities are positively related to changes in default-free interest rates.
In addition, they present anecdotal evidence for a weak link between CDS-implied default
probabilities and expected default frequencies for banks. A potential explanation is that
financial firms are typically much more closely monitored by the regulators, causing a
different behavior as the firm value deteriorates than for non-financial corporate reference
26
entities. This effect should also be reflected in the bond market.
In addition, none of the above studies analyze subinvestment grade instruments because
data on CDS on lower grade debt has traditionally been scarce. An exception is Ericsson
et al. (2005), but the authors do not differentiate by industry sectors. Due to our large data
set, we are able to analyze sovereign, financial, and non-financial corporate reference entities
from 8 different industry sectors and partition the sample into investment and subinvestment
grade debt. Table 3.1 presents the distribution of the reference entities and the observations
across the different rating classes and industry sectors. For ease of exposition, we first
compute the time series average numerical rating of a reference entity across all days with
sufficient observations. We then map the numerical value to the S&P rating and use this as
the column heading.
Table 3.1 shows that most reference entities have an average investment grade rating if time
series averages are considered; only 13 lie in the subinvestment grade range. Nevertheless, we
observe 8,993 CDS mid premia and 19,906 bond yields for these 13 reference entities which
suffices for the following empirical analyses. In addition, many reference entities exhibit a
subinvestment grade rating at some date in the observation interval.
The largest industry sector, both regarding the number of reference entities and the
number of observations, is the financial sector with 54 reference entities and 175,870,
respectively 38,046, bond yield and mid CDS premium observations. These numbers amount
to 32% of the bond yield observations and 28% of the mid CDS premium observations.
Moreover, financial firms are among the top-rated ones, constituting 34% of the investment
grade reference entities.
Regarding the sovereign sector, Table 3.1 shows that there is both a significant variation
in the average rating and a relatively high number of observations. 5 out of the 6 AAA-rated
and two out of the three B-rated reference entities are sovereigns. This rating diversity in
conjunction with the 6,594 CDS premia suggests that it is possible to treat the sovereign
sector separately in the empirical analyses as well. This is of particular interest because the
study of Packer and Suthiphongchai (2003) implies that corporate ratings have a different
informational content than sovereign ratings.
As described in Section 3.1.3 and in Appendix 3.5, the bond yield observations for each
reference entity are converted into synthetical yield spreads with the same time-to-maturity
as the CDS contracts on the reference entity. We can therefore directly compare the CDS
premium to the yield spread and compute the basis as the difference between these two
quantities. In the next sections, we present the descriptive statistics of the CDS premia,
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the interpolated yield spreads computed with regard to the different default-free reference
interest rate, and the resulting basis.
3.2.2 Mid CDS Premia
In contrast to Table 3.1, Table 3.2 is compiled for the actual rating at each observation
date instead of the time series average rating, i.e. the time series for which the statistics are
computed is allowed to fluctuate between the rating classes, and observations are assigned
to the rating class which contained the reference entity at the observation date.
As Table 3.2 shows, the mean and median CDS premia for the entire sample increase
monotonously as the rating deteriorates. For each rating step, the mean and median premia
approximately double within the investment grade segment, and as the rating goes down to
subinvestment grade, they increase by almost 400%. From the BB to the B rating class, the
increase is approximately 160%. This finding supports the notion that the difference between
CDS premia for the lowest investment grade and the highest subinvestment grade rating
class is larger than between two rating classes from the same segment. Default insurance for
subinvestment grade debt becomes much more costly than for investment grade debt.16 The
standard deviation also increases across rating classes starting from the AA rating segment
in absolute terms, but relative to the mean and median premia, it is much higher for the
investment grade segment. The values of 193% (AAA), 72% (AA), 90% (A), and 118%
(BBB) versus 93% (BB), 49% (B), and 13% (CCC) relative to the mean premia imply that
the variation in CDS premia may be too high to be explained by default risk alone.17
Comparing financial to non-financial corporate reference entities, we find that mean and
median CDS premia for financial entities are consistently lower than for non-financial ones
in the same rating class. This is especially pronounced for AAA-rated entities and those
in the subinvestment grade sample. At first, this seems surprising since a default within
the financial sector would have severer consequences than in other corporate sectors because
of systemic risk and a potential spillover into the real economy. As CDS could then be
used as default insurance against the firm-specific and the market-wide risk, premia ought
to be higher, not lower, for the financial sector. A first economic explanation draws on
16The only exception is the CCC rating class, but since we only have 171 observations, the lower value
of 289.81 bp may not be representative. A similar behavior is reported by Ericsson et al. (2005), but they
obtain the maximal CDS premia for the BB rating class.
17The numbers are compiled both across reference entities and over time. The standard deviation for a
single reference entity over time is typically much lower than that across the entire sample in one rating
class.
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the asymmetric information effect explored by Acharya and Johnson (2007), a second on
the contract-specific counterparty risk which may be higher given the default of a financial
reference entity. A third potential explanation lies in the fact that a bank may effectually
be too big to fail. As lender of last resort, a central bank provides additional financial
resources to banks in distress. Under this assumption, the only relevant default event of the
CDS contract is restructuring which leads to lower average CDS premia. As argued above,
defaults are also effectively prevented by a closer monitoring. Since this behavior is unique
to the financial sector, it may be difficult to compare the creditworthiness implied by a rating
for a financial and a non-financial institution. Following the above argument, the rating of
a financial institution may not measure the probability of bankruptcy or failure to pay, but
rather be aimed at the soundness of the institution’s overall economic health.
The standard deviation is also lower for the financial sector on an absolute level, but
relative to the mean and median, there do not seem to be any systematic differences in the
standard deviations. We take this as further evidence that non-credit risk related factors
affect CDS mid premia.
For the investment grade segment, CDS premia on sovereign reference entities are slightly
lower than for financial reference entities. For the subinvestment grade rating classes,
however, CDS premia are much higher than for financial or non-financial corporate reference
entities. This can be attributed a lack of cross-country bankruptcy regulations. For a
sovereign default, an investor holding debt securities will have difficulties in even filing her
claims against the defaulted country, let alone recover a significant proportion. On the other
hand, if a foreign firm defaults to whose firm-specific risk the investor is exposed, the investor
will be able to file her claims under the local bankruptcy code. Consequently, the potential
loss given default to an individual investor is likely to be smaller for the corporate sector.
Therefore, CDS protection sellers will charge higher premia for sovereign reference entities.
3.2.3 CDS Bid-Ask Spreads
The descriptive statistics of the CDS bid-ask spreads are presented in Table 3.3.
As Table 3.3 shows, the bid-ask spread level increases as well as the mid premium as the
rating deteriorates. From a mean value of 2.54 bp and a median of 2.00 bp for the AAA rating
class, the maximal mean and median of 29.16 bp, respectively 23.22 bp, are attained for the
B rating class. This holds both for the entire sample and for each industry sector. For the
relative bid-ask premia, however, we observe the reverse effect: the mean and median values
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decrease with the rating. Again, this holds for the entire sample and each industry sector.
If we take the bid-ask spread as a proxy for liquidity, this implies that absolute liquidity
premia increase with credit risk while relative liquidity premia per basis point decrease.
This finding has been explored for corporate bonds by Ericsson and Renault (2006) in a
theoretical setting. In the CDS market, evidence on the behavior of bid-ask spreads is
somewhat less conclusive. Acharya and Johnson (2007) do not find a significant relationship
between CDS mid premia and bid-ask spreads, but Tang and Yan (2007) show that for a
broader sample of traded contracts, bid-ask spreads relative to the mid premium seem to
decrease with rating. They attribute this to a higher interest in credit protection for the
lower-rated reference entities and, as a result, more active trading.
Comparing absolute and relative bid-ask spreads for the different industry sectors, we
find that sovereign and, for the BBB rating class, financial reference entities exhibit the
lowest absolute bid-ask spread for the investment grade segment. In the subinvestment grade
segment, absolute bid-ask spreads are somewhat lower for non-financial corporate reference
entities. With regard to the relative bid-ask spread, the sovereign sector exhibits the highest
values while those for non-financial corporate reference entities are lowest. This finding is in
contrast with the informational asymmetry argument by Acharya and Johnson (2007). Tang
and Yan (2007) also argue that CDS contracts on non-financial corporate reference entities
are traded at a higher frequency. This implies a shorter time until a protection buyer or
seller can unwind her position, leading to lower search costs and lower bid-ask spreads. This
market microstructure argument is supported for our data set by the fact that mean and
median bid-ask spreads are low when the number of observations is high.
3.2.4 Bond Yield Spreads
The descriptive statistics of the synthetical 5-year yield spreads over the default-free interest
rates are presented in Table 3.4.
As the minimal values show, we obtain partly negative yield spreads. For the entire
sovereign and the financial sector in the AAA rating class, the negative values are caused by
interpolating negative yield spreads. These surprisingly large negative values also cause the
negative mean for the sovereign sector in the A rating class. We have carefully checked each
bond for which we obtained a negative yield spread and were unable to identify contractual
differences or a specific time interval that could have caused these negative values. For
the remaining financial rating classes and the entire non-financial corporate sector, we only
obtain negative values when we extrapolate the observed yield spreads.
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Table 3.4 demonstrates that in spite of the similarities, there are also clear differences
between CDS mid premia and yield spreads. Even though the mean and median of the
yield spreads increase for the lower rating classes, the difference between the mean and the
median is larger than for mid CDS premia, pointing at outliers in the right-hand tail of the
distribution. Ericsson et al. (2005) report slightly higher mean values but a similar deviation
between mean and median.
The differences between the rating classes for the entire sample seem to be not quite as
clear-cut for the mean yield spreads as for the mid CDS premia, in particular the differences
between the AA and the A rating class are almost negligible. This is mostly caused by the
low yield spreads for A-rated sovereign reference entities. In comparison to the mid CDS
premia, we find that the average yield spread is higher than the CDS premium, and the
difference is more pronounced for the intermediate rating classes and the sample means.
This results in a pronounced basis smile as described by Schueler and Galletto (2003). The
median values differ less strongly, and in particular for the subinvestment grade segment,
the mid CDS premia almost coincide with or exceed the yield spreads.
Comparing the yield spreads for the different industry sectors, we find that sovereign
reference entities tend to display the lowest yield spreads while non-financial corporate
reference entities have the highest yield spreads. The higher liquidity of sovereign bonds may
be one explanation for this finding, our choice of the default-free interest rate a second one.18
But since we observe a similar relation between the financial, non-financial, and sovereign
sector CDS premia, it could be argued that the yield spreads reflect different recovery rates
for the sovereign sector, and possibly a different default definition for financial entities.
A comparison of the yield spreads over the government yield curve and the swap curve
reveals that both samples only exhibit limited differences in their descriptive statistics. Since
the swap rates are slightly higher than the government rates, the mean and median yield
spreads are lower by approximately 10 bp to 20 bp. The differences decrease as the rating
deteriorates,19 and are almost negligible for subinvestment grade financial and sovereign
reference entities.
18In fact, it is difficult to judge whether it is appropriate to compare the yield of traded sovereign bonds
to the Nelson-Siegel-Svensson curve computed for German government bonds.
19Since we first determined the yield spreads for each bond as described in Appendix 3.5 and then
interpolated the yield spreads to a synthetical 5-year maturity, the difference is not constant cross-sectionally.
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3.2.5 Basis
To conclude this section, we exhibit the descriptive statistics of the basis, computed as the
difference between the mid CDS premium and the yield spreads, in Table 3.5.
Overall, we see from Table 3.5 that the basis mostly takes on negative values. This is a sign
that yield spreads are higher than if credit risk were the only priced factor.
Across the rating classes, the mean and median basis values display a slight U-shape.
For all except the CCC rating class, the median value exceeds the mean value which implies
outliers in the left tail of the distribution. If the mean basis is taken relative to the CDS
mid premium, the pattern is not clear. The ratio fluctuates between -321% for the AA
rating class and +1% for the AAA rating class. If anything, we can differentiate between
the investment grade and the subinvestment grade segment in the sense that the impact of
credit risk becomes more dominant than other risk factors both for CDS mid premia and
bond yield spreads for the lower rating classes.
With regard to the differences between the industry sectors, we find that except for the
AA rating class, the mean basis is less strongly negative in each rating class for the financial
than for the non-financial corporate sector. The smaller absolute difference suggests that
the factors which increase yield spreads compared to CDS premia are less important for
financial reference entities. Taking the basis relative to the mid CDS premium, we again
observe that the absolute values are much higher for the investment grade segment than
for the subinvestment grade segment both for the financial and the non-financial corporate
sector.
The sovereign sector presents a very different picture. The sign of the mean and median
basis changes with each rating step until the subinvestment grade segment is reached. From
then on, the mean and median are positive, suggesting that CDS premia are on average too
high in comparison to yield spreads. Relative to the CDS mid premium, our above finding
holds; the effect of factors other than credit risk compared to that of credit risk is lower
for the subinvestment grade segment. Both of these findings could be the result of a higher
liquidity of sovereign bonds.
3.3 Time Series Properties
We now explore the connection between the time series of yield spreads and CDS premia for
each reference entity. As in the previous section, we differentiate between rating classes and
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industry sectors. If credit risk is the main priced factor, we should find a close and positive
cross-sectional and time series relation between the CDS premia and yield spreads. The
theoretical relationship between these quantities has first been explored by Duffie (1999),
and numerous studies such as Hull et al. (2004) and Blanco et al. (2005) have documented
its existence empirically. The relation should still hold if the factors which lead to differences
between CDS premia and the yield spreads do not exhibit a high amount of variation over
time, e.g. if they are characteristics of the market on which the instrument is traded or of
the reference entity. If, on the other hand, we do not find a positive association between
CDS premia and yield spreads, it is natural to ask which factors can obscure the credit-risk
induced relationship. The latter analysis is undertaken in Section 3.4.
For all analyses in this section, it is important to obtain a long time series without gaps.
We therefore use the average rating of the reference entity as in Section 3.2.1 and not the
actual observed rating to avoid gaps in the time series to segment the data. Details are given
in Appendix 3.5
3.3.1 Stationarity
To explore whether the underlying data generating process of the time series has a unit root,
we apply the augmented Dickey-Fuller test. The analysis is conducted on a daily, weekly,
and monthly basis with 5 lags on the daily, 4 on the weekly and 2 on the monthly level in
order to capture higher-order autocorrelation. The results at the 5% significance level are
given in Table 3.6.20
Table 3.6 shows that the null hypothesis of a unit root can only be rejected for a relatively
minor part of the time series. Comparing the test results for data on the daily, weekly, and
monthly level, we find that the null hypothesis can be rejected most often on the daily level.
This result is sensible since deterministic trends in the time series are more difficult to detect
given the higher fluctuation on the daily level. CDS premia tend to be stationary less often
than yield spreads. If credit risk were the only priced factor, either both or neither CDS
premia and yield spreads would be stationary. Therefore, this finding is a sign of different
risk factors affecting the two quantities at the daily level. At the monthly frequency, on the
other hand, short-term deviations may be more difficult to detect if CDS premia and bond
yield spreads react quickly to new information.
Regarding the basis time series, the low number of stationary time series at the daily,
weekly, and monthly frequency demonstrates that - and this even holds at the 10%
20The results for the 1% and the 10% significance level are similar.
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significance level - for less than 50% of the reference entities CDS premia and bond yield
spreads can be exclusively determined by credit risk.
For the different rating classes, no clear pattern emerges. At the daily frequency,
approximately 25% of CDS premia are stationary for the investment grade segment, and
no CDS premia are stationary at all for the subinvestment grade segment. The results are
similar at the weekly and monthly frequency. Yield spreads are also more often stationary
at the daily frequency for the investment grade segment. With regard to the basis, the
results do not seem to depend on the rating. At the daily frequency, the basis tends to
be stationary only if both CDS premia and yield spreads are stationary. At the weekly
frequency, a stationary basis can also be observed for non-stationary CDS premia and yield
spreads at the weekly level. This implies that differences between the bond and the CDS
market do not persist as strongly at a lower data frequency.
Comparing the results for the different industry sectors, we observe that stationary
CDS premia, yield spread, and basis time series are more prevalent in the financial sector,
especially at the weekly and monthly level. This finding supports our initial hypothesis that
CDS premia and yield spreads for financial reference entities are less affected by dynamic
non-credit risk related factors. The effect can be documented across all investment grade
rating classes. A conclusive analysis of the sovereign sector is slightly more difficult since
we only observe 16 sovereign reference entities. The fact that only one or, at the 10%
level, two reference entities, had a stationary basis seems to point at a fairly high effect of
discriminating factors for the sovereign sector.
3.3.2 Cointegration
Since some CDS premia and yield spread time series were stationary and some non-stationary,
we employ the Phillips-Ouliaris cointegration test which implicitly differentiates between
stationary and non-stationary time series and computes a comparable cointegration vector.
For jointly stationary time series, we compute a simple correlation coefficient. For non-
stationary time series, we first check the degree of integration for both time series. If the
degree is identical, we perform a standard cointegration test. If the degrees are different, the
we determine whether a linear combination of the CDS premia, yield spreads, and a simple
time-trend is stationary.21
In order to adjust for different means and linear time series trends, we simultaneously
21Theoretically, we could also explore how changes in the yield spread level are associated with CDS
premium levels or vice versa if the degree of integration differs. This procedure, however, is unusual, and
there is no straightforward economic intuition for such an association.
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estimate the cointegration coefficient, a constant mean, and the coefficient of the linear time
series trend of the difference between the CDS premia and the yield spread. The results of
the test at the 5% level are displayed in Table 3.7.
As we see from Table 3.7, the difference between the daily, weekly, and monthly level becomes
easier to grasp than in Table 3.6. The average estimated cointegration coefficient for the
entire sample is equal to 1.00 at the weekly and the monthly frequency, and the standard
deviation of the 171 significant coefficients is 0.00 when rounded to two decimal places.22 At
the daily frequency, only for 82% of the reference entities, CDS premia and yield spreads
are significantly cointegrated, and the lower coefficient of 0.31 in conjunction with the high
standard deviation of 0.41 across all significant estimates shows that this relation is not
identical across the reference entities. At the 10% significance level, the results are unchanged
at the weekly and monthly frequency. The average coefficient at the daily frequency declines
to 0.29 for a total of 145 reference entities (85%).
Since all reference entities are cointegrated at the weekly and monthly frequency with a
coefficient that is identical to 1.00 when rounded to two decimal places, differences across
the rating classes and the industry sectors are only of interest at the daily frequency. Across
the different rating classes, the proportion of significant relations increases as the rating
deteriorates. This result suggests that the idiosyncratic fluctuations become dominated by
the credit risk component as the rating deteriorates. Simultaneously, the size of the average
coefficient estimate increases up to 0.69 for the BB rating class, and for this rating class only,
the average is also significantly different from 0 as implied by the lower standard deviation
in a simple t-test. For each investment grade rating class, we cannot reject the hypothesis
that the average coefficient vector is equal to 0. As the high standard deviation suggests,
we partly obtain individual coefficient estimates that are smaller than 0. This suggests that
CDS premia and yield spreads move in the opposite direction, an effect that cannot be caused
by credit risk.
For the different industry sectors, we observe that the average coefficients and their
standard deviations are of a comparable size for financial and non-financial corporate
reference entities. Financial reference entities have a lower percentage of significantly
associated CDS premia and yield spreads than non-financial corporate ones. We attribute
22In Table 3.6, the maximum number of reference entities which could have been tested for correlation
and cointegration would have been smaller. For example, 16 CDS premia time series were stationary, but
only 14 yield spread time series. This suggests that the potential number of cointegration relationships
is 169. In Table 3.7, the potential number of cointegration relations is 171. This is possible because the
Phillips-Ouliaris test adjusts for potential time series trends which the augmented Dickey-Fuller test does
not.
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this difference to a higher degree of dependence on market-wide factors than on firm-specific
risk factors for financial reference entities. In contrast, the sovereign sector displays a very
different behavior. For the rating classes AAA to A, the coefficient estimates are in the range
from -0.05 to 0.02 and grow to 0.68 to 0.92% for the BBB to B rating classes. This result
demonstrates that credit risk does not seem to be the only determinant of CDS premia and
yield spreads for highly rated sovereign reference entities, whereas for reference entities with
a higher default risk these two terms appear to be mainly determined by common factors.
In short, the stationarity and cointegration tests show that CDS premia and yield spreads
partially display a very different time series behavior and that credit risk cannot be the only
determinant. We also find that the relation is affected by the sampling frequency, i. e.
whether daily, weekly, or monthly data is used, and by the degree of credit risk which is
reflected in the two quantities. Our results imply that weekly and monthly CDS premia and
yield spreads exhibit a high degree of comovement when we also adjust for different means
and time-dependent trends. On the daily level, we do not find a similar comovement. The
next section is concerned with the analysis of the impact of the difference between the bond
yield spread and the CDS premium. In particular, we explore whether the comovement of
the two quantities is simultaneous or whether changes in one of the time series precede those
in the other. If this reaction mechanism occurs within one week, this could be a reason for
the different behavior of the CDS premia and the yield spreads at the daily level and the
high degree of comovement at the weekly and monthly level.
3.3.3 Vector Error Correction Model
In this section, we explore the time series dependence of CDS premia and yield spreads on
one another. As the cointegration tests show, CDS premia and yield spreads sampled at a
daily frequency do not necessarily move in unison and, in some cases, even exhibit reverse
behavior. At the weekly frequency, the two quantities are almost perfectly cointegrated or,
in the case of stationarity, correlated.
This different behavior could be caused by two effects. First, the daily CDS premia and
yield spreads could be affected by uncorrelated idiosyncratic disturbances that mask the
actual relation between the time series. Moving to the weekly frequency, the joint behavior
becomes easier to detect as the idiosyncratic disturbances cancel out.
The second possibility is that one market leads the other in the context of price discovery,
i.e. similar factors cause movements in CDS premia and yield spreads but at a different
speed. If, as Blanco et al. (2005) argue, a time lag exists between the two markets, the
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simultaneous cointegration test performed in the previous section cannot pick up on this non-
simultaneous changes at the daily frequency. At a weekly frequency, however, a difference
in the adjustment speed cannot be fully detected if the adjustment occurs in both markets
within a few days.
In order to explore whether the second effect can be detected in our sample, we perform
a vector error correction model (VECM) analysis. In particular, we first determine for each
reference entity whether the mid CDS premium and the bond yield spread time series are
stationary. If the augmented Dickey-Fuller test cannot reject a unit root at the 5% level for
each time series, we test whether the first differences of the mid CDS premium and the bond
yield spread time series are stationary. If the augmented Dickey-Fuller test can reject a unit
root in the first differences at the 5% level for each time series, we perform the Johansen
test for cointegration23 between the mid CDS premium and the bond yield spread. If the
cointegration vector is significantly different from 0 at the 5% level, we estimate the following
set of equations for each reference entity:
∆CDSt = v1 (CDSt−1 − βyst−1) +
p∑
i=1
ui∆CDSt−i +
p∑
i=1
wi∆yst−i + ε1,t
∆yst = v2 (CDSt−1 − βyst−1) +
p∑
i=1
xi∆CDSt−i +
p∑
i=1
zi∆yst−i + ε2,t, (3.1)
where ∆CDSt denotes the change of the CDS mid premium between t− 1 and t, ∆yst the
change of the yield spread between t − 1 and t, p is the maximum lag order, v1 and v2 are
the coefficients of the error correction term CDSt−1 − βyst−1 with regard to the CDS mid
premium and the yield spread changes, β is the cointegration coefficient, ui, wi, xi, and zi
are the coefficients of the lagged changes of the CDS mid premia and yield spreads, and ε1,t
and ε2,t are the error terms. The size and significance of v1 and v2 are used to infer whether
a deviation of either the CDS mid premium or the yield spread from their long-run relation
causes one of these quantities to change in a systematic way.
The results of the estimation are displayed in Table 3.8. We only report the coefficients
of the error correction term for the lag order p = 5, the results for the lag orders 2 to 4 were
similar.
We see from Table 3.8 that the error correction term affects yield spreads more often and
more strongly than it does CDS premia. More than twice as many yield spreads react
to deviations from the cointegration relationship, and the average coefficient for the yield
23See Johansen (1977).
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spread is mostly higher than for the CDS premia. At the 1% level, the difference is even
more pronounced with three times as many yield spreads affected by CDS premia than vice
versa. This result suggests that price discovery first takes place in the CDS market and that
yield spreads adjust more slowly. This finding is in line with Blanco et al. (2005). For all
reference entities for which v1 and v2 are simultaneously significant, the sign of v1 is the
reverse of the sign of v2. Since we obtain a positive cointegration coefficient β, a negative
sign for v1 and a positive one for v2 or vice versa, both CDS premia and yield spreads revert
to the cointegration relationship. For those reference entities for which either v1 or v2 is not
significant, we observe positive values of v1 and negative ones of v2. These signs also imply
a reversion to the long-run relation, but due to the averaging this is more difficult to infer
from Table 3.8.
The results for the different rating classes suggest that the asymmetry regarding the CDS
premia and yield spreads is most pronounced for the AAA, the A, and the BB rating class.
We conclude that there is no clear link between the rating and the price discovery.
Regarding the differences between the industry sectors, we find that the non-financial
sector tends to have the highest proportion of significantly affected CDS premia and yield
spread changes. Across the rating classes, 15% of CDS premia changes are affected and
33% of the yield spread changes. The financial sector, on the other hand, exhibits significant
estimates for v1 for 7% of all reference entities and significant estimates for v2 for 22%. These
proportions show that the non-financial sector has a less pronounced asymmetry between
the number of significantly affected CDS premia and yield spread changes than the financial
sector, suggesting that both the bond and the CDS market react to deviations from the
long-run equilibrium relationship. Price discovery in the financial sector seems to take place
more frequently through the CDS than through the bond market. This finding agrees with
the evidence for US financial reference entities analyzed by Blanco et al. (2005).
The behavior of the sovereign sector stands in contrast to both corporate sectors. For this
sector, either the CDS premia or the yield spreads react to deviations from the cointegration
relation, but never both.24 This supports our notion that the CDS and the bond market
for sovereign reference entities are less strongly interconnected bilaterally. For highly rated
reference entities, the bond market leads the CDS market, and the reverse result holds for
lower-rated reference entities.
To summarize, Table 3.8 demonstrates that even if CDS premia and yield spreads are
cointegrated, the error correction term does not significantly affect CDS premia or yield
24Even for the AAA rating class at the 10% level, v1 and v2 never both significant for any reference entity.
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spread changes for a high number of reference entities. This finding is robust with regard
to the number of lags in equation (3.1). In addition, CDS premia seem to be affected by
deviations from the cointegration relation less frequently than yield spreads, suggesting that
information moves from the CDS market to the bond market more often than vice versa.
This asymmetry decreases with the rating of the reference entity and is more pronounced
for financial corporate reference entities. From these results, we draw the conclusion that we
cannot reject the hypothesis that CDS premia and yield spreads reflect similar information
but at a different speed.
We now turn to the core analysis of this chapter, the fixed-effects regression analysis of
the CDS premia and yield spreads in the next section.
3.4 Explaining CDS Premia, Bond Yield Spreads, and
the Basis
As the time series of CDS premia and yield spreads are frequently non-stationary, we cannot
use standard OLS estimates to determine the significance of the impact of the explanatory
variables. A standard way to cope with this problem is the use of first differences instead of
levels since these are stationary in our setting. This procedure, however, has the drawback
that the results become more difficult to interpret economically. Instead of using first
differences, we analyze the impact of the explanatory variables on the mid CDS premia,
the yield spreads, and the basis in a fixed-effects framework. This type of model is used to
explore the impact of a time-invariant, unobserved effect that is potentially correlated with
the explanatory variables, on the dependent variable.25 Since the fixed-effects formulation
allows us to pool the CDS mid premia and bond yield spread observations in levels across
all reference entities, the size coefficient estimates are economically more intuitive.
3.4.1 Firm-Specific Factors
In this section, we explore how firm- and instrument-specific measures of credit risk and
liquidity affect CDS premia, yield spreads, and the basis.
Explanatory Variables
Our results from Section 3.2 imply that while credit risk proxied by the rating is one of the
main determinants of the level of CDS premia and yield spreads, the high variability within
25See e.g. Wooldridge (2002), p. 252.
CDS Premia, Bond Yield Spreads, and the Basis - An Econometric Approach 47
a given rating class suggests that other factors also significantly affect them. Since it is likely
that the rating of a reference entity constitutes only an inert proxy for the true credit risk,
we use additional variables that may improve the explanation of the credit risk component
in the dependent variables. In particular, we use the equity return and the historical and
option-implied volatility as measures of credit risk.
It is natural to assume that the liquidity of the bond and the CDS market have an impact
on the yield spreads and the CDS premia. For the CDS, we have a direct proxy of the liquidity
in the bid-ask spread reported in Table 3.3. A priori, we expect the standard liquidity effect
described by Amihud and Mendelson (1986): the higher the bid-ask spread, the higher the
illiquidity and the CDS mid premium. Choosing an appropriate proxy for the bond is more
difficult as we do not have access to historical transaction data or quotes and thus no direct
liquidity measures. Instead, we follow Houweling et al. (2004) who identify the impact of a
number of liquidity measures on the yields of corporate bond portfolios. The authors find
that among potential liquidity proxies including issued amount, age, and number of quote
contributors, the bond yield volatility on a given date across the portfolio is one of the most
powerful explanatory variables for the portfolio’s liquidity. As Shulman et al. (1993) and
Hong and Warga (2000), their study shows that a higher yield volatility is associated with
lower liquidity and higher yields. We therefore expect a positive association between the
volatility across a reference entity’s bond yields on a given date and yield spreads.
Regarding the cross-market liquidity impact, we cannot predict the sign of the coefficient
estimates because the liquidity of the markets is linked both directly and indirectly. First,
CDS premia are directly affected by bond liquidity since a lower liquidity of a reference asset
will in general decrease its price. This increases the expected payment contingent upon
default from the protection seller and the CDS premia. Second, credit risk can be taken
on or sold of either directly by buying or selling the bond or indirectly by selling or buying
protection in the CDS market. Therefore, it is possible that positions are taken in either one
market or the other. Reversely, positions in the CDS and the bond market can be combined
to arrive at a given risk exposure, e.g. buying the bond and subsequently buying credit risk
protection yields a default risk-free position.
As the last explanatory variable, we include the value of the cheapest-to-deliver (CTD)
option. As we currently have no theory for this value, we have to find an appropriate proxy.
This proxy is somewhat difficult to define since there is no clear theoretical link between
the bond prices of a firm prior to default and their post-default dispersion. Therefore, we
make the following assumptions. First, the value of the CTD option is likely to be higher
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if a reference entity has more bonds outstanding. Second, the value of the CTD option is
likely to be higher if the range of the prices of outstanding bonds issued by the same entity
is larger. Given these assumptions, we use the product of the number of bonds outstanding
with the difference between the highest and the lowest bond price at a given date as our
proxy for the CTD option.
Model Specification
As shown in Table 3.6, for a single firm the time series of the CDS premia, the bond
yield spreads, and the basis are only stationary for few reference entities. Therefore, we
pool the time series data for our fixed effect analysis by concatenating the time series
of observations for all reference entities.26 In the industry-sector and rating-class-specific
analyses, we concatenate the time series for the relevant subsamples.
The explanatory variables are concatenated in the same way, and for each of the reference
entities, we include a different intercept term to capture the firm-specific fixed effects. The
resulting system of equations which we estimate is given by
CDSi,t = α0,i + α1ri,t + α2µi,t + α3σhisti,t + α4σ
OI
i,t + α5bai,t + α6yvi,t + α7ctdi,t + εi,t,
ysi,t = β0,i + β1ri,t + β2µi,t + β3σhisti,t + β4σ
OI
i,t + β5bai,t + β6yvi,t + β7ctdi,t + ηi,t,
bi,t = γ0,i + γ1ri,t + γ2µi,t + γ3σhisti,t + γ4σ
OI
i,t + γ5bai,t + γ6yvi,t + γ7ctdi,t + νi,t.
(3.2)
CDSi,t, ysi,t, and bi,t denote the CDS mid premium, the yield spread, and the basis for
reference entity i at time t where data is used at a daily, weekly, and monthly frequency.
The fixed effects α0,i, β0,i, and γ0,i are assumed to be time-invariant and can be correlated
with the exogenous variables. ri,t, µi,t, σ
hist
i,t , and σ
OI
i,t refer to the rating, equity return,
historical, and option-implied volatility. bai,t and yvi,t are the proxies for the CDS and the
bond liquidity. In order to avoid endogeneity issues, we use the liquidity proxies two business
days prior to t. ctdi,t is the proxy for the value of the CTD option defined above.
In order to check whether the coefficient estimates are robust against the inclusion of
the potentially correlated explanatory variables, we estimate Equation 3.2 both univariately
(using only one explanatory variable) and multivariately. We repeat the analysis for each
industry sector and all rating classes separately.
We determine the significance of the coefficient estimates using the Newey-West
26For a similar pooling approach, see Timmreck (2006), pp. 139–144.
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covariance estimate to adjust for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity.27 We also test
whether the time series of the residuals is stationary for each reference entity. Due to the
heteroscedasticity and the autocorrelation of the error terms, we use the Phillips-Perron test
instead of the augmented Dickey-Fuller test.28 For the CDS premia, the Phillips-Perron test
can reject the null hypothesis of a unit root (for the full model specification) at the 10%
significance level for 157 reference entities. The null hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 10%
level for 7 investment-grade financial, 5 investment-grade non-financial corporate, and two
subinvestment grade sovereign reference entities. For the bond yield spreads and the basis,
the Phillips-Perron test can reject the null hypothesis of a unit root in the regression residuals
(for the full model specification) at the 10% significance level for all but two investment grade
and one subinvestment grade sovereign reference entities.
The results of the estimation are given in Table 3.9.
For the CDS premia, the bond yield spread, and the basis, we first discuss the estimation
results for all reference entities, then the results by industry sector, and last the results by
rating class.
CDS Premia
As Panel A of Table 3.9 shows, all credit risk and liquidity measures except for the stock
return significantly affect mid CDS premia both in the univariate and in the multivariate
setting. For the full sample, the explanatory variables all increase CDS premia at the
1% significance level. The adjusted R2 is highest for the historical volatility with 12%
among the credit risk variables and for ba with 68% among the liquidity variables. The
bond-derived measures yv and ctd also affect CDS premia, but the lower adjusted R2 of 9%
and 1% suggests that the variation in CDS premia is less dependent on variations in these
measures. µ is only significantly different from 0 in the full model specification and increases
the CDS mid premium. The multivariate estimation which uses all explanatory variables
simultaneously shows that there is some overlap between the explanatory variables in the
univariate estimation since the value of all coefficients - except for ba - strongly decreases.
The overall adjusted R2 of 72% is high, but compared to the R2 of the bid-ask spread the
additional explanatory variables have a limited effect.
27See Campbell et al. (1997), pp. 234-235.
28See Enders (1995), pp. 239-240.
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Table 3.9: Impact of Firm-Specific Risk Factors
The table shows the coefficients, significance level, and adjusted R2 for the fixed effects model.
The model is estimated for each variable univariately (“Single”) and for the full multivariate
specification (“Full”). r denotes the rating, µ the stock return, σhist the historical volatility, σOI
the option-implied volatility, ba the CDS liquidity, yv the bond liquidity, and ctd value of the CTD
option. Significance is determined using Newey-West heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust
standard errors. ***, **, and * denote the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level. Coefficients are
determined for mid CDS premia, bond yield spreads, and the basis in basis points, the adjusted
R2 are given in brackets.
Panel A: Analysis by Industry Group
Financial Non-Financial Sovereign All
Single Full Single Full Single Full Single Full
Mid CDS Premia
r 1.62*** 1.57*** 5.52*** 4.57*** 26.49*** 22.34*** 5.25*** 4.40***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.35) (0.03)
µ 2.65 4.61* 10.81 13.59** - - 8.88 11.55**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
σOI 0.12** 0.05 2.40*** 0.65*** - - 2.00*** 0.55***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
σhist 0.47*** 0.09*** 2.09*** 0.68*** - - 1.66*** 0.51***
(0.18) (0.15) (0.12)
ba 4.52*** 4.33*** 4.76*** 4.31*** 6.02*** 4.74*** 4.76*** 4.45***
(0.66) (0.69) (0.27) (0.68)
yv -1.62*** -1.45*** 64.23*** 15.15*** 12.63*** 8.00*** 38.64*** 8.40***
(0.00) (0.15) (0.01) (0.09)
ctd 0.11*** 0.01 2.05*** 0.23*** -0.26** 0.44*** 1.27*** 0.14***
(0.00) (0.69) (0.01) (0.74) (0.00) (0.51) (0.01) (0.72)
Bond Yield Spreads
r -0.86*** -0.03 5.53*** 4.34*** 31.92*** 28.64*** 5.02*** 4.14***
(0.00) (0.02) (0.36) (0.01)
µ 38.36 48.16 28.13 29.69* - - 30.55** 33.01**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
σOI 3.52*** 2.94*** 6.27*** 3.24*** - - 5.78*** 3.37***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
σhist -0.12*** -0.19*** 1.11*** 0.10*** - - 0.79*** -0.01
(0.00) (0.02) (0.01)
ba 1.13*** 1.97*** 3.58*** 3.36*** 5.43*** 3.75*** 3.55*** 3.36***
(0.00) (0.19) (0.15) (0.14)
yv 25.62*** 26.26*** 52.29*** 19.72*** 6.98*** 0.10 39.63*** 19.95***
(0.02) (0.05) (0.00) (0.03)
ctd 0.03 -0.59*** -0.69*** -2.02*** -0.77*** -0.19* -0.48*** -1.41***
(0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.22) (0.00) (0.43) (0.00) (0.17)
Basis
r 2.49*** 1.62*** 0.01 0.27** -5.46*** -6.38*** 0.25** 0.30***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00)
µ -35.78 -43.54 -16.93 -16.05 - - -21.39 -21.39
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
σOI -3.40*** -2.89*** -3.89*** -2.61*** - - -3.81*** -2.84***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
σhist 0.58*** 0.28*** 0.98*** 0.59*** - - 0.87*** 0.52***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
ba 3.39*** 2.36*** 1.20*** 0.97*** 0.61*** 1.01*** 1.23*** 1.11***
(0.01) (0.03) (0.00) (0.02)
yv -27.17*** -27.69*** 12.05*** -4.43*** 5.68*** 7.84*** -0.95** -11.47***
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ctd 0.09 0.60*** 2.75*** 2.25*** 0.51*** 0.62*** 1.75*** 1.55***
(0.00) (0.03) (0.01) (0.05) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.04)
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Industry Sectors Comparing the results for the different industry sectors in Panel A,
we observe that the non-financial corporate sector exhibits the highest adjusted R2 of 74%
for the full model. The explanatory power is lowest for the sovereign sector, but since the
stock-market dependent measures cannot be included, this may be an immaterial effect.
The financial sector is less strongly affected by the option-implied than by the historical
volatility. In the non-financial corporate sector, the reverse holds for the univariate setting
and the same in the multivariate model. Overall, the explanatory power of all credit-risk
related measures is similar for both private sectors.
An interesting difference of the financial to the non-financial sector concerns the impact
of bond liquidity and the delivery option: yv negatively affects the CDS premium in the
univariate and the multivariate specification for the financial sector. This indicates that
CDS are not predominantly used as default insurance but that buying or selling credit
risk through a CDS is a substitute for selling or buying credit risk through the bond. ctd
significantly increases CDS in the univariate specification but becomes insignificant in the
full model. Non-financial corporate reference entities, on the other hand, are affected more
strongly and positively by yv and ctd.
As expected from our earlier analysis, the sovereign sector shows a different behavior to
the corporate sectors. Even in the univariate specification, the high coefficient estimate for
the rating and the adjusted R2 of 35% suggests that credit risk is sufficiently captured in
the rating. ba has the lowest adjusted R2 for the sovereign sector, and yv also affects the
CDS premia less strongly than for the non-financial corporate sector. The coefficient of ctd
is negative in the univariate model but positive and larger than for the other sectors in the
multivariate setting.29 This is sensible when taking into account the high variability of bond
prices for defaulted sovereign issuers.
Rating Classes Regarding the results for the different rating classes given in Panel B of
Table 3.9, we see that the adjusted R2 for the multivariate model increases monotonously
up to the B rating class for which a value of 79% is attained. For the CCC rating class,
the value is lower at 64%. For the AAA rating class, CDS premia are mostly unaffected
by the stock and option-implied credit risk measures in the univariate specification. Only
the rating, the bond- and CDS-specific liquidity, and the delivery option have a significant
impact.
The remaining investment grade classes exhibit a mostly increasing sensitivity to the
29We further discuss the negative coefficient of ctd below.
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explanatory variables in the univariate setting and an increasing adjusted R2 both in the
univariate and the multivariate setting. This increase suggests that the variation in the CDS
premia can be explained better through credit risk and liquidity, the higher the credit risk is.
In particular for the BBB rating class, the CDS premia are highly sensitive to yv as shown
by the high coefficient estimates in the single and the full model and by the adjusted R2 of
8%.
The impact of the stock and option-implied credit risk measures is also more pronounced
for the subinvestment grade segment in the univariate model, only the rating has no impact
on CDS premia. An interesting finding is the negative sign of the coefficients for yv in the
BB and the CCC rating class. This again implies that CDS are not primarily used as default
insurance, but as a substitute to a direct investment in the bond and that this effect is most
pronounced for the subinvestment grade segment.
Bond Yield Spreads
In the following, we focus on the differences to the results we obtained for CDS premia. As
Panel A of Table 3.9 shows, the yield spreads show a similar dependence on the explanatory
variables as the CDS premia, but the adjusted R2 are much lower. The lower coefficient
estimates for the historical volatility for the entire sample imply that the option-implied
volatility is a more appropriate measure for credit risk in the bond market than in the CDS
market. This result contrasts with the finding of Cremers et al. (2004). As expected, we
obtain a higher coefficient estimate for yv than we did for the CDS premia, but surprisingly,
the adjusted R2 is lower. The delivery option has a negative coefficient estimate. We
attribute this to the fact that our proxy is positively related to bond liquidity as we multiply
the price range by the number of available bonds to obtain the proxy. Houweling et al. (2004)
show that an increasing number of available bonds is positively associated with liquidity.
Therefore, ctd also proxies for higher liquidity and decreases yield spreads. Interestingly,
this secondary effect of the delivery option is insignificant for financial reference entities.
Industry Sectors For yield spreads, the differences between the different industry sectors
displayed in Panel A of Table 3.9 are more pronounced than for CDS premia, in particular
with regard to the explanatory power. Yield spreads for financial reference entities are not
affected strongly by the explanatory variables as measured by the adjusted R2 even though
all variables except for µ and ctd are significant. The coefficient for the historical volatility
is negative both in the univariate and the multivariate model. The highest sensitivity of the
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yield spreads is with regard to yv which is shown by the high coefficient estimate and the
largest R2 in the univariate specification. The non-financial corporate sector is more sensitive
to the explanatory variables, in particular ba has a high explanatory power in the univariate
setting. This agrees with our earlier finding that spill-over effects between the CDS and the
bond market are stronger for non-financial reference entities. In the multivariate model, we
obtain an adjusted R2 which is still much lower than that for the mid CDS premia but 11
times larger than for the financial sector. In contrast to the corporate sectors, the sovereign
sector has the highest adjusted R2 of 43% in the multivariate model specification which only
slightly falls below that for the CDS market. This is due to the effect of the rating on the
yield spreads which is sufficiently high to account almost entirely for the adjusted R2 in the
multivariate model.
Rating Classes For the coefficient estimates across the different rating classes depicted in
Panel B of Table 3.9, our results resemble those for the CDS premia, but the adjusted R2 are
again much lower. The explanatory power remains higher for the subinvestment grade rating
class. For the AAA rating class, only yv and, in the multivariate setting, ctd significantly
affect yield spreads.
For the remaining investment grade rating classes, the coefficients are roughly of the same
magnitude. As for the CDS market, we observe that the BBB rating class is most sensitive
to the liquidity of the other market both in the univariate and the multivariate model which
is shown by the higher coefficient estimate and the higher adjusted R2.
The subinvestment grade rating classes again tend to be affected more strongly by the
explanatory variables. The liquidity-driven link between the two markets is also stronger
in the subinvestment grade segment, as is the impact of yv. For the CCC rating class,
we observe the same negative dependence on the other market’s liquidity which points at
liquidity moving in opposite directions in the bond and the CDS market.30
Basis
The coefficient estimates for the basis in Panel A and B of Table 3.9 can be directly inferred
from the results for the CDS premia and yield spreads. We therefore only discuss which
effect prevails in the basis and the significance and explanatory power which these effects
have.31
30The analysis of the yield spreads computed from swap rates yields similar results.
31Recall from Table 3.5 that the basis is mostly negative. Therefore, a basis increase means decreasing
differences between the CDS premia and yield spreads.
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For the full sample, credit risk affects the basis in two ways. Both the rating and the
historical volatility tend to increase the basis, but the option-implied volatility decreases it.
From our analysis of CDS premia and yield spreads, we can explain this finding by CDS
premia being affected more strongly by the rating and the historical volatility while yield
spreads are associated more closely with the option-implied volatility. The CDS bid-ask
spread and the CTD option increase the basis, showing that the impact on CDS premia is
higher than on yield spreads. The negative coefficient for the bond liquidity shows that its
effect on yield spreads is stronger than on CDS premia.
Industry Sectors Regarding the differences between the industry sectors, Panel A of
Table 3.9 shows that a deterioration in the rating leads to a decrease in the basis for sovereign
reference entities while it increases the basis for financial and non-financial corporate
reference entities. The remaining credit risk measures all have a similar effect as for the
full sample, and so do ba and ctd. The explanatory power is rather low, the adjusted R2
lies between 3% and 5% in the multivariate model specifications. This suggests that the
differences between CDS premia and yield spreads are not entirely due to the reference
entity’s credit risk and the instrument-specific liquidity.
Rating Classes For the different rating classes, Panel B of Table 3.9 shows that the
basis for the AAA rating class is, as the yield spreads, exclusively affected by yv and,
in the multivariate model, ctd. Interestingly, the coefficient of ctd is negative. Since
the negative coefficient for yv decreases in the multivariate model, we believe that the
joint significance is only significant statistically and not economically meaningful. For the
remaining investment grade rating classes, the impact of the option-implied volatility is
negative whenever significant as for the entire sample. The historical volatilities have a
positive impact which increases from the A to the CCC rating class. ba has a consistently
positive impact and tends to be higher for the investment grade rating class, and yv and ctd
exhibit the reverse behavior. In the univariate setting, the coefficients have a hump-shaped
curve across the rating classes with the maximum attained in the BBB rating class. These
findings lend support to our earlier notion that the impact of the bond liquidity on the
CDS premia - and therefore on the basis - may be twofold and that it is not clear ex ante
which effect dominates. The adjusted R2 increases monotonously as the rating decreases,
suggesting that CDS premia and yield spreads deviate because they reflect credit risk and
liquidity differently in the subinvestment grade segment.
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To summarize the results of the firm-specific fixed effects analysis, we find that CDS
premia are affected by the credit risk and liquidity-related explanatory variables. The factors
have a high explanatory power, most of all the bid-ask spread which seems to measure not
only CDS-specific liquidity but also credit risk. Financial reference entities are affected less
by the credit risk measures, the bond liquidity has a negative impact, and that of the CTD
option is very limited. This suggests that the credit risk of a financial reference entity is
reflected in CDS premia differently than in the rating, the stock market, and the options
market. The rating has the highest impact in the sovereign sector, and the CTD option is
also most important for this sector. The latter result agrees with evidence that the price
range for sovereign defaulted debt tends to be wide. Across the different rating classes,
we observe an increasing impact of credit risk and liquidity, in particular when comparing
the investment grade to the subinvestment grade segment. Bond liquidity has the highest
impact for the BBB rating class, suggesting that close to the subinvestment grade barrier,
the connection between the two markets’ liquidity is strongest. The negative coefficients
for the bond liquidity in the BB and CCC rating class also suggests that positions as CDS
protection seller are used for taking on credit risk.
Bond yield spreads exhibit a much lower adjusted R2. Even though the same factors
have an impact on the bond market, the spread variation is not largely due to these factors
as in the CDS market. Overall, the bond market is more closely linked to the options market
than the CDS market. The sign of the coefficient for ctd becomes negative as a higher value
of the explanatory variable is associated with a higher bond liquidity. The lower adjusted
R2 in the multivariate model for financial reference entities implies that the same weaker
relation between a reference entity’s specific credit risk and liquidity and the premia holds in
the bond market as in the CDS market. The sovereign bond market shows most similarity
to the CDS market, and we trace this back to the impact of the rating by which both CDS
premia and yield spreads are strongly affected. Across the different rating classes, we observe
a much lower adjusted R2 than for CDS premia, but the dependence structure is similar.
The subinvestment grade rating classes are affected more strongly by credit risk and liquidity
as shown by the higher coefficient values and higher adjusted R2, and the BBB rating class
exhibits the highest sensitivity to the CDS market’s liquidity.
For the basis, we find that credit risk can have two effects. If we measure credit risk by
the rating or the historical volatility, the basis increases with credit risk. If, on the other
hand, credit risk is measured by the option-implied volatility, the basis decreases for higher
credit risk. The impact of the liquidity measures across the different rating classes differs.
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The bond liquidity and the CTD option coefficients have a hump-shaped curve, the one for
the CDS liquidity is slightly U-shaped. In both cases, the extremal points lie in the BBB
rating class. From this, we conclude that the change from investment to subinvestment grade
also changes the impact of liquidity in the sense that CDS liquidity becomes more important
while the bond liquidity and the CTD option have a smaller effect. The adjusted R2 remains
largest for the subinvestment grade segment. Even though the differences between the CDS
and the bond market increase with regard to the level, they are also more closely associated
with credit risk and liquidity. Therefore, the higher the credit risk - as measured by a lower
rating - the larger is the pricing impact of the identical risk factors.
For brevity, we do not show the results at the weekly or the monthly data frequency.
The major differences are that CDS premia, yield spreads, and the basis are less strongly
affected by the equity and the equity options market and that the link between the CDS
and the bond market does, in fact, become stronger as the results of Section 3.3 suggested.
3.4.2 Market-Wide Factors
In an extension of the firm-specific analysis, we now explore the dependency of the CDS
premia, bond yield spreads, and the basis on the market-wide measures of credit risk and
liquidity described in Section 3.1.5. Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) find that a number of
firm-specific variables that should in theory affect credit spread changes for individual bonds
have very little explanatory power, and that the remaining variation is explained to a large
extent by a single common but unknown factor. This evidence is also supported by Pedrosa
and Roll (1998) who show that credit spreads of various bond indices are influenced by
common underlying factors. We therefore analyze whether the explanatory power of these
market-wide measures is similar to the explanatory power of the firm-specific measures of
credit risk and liquidity and whether the sensitivity to the market-wide variables depends
on the industry sector and the rating class.
Explanatory Variables
As interest rate variables, we include the level and the slope of the EURIBOR curve. We
use EURIBOR as a timely and highly liquid benchmark interest rate in the Euro money
market. The level is chosen as the longest available EURIBOR maturity which equals 12
months, the slope as the difference between the 12-month and 1-month level. Other studies
such as Duffee (1998) or Bedendo et al. (2007) use longer maturities of up to 30 years in their
empirical analysis of the determinants of bond yield spreads. However, their bond sample
58
also consists of bonds with a much longer maturity than 5 years. We therefore believe that
our choice of a shorter maturity is sensible. As discussed in Section 3.1.5, it is not clear ex
ante in which direction the interest rate variables affect the CDS premia, bond yield spreads,
and the basis.
As corporate bond indices, we use the JPMorgan Aggregate Index Europe and the rating-
class specific S&P Global Bond Index which are described in more detail in Appendix 3.5.
For these indices, we determine the yield spread over the 5-year swap rate. Assuming a
constant price of credit risk, a higher index yield spread measures a higher market-wide
credit risk which will in general translate into higher individual CDS premia and bond yield
spreads. However, taking into account the flight-to-quality effect, we also surmise that yield
spreads for highly rated debt may decrease if the index yield spreads increase.
As the last explanatory variable, we use the ECB Financial Market Liquidity Indicator
which is also described in Appendix 3.5. A higher value of the indicator implies a higher
overall market liquidity. As for the index yield spreads, we assume that a lower degree of
liquidity translates into higher yield spreads, i.e. that the relation between the index and
the CDS premia and bond yield spreads is negative. For very highly rated reference entities,
on the other hand, the coefficient estimate may also be positive.
Model Specification
The system of equations which we estimate is given by
CDSi,t = α0,i + α1leurt + α2s
eur
t + α3MAGGIEt + α4SPWCi,t + α5FMLt + εi,t,
ysi,t = β0,i + β1leurt + β2s
eur
t + β3MAGGIEt + β4SPWCi,t + β5FMLt + ηi,t,
bi,t = γ0,i + γ1leurt + γ2s
eur
t + γ3MAGGIEt + γ4SPWCi,t + γ5FMLt + νi,t.
(3.3)
CDSi,t, ysi,t, bi,t, α0,i, β0,i, and γ0,i are defined as in Equation 3.2. l
eur and seur denote the
EURIBOR level and slope. MAGGIE gives the JPMorgan Aggregate Index Europe yield
spread, SPWC the rating-class specific S&P Global Bond Index yield spread, and FML the
ECB Financial Market Liquidity Indicator.
The significance of the coefficient estimates is determined using the Newey-West
covariance estimate to adjust for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. Stationarity of
the residuals is determined via the Phillips-Perron test. For the CDS premia, we can
reject the null hypothesis of a unit root (for the full model specification) at the 10%
significance level for 148 reference entities. The null hypothesis cannot be rejected at the
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10% level for 5 investment-grade financial, 16 investment-grade non-financial corporate, and
two subinvestment grade sovereign reference entities. For the bond yield spreads and the
basis, we cannot reject a unit root (for the full model specification) at the 10% significance
level for the same three sovereign reference entities as in the firm-specific analysis.
The results of the estimation are given in Table 3.10.
As in the previous section, for each dependent variable we discuss the estimation results first
for all reference entities, then the results by industry sector, and last the results by rating
class.
CDS Premia
As Panel A of Table 3.10 shows, for the entire sample the market-wide explanatory variables
have a high impact on CDS premia and yield spreads both in the univariate and the
multivariate model as measured by the significance of the coefficients and the adjusted R2.
leur and seur have a negative impact in the univariate model as also found in Aunon-Nerin
et al. (2002) and Benkert (2004).
Higher overall credit risk, reflected by a higher value of MAGGIE, also increases CDS
premia both univariately and multivariately. The rating-specific default risk which we proxy
by SPWC increases CDS premia, and a higher financial market liquidity which is proxied by
higher values of FML decreases CDS premia. This finding suggests that mid CDS premia
are affected by aggregate market liquidity.
The explanatory power of MAGGIE, SPWC, and the liquidity indicator are rather high.
With an adjusted R2 of 9% and 10% each in the univariate model specification, these market-
wide variables have a similar impact on CDS premia as the firm-specific historical volatility
in Table 3.9.
Industry Sectors Across the different industry sectors, we observe from Panel A of
Table 3.10 that most explanatory variables have a higher explanatory power for CDS on
reference entities from the financial sector. MAGGIE and the liquidity indicator affect CDS
more strongly than any of the firm-specific variables except the bid-ask spread in Table 3.9.
This result agrees with Ericsson et al. (2008) who document that the 10-year treasury yield
has a higher explanatory power for CDS bid and ask quotes on US reference entities than
the firm-specific stock return volatility.
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Table 3.10: Impact of Market-Wide Risk Factors
The table shows the coefficients, significance level, and adjusted R2 for the fixed effects model. leur
and seur denote the EURIBOR level and slope, MAGGIE the JPMorgan Aggregate Index Europe
yield spread, SPWC the rating-class specific S&P Global Bond Index Yield spread, and FML
the ECB Financial Market Liquidity Indicator. The model is estimated univariately (“Single”)
and for the full multivariate specification (“Full”). Significance is determined using Newey-West
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors. ***, **, and * denote the 1%, 5%,
and 10% significance level. Coefficients are determined for mid CDS premia, bond yield spreads,
and the basis in basis points, the adjusted R2 are given in brackets.
Panel A: Analysis by Industry Group
Financial Non-Financial Sovereign All
Single Full Single Full Single Full Single Full
Mid CDS Premia
leur -4.35*** 75.89*** -3.73*** 236.60*** -1.75** 73.44** -3.81*** 194.30***
(0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
seur -30.21*** -5.98*** -74.50*** -20.21*** -30.90*** -42.50*** -61.35*** -18.25***
(0.22) (0.06) (0.02) (0.05)
MAGGIE 1.44*** 1.46*** 3.90*** 3.40*** 1.34*** -1.99*** 3.17*** 2.85***
(0.33) (0.10) (0.02) (0.09)
SPWC 15.19*** 13.22*** 40.65*** 33.88*** 13.72*** 12.98*** 32.67*** 26.94***
(0.05) (0.12) (0.07) (0.10)
FML -27.47*** -5.63*** -72.83*** 13.48*** -38.68*** -39.72*** -60.40*** 5.38***
(0.30) (0.40) (0.09) (0.20) (0.05) (0.13) (0.09) (0.17)
Bond Yield Spreads
leur 16.58*** 405.08*** -0.37*** 47.42** 8.48*** 63.77 4.88*** 143.35***
(0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
seur 48.94*** 42.30*** -29.88*** -9.24*** -21.83*** -53.60*** -9.47*** 2.57
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
MAGGIE -1.32*** -1.54*** 1.78*** 1.56*** 0.27** -1.23** 0.94*** 0.59***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
SPWC 21.22*** 18.80*** 23.84*** 22.70*** 9.15*** 10.21*** 19.65*** 18.81***
(0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
FML 8.74*** -44.06*** -32.14*** 10.03*** -26.54*** -40.68*** -22.01*** -9.86***
(0.00) (0.04) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.12) (0.00) (0.02)
Basis
leur -20.93*** -329.19*** -3.33*** 189.14*** -10.23*** 10.62 -8.67*** 50.97***
(0.02) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00)
seur -79.11*** -48.29*** -44.43*** -10.92*** -8.95*** 11.11** -51.72*** -20.78***
(0.03) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02)
MAGGIE 2.76*** 3.00*** 2.12*** 1.84*** 1.07*** -0.76* 2.23*** 2.26***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
SPWC -6.27*** -5.60** 16.75*** 11.09*** 4.48*** 2.61*** 12.91*** 8.03***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
FML -36.20*** 38.41*** -40.81*** 3.36 -12.14*** 0.98 -38.46*** 15.16***
(0.01) (0.06) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.08) (0.02) (0.03)
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For the non-financial corporate sector, the estimation yields higher coefficient estimates
in the univariate setting. However, the explanatory power of all variables but SPWC is lower
than for financial reference entities. Nevertheless, SPWC has a similar adjusted R2 as the
historical volatility in Panel A of Table 3.9. This suggests that firm-specific risk is more
important for non-financial corporate reference entities than for financial ones.
The sovereign sector also reacts sensitively to market conditions, but the explanatory
power of the interest rates and MAGGIE is poor. Only SPWC and the liquidity indicator
have an adjusted R2 of 7% and 5%, but compared to the impact of the rating, the effect
remains limited. A similar result is documented by Aunon-Nerin et al. (2002) who find that
up to 67% of the sovereign CDS variation can be explained through the rating alone.
In summary, we find that the CDS premia for the financial sector are closely connected
to overall market conditions and that the non-financial corporate and sovereign sector seem
to be predominantly affected by the reference entity’s specific risk.
Rating Classes Regarding the different rating classes, Panel B of Table 3.10 shows that
in contrast to the entire sample, CDS premia for the AAA class react negatively to changes
in MAGGIE and SPWC in the univariate setting. For the AA rating class, the impact of
SPWC is also negative. This finding agrees with the flight-to-quality effect. Interestingly,
the joint explanatory power of the market-wide explanatory variables is more than twice as
large as the firm-specific variables’ in the multivariate model. Clearly, CDS on AAA rated
reference entities are not only driven by the entity’s idiosyncratic risk but rather depend on
the financial markets’ overall condition.
The remaining rating classes exhibit a similar sensitivity to the interest rate variables as
the entire sample. In the investment grade segment below AAA, the coefficient estimates for
leur and seur and the liquidity indicator become more pronouncedly negative in the univariate
model. Simultaneously, their explanatory power as well as the adjusted R2 of the multivariate
model decrease as the rating deteriorates. The index spread coefficient estimates increase,
and while the explanatory power of MAGGIE decreases to an adjusted R2 of 17%, SPWC
becomes more important with an increase to 12% for the BBB rating class.
The subinvestment grade segment is also highly sensitive to leur and seur. In particular
for the CCC rating class, seur has an adjusted R2 of 45% in the univariate setting. The
rating-specific yield spread also has a larger explanatory power than for the investment
grade segment, but the impact of the liquidity indicator decreases from an adjusted R2 of
31% to 15% and 16%.
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Bond Yield Spreads
Panel A of Table 3.10 shows that even though the coefficient estimates for the yield spreads
are significant for all market-wide measures, they have almost no explanatory power. The
effect (which pertains at the weekly frequency) contrasts with the result of Collin-Dufresne
et al. (2001). For the entire sample, the slope of the interest rate curve has the expected
negative impact, but the yield spreads exhibit a positive dependence on the level with a
coefficient estimate of 4.88.
Industry Sectors The lack of the yield spreads’ sensitivity to the market-wide measures is
illustrated further if we compare the different industry sectors in Panel A of Table 3.10. The
coefficient estimates for leur and seur become unexpectedly positive for financial reference
entities in the univariate setting. In addition, leur also has a positive association with
sovereign yield spreads.
Since financial reference entities are more likely to refinance themselves at an interest
rate close to EURIBOR, we believe that the coefficient estimates indicate their sensitivity
towards refinancing costs. In particular banks, who traditionally invest in longer-term risky
assets and accept low-risk and short-term deposits, tend to hold fixed-interest rate assets
and liabilities with diverging maturities. As Czaja et al. (2006) argue, this effect pertains to
most financial institutions and makes them more sensitive to interest rate risk. Therefore,
increasing interest rates decrease the value of the fixed-income assets to a larger extent than
the short-term liabilities, leading to a higher credit risk and higher yield spreads.
Yield spreads in the financial sector are also positively associated with the liquidity
indicator and negatively with MAGGIE, i.e. they increase when liquidity or credit risk
decrease. This result illustrates that the flight-to-quality and the flight-to-liquidity effect are
most pronounced in the financial sector. This agrees with the on average higher rating for
financial reference entities. The small explanatory power prevails for all industry sectors,
only the sovereign sector has an adjusted R2 of 12% for the multivariate model.
Rating Classes Comparing the impact of the market-wide measures for the different
rating classes in Panel B of Table 3.10, the explanatory power of the multivariate model is
surprisingly large for the AAA and the subinvestment grade rating classes. The liquidity
measure in particular has an adjusted R2 of approximately 30% for the BB and the CCC
rating class, and the AAA rating class is more adequately described than through the firm-
specific variables in Table 3.9. The coefficient estimates for leur and seur become positive for
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the AA rating class which agrees with the large proportion of financial reference entities in
this class.
Basis
As a consequence of the low explanatory power for yield spreads, the market-wide risk
measures cannot explain the basis very well either even though almost all coefficients are
significant at the 1% level. Panel A of Table 3.10 shows that the basis depends negatively
on leur and seur and the liquidity measure for the full sample in the univariate model. Since
the signs agree with those we obtained for CDS premia, CDS premia react more sensitively
to the market-wide measures than yield spreads. As the basis is mostly negative, we find
that higher interest rates, a higher slope, and higher market-wide liquidity widen the basis.
Industry Sectors Regarding the results for the different industry sectors, we find that the
basis in the financial sector exhibits a negative dependence on MAGGIE while the coefficient
for the non-financial corporate and the sovereign sector is positive.
Rating Classes For the different rating classes in Panel B of Table 3.10, we again observe
that the coefficient signs agree with those for the CDS premia in the univariate model. Only
the AAA rating class exhibits a consistently reverse behavior, all coefficients have the reverse
sign which suggests that in this case the impact of the explanatory variables on the bond
market is higher.
To summarize, the market-wide fixed-effects analysis yields the following results. First,
premia for CDS written on financial and sovereign reference entities are closely associated
with market-wide explanatory variable while those for non-financial corporate reference
entities are more adequately described by firm-specific variables. Second, yield spreads
are significantly affected by the market-wide variables but the explanatory power is low.
Sovereign reference entities fare best with an adjusted R2 of 12% for government rates.
Third, yield spreads for financial corporate reference entities have a positive dependence on
the level and slope of the interest rate curve which we attribute to the impact of refinancing
costs. Fourth, CDS premia tend to be more closely connected to market-wide measures than
yield spreads, only for AAA-rated and financial reference entities the yield spreads depend
more strongly on the market-wide measures. Last, the explanatory power of the market-wide
variables in the multivariate model specification exceed those of the issuer-specific ones for
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the AAA and the AA rating classes for CDS premia, yield spreads, and the basis.
In the next chapter, we develop a reduced-form model that allows us to disentangle the
credit risk and liquidity components of the CDS premia and bond yield spreads. This will
allow us to explore in more detail how credit risk and liquidity interact in the two markets,
and how the liquidity of one market affects that of the other.
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3.5 Appendix to Chapter 3 - Data Collection
Default-Free Interest Rates
In Chapter 3, we focus on bond yield spreads in excess of the Nelson-Siegel-Svensson curve
computed from the Bundesbank parameter estimates for German government bonds. To
demonstrate that the differences between the two proxies for the default-free interest rate
were limited during our observation interval, we show the time series of the spot interest
rates for the government rate and the Euro interest rate swap rate. The maturity is constant
at 1 year and 5 years.
Figure 3.1: German Government Bond Interest Rates and Euro Swap Rates
The figure shows the time series of German government bond interest rates and
the Euro swap rate in percentage points from June 2001 to June 2007. The
German government bond interest rate is determined from the Bundesbank parameter
estimates for the Nelson-Siegel-Svensson curve (NSS), the Euro swap rates are
collected from Bloomberg. The maturity is constant at 1 year and at 5 years.
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CDS Premia
We exclusively focus on data from the Euro area since the sample of Euro-denominated CDS
contracts is much larger than that of US-Dollar denominated contracts in the early phase of
our research interval: Between June 1, 2001 and September 30, 2001, we observe CDS ask
and bid quotes on 119 Euro-denominated contracts in contrast to 16 US-Dollar denominated
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contracts. We exclude CDS contracts denominated in US-Dollar and Japanese Yen in order
to obtain a sample that is homogenous with regard to the delivery option for restructured
debt. Since the literature agrees that CDS with 5 years to maturity are the most liquid
segment of the CDS market, see e.g. Meng and ap Gwilym (2006) and Gu¨ndu¨z et al. (2007),
we exclude all CDS with 1, 3, 7, and 10 years until maturity. In total, we obtain a set of
458 reference entities on which CDS contracts fulfilling the above criteria exist.
To determine whether a given CDS contract has a constant time-to-maturity of 5 years or
whether it follows the standard time conventions of fixed maturity days which have prevailed
in the market since late 2002, we visually explore every CDS time series. If the observed
time series exhibits a jump when the reference maturity date changes, we compute the size
of the jump. If the jump is at least as large as 25% of the quarterly payment associated
with the minimum annualized quoted CDS premium in a window of 5 days before and 5
days after the jump, we mark the CDS quotes as “standard maturity” starting from the first
jump. Otherwise, the quotes are marked as “constant maturity”.
Bond Yield Spreads
We perform the following interpolation scheme to compute the bond yield spreads over
the default-free interest rates. In the first step, we compute the time-t yield spread
yst (c, F, t1, . . . , tn) of each bond with coupon c, payment dates t1, . . . , tn, and maturity tn.
In detail, yst (c, F, t1, . . . , tn) is defined as
yst (c, F, t1, . . . , tn) = argmin
(
c ·
tn∑
ti=t1
[
ti − ti−1
(1 + yrf (ti) + ys)
ti−t0 −
ti − ti−1
(1 + ytm)ti−t0
]
+
F ·
[
1
(1 + yrf (tn) + ys)
tn−t0 −
1
(1 + ytm)tn−t0
])2
,
where t0 := t, yrf (ti) denotes the yield-to-maturity of a default-free zero coupon bond with
time-to-maturity ti − t0, and ytm denotes the observed yield-to-maturity of the given bond
with time-to-maturity tn − t0.
In the second step, we perform a linear regression of the yield spreads for a given reference
entity on the time-to-maturity of the bond for each of the observation dates. The resulting
daily estimates of the intercept and the slope are used to compute the theoretical yield
spread of a synthetical bond with the same maturity date as the CDS contract written on
the reference entity of 5 to 51
4
years. This interpolation procedure yields a more stable
time series of yield spreads than first interpolating the bond yields and then subtracting
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the yield-to-maturity of a default-free bond. The total number of 137,816 synthetical yield
spreads equals that of the CDS quotes.
A potential problem which we incur through interpolating yield spreads concerns the
dependence on explanatory variables. Basically, the linear interpolation suggests that we
subtract the short-term from the long-term yield spread. If both depend positively on
an explanatory variable but the sensitivity of the short-term yield spread is higher, the
interpolated yield will have a negative dependence. Duffee (1998) shows that corporate bond
yield changes for bonds with short maturities tend to have a more pronounced negative
dependence on the 4-month T-bill yield than bonds with medium maturities, suggesting
that while the impact on each yield spread is negative, the impact on an interpolated
yield spread may be positive. This effect is an alternative, technical explanation for the
positive dependence of the bond yield spreads on the interest rate level and slope for financial
reference entities in Table 3.10
Rating
For each of the reference entities, we collect a complete rating history from Bloomberg
between June 1, 2001 and June 30, 2007. We determine both the S&P rating and the
Moody’s rating for senior unsecured debt of each reference entity on June 1, 2001. If neither
of these are available, we use the S&P and Moody’s long-term issuer debt rating instead.
If these are also unavailable, we choose the respective issuer rating. In the second step, we
collect every published rating change, including changes of the quantifiers (+ and - for S&P,
1, 2, and 3 for Moody’s) and the rating outlook (*+, *, and *-, both for S&P and Moody’s)
until June 30, 2007. In the third step, we map the ratings onto a numerical scale ranging
from 1 to 67 where 1 corresponds to the AAA*+ S&P rating (Aaa*+ Moody’s rating, both
the highest rating grade with a positive outlook). The highest value, 66, corresponds to
a D*- S&P rating (for Moody’s, C*- is the lowest rating) which marks defaulted reference
entities with a negative outlook. 67 is used to denote a withdrawn rating. If the resulting
numerical rating differs by 2 or more on a given day, we assign the average numerical rating
to the reference entity, rounding up to the next integer when the average is not in the rating
scale. If the rating differs by 1, we choose the more conservative S&P rating and ignore the
Moody’s rating. This procedure gives us a numerical rating value for each of the reference
entities on each of the dates where both a CDS quote and at least two bond yields were
observed. The highest resulting numerical rating equals 2, corresponding to a AAA S&P
rating, while the lowest rating in the sample is 50 and marks a CCC+ S&P rating.
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Averages across the rating classes are determined in one out of two ways. The first
approach is used when it is necessary to obtain a longer time series without gaps. Then, we
first determine the time series average rating for each reference entity across all observation
dates where there were at least two bond price quotes, a CDS ask quote, and a CDS bid
quote available. The actual rating of the reference entity could therefore theoretically differ
from the average rating on each observation date. We subsequently treat all reference entities
with the same average rating as if they had exhibited this rating at each observation date.
This is the approach used in the overview over the sample in Table 3.1 and in the time series
analysis in Table 3.6, Table 3.7, and Table 3.8.
The second approach to determine averages is used when the time series relation is less
important. We then allow reference entities to move between the rating classes and compute
the average rating across the observations for all reference entities which had a specific rating
on that observation date and across all observation dates. This is the approach used in the
descriptive statistics in Table 3.2, Table 3.3, Table 3.4, and Table 3.5 as well as in the
fixed-effects regression analysis in Panel B of Table 3.9 and Table 3.10.
Stock Returns and Volatility
We determine the equity tickers of the 171 reference entities for straight equity. For 16
sovereign reference entities, three fully state-owned, and 6 private firms, no equity data
was available. For the remaining 146 firms, we obtain a time series of ex-dividend stock
prices starting from June 1, 2000 from Bloomberg from which we compute a time series of
daily stock returns. The earlier starting point allows us to determine the historical stock
return volatility for an interval of up to 12 months. In addition, we obtain the time series
of option-implied volatilities for the time interval from June 1, 2001 to June 30, 2007 for 98
firms. We use European vanilla at-the-money options with a time-to-maturity of 12 months
since the data for these was most widely available; we only had access to option-implied
volatilities for 32 firms for a maturity of 1 month and for 47 firms for a maturity of 3 and 6
months. Overall, we observe 233,785 daily stock return and 54,099 option-implied volatility
data points.
Corporate Bond Indices
All index data is obtained from Bloomberg. We use the JPMorgan Aggregate Index Europe
(MAGGIE) and the S&P Global Corporate Bond Indices (SPWC).
The MAGGIE is a weighted average of three subindices, the EMU Government Bond
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Index, the Euro Credit Index, and a Jumbo Pfandbrief index. As of June 2007, the MAGGIE
contained approximately 1,800 bonds from the Eurozone with a maturity of 5 to 7 years which
JPMorgan claims are chosen on the basis of their traded liquidity. We obtain the daily
MAGGIE mid quote yield-to-maturity from June 1, 2001 to June 30, 2007, thus yielding a
total of 1,548 observations each.
The SPWC represents the S&P Creditweek Corporate Bond Yield Indices, containing
bonds with a minimum outstanding volume of USD 100 million. Bloomberg contains 307
weekly yield observations with a constant 5-year maturity for all rating classes between AAA
and B, computed from bond prices in USD. The SPWC indices have been discontinued from
May 1, 2007.
Financial Market Liquidity Indicator
The description of the liquidity indicator was made available to us by the ECB. The first
three constituents which proxy for the market tightness are the bid-ask spreads on (1) the
EUR/USD, EUR/JPY and EUR/GBP exchange rates, (2) the 50 individual stocks which
form the Dow Jones EURO STOXX 50 index, and (3) 1-month EONIA and 3-month swap
rates. The three measures of market depth are the return-to-rollover ratios for (4) the 50
individual stocks which form the Dow Jones EURO STOXX 50 index, (5) the Euro Bond
market total return index and the Deutsche Boerse total turnover on the bond market as
well as (6) the EURO STOXX 50 index option-implied volatility absolute change divided by
the open interest in options contracts on the EURO STOXX 50 index. The final components
quantify the liquidity premium and are given by (7) spreads on Euro area high-yield corporate
bonds adjusted by the expected default frequency and (8) the spreads between interbank
deposit rates and repo interest rates for the Euro area. Taking the simple average of all the
liquidity measures at each point-in-time gives the time series of the liquidity indicator which
is then demeaned and normalized to a standard deviation of 1.
Chapter 4
The Credit Risk and Liquidity Model
In this chapter, we introduce our reduced-form model that accounts for credit risk and
liquidity premia in bond and CDS markets. As the analysis in Chapter 3 shows, an explicit
model is warranted since both bond and CDS market liquidity proxies seem to play an
important role in explaining the differences between bond yield spreads and CDS premia after
the coupon and maturity mismatch is accounted for. We contribute to the existing literature
on the components of bond yield spreads and CDS premia theoretically and empirically by
exploring the idea that the bid and ask quotes for CDS premia contain information on the
liquidity of the CDS market.
In the theoretical part of our analysis, we extend the reduced-form credit-risk model of
Longstaff et al. (2005) to incorporate illiquidity both in the bond and the CDS market. In
the bond market, illiquidity results in price discounts and yield surcharges. This assumption
is also made by Longstaff et al. (2005). Our extension consists of the modelling of a twofold
liquidity effect on CDS premia. First, the bond-specific liquidity has a direct effect on CDS
premia since the potentially illiquid bond is delivered under the CDS contract if default
occurs. Therefore, the CDS premium in our model accounts for bond liquidity as a source
of bond price variation.
In addition to this straightforward liquidity spill-over, we include a CDS-specific liquidity
which has a more intricate effect. After all, it is not obvious from a theoretical perspective
whether liquidity should be included in a model for CDS premia. CDS are derivatives, not
assets, and thus not exposed to illiquidity effects caused by a fixed supply or the costs of
short-selling such as bonds are. Both in empirical studies and in theoretical models, see
e.g. Schueler and Galletto (2003) or Longstaff et al. (2005), it is generally assumed that the
CDS mid premium reflects a price which is entirely free of liquidity risk. This assumption
neglects the possibility of a liquidity-driven market imbalance that causes the pure credit
risk CDS premium which is unaffected by the liquidity of the CDS market to be closer either
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to the ask or the bid quote. Undoubtedly, however, the bid and ask premia reflect liquidity
aspects of a CDS. We therefore circumvent the question of systematic liquidity premia in
CDS mid premia by modelling the ask and bid premia instead. This procedure is equivalent
to assuming that the bid and ask quote are affected by illiquidity. As a consequence, we
model two values of the fixed leg of the CDS, one for the ask and one for the bid side. From
these, we extract the unobservable, pure credit risk premium. Typically, this premium will
differ from the mid premium. Our measure of CDS liquidity then arises as the difference
between this liquidity-free CDS premium and the mid premium.
Our model allows us to analyze in a consistent way the empirical relationship between
time-varying bond- and CDS-specific liquidity premia. To the best of our knowledge, we are
the first to explore this dynamic relationship in a model of bond and CDS liquidity.32 Our
results on the behavior of the liquidity premia can be consistently interpreted by demand
relations for credit risk between the bond and the CDS market.
In the empirical part of our analysis, we estimate the credit risk and the liquidity
components of yield spreads and CDS premia for the data set described in Chapter 3. We
then analyze the relation between the time-varying credit risk and liquidity premia for the
two markets.
Our most important findings are threefold. First, we find that adding a CDS-specific
liquidity component to the model has the important consequence of consistently positive
credit risk and liquidity premia in corporate bond markets. This result contrasts with those
in Longstaff et al. (2005) who obtain strongly negative liquidity premia in corporate bond
yields. In particular, we show that neglecting CDS-specific liquidity can result in negative
bond liquidity premia. The average bond liquidity premia for corporate reference entities
are of a similar magnitude as the liquidity risk premia which de Jong and Driessen (2005)
identify for expected excess bond returns. The CDS liquidity premium is mostly positive
which points to a demand pressure in the CDS market which supports the cross-sectional
results of Chen et al. (2007), Bongaerts et al. (2007), and Meng and ap Gwilym (2006).
Second, our model allows us to analyze the relation between credit risk and liquidity
premia in the bond and the CDS market. We find that the bond market’s liquidity dries
up as the reference entity’s credit risk increases. This empirical result in our reduced-form
model setting supports the theoretical prediction of the structural-form model by Ericsson
and Renault (2006). They assume that liquidity shocks to the bond holder are correlated
32A similar approach is chosen by Dunbar (2007) who develops a reduced-form model that includes a
liquidity risk factor in CDS premia. However, his model does not take into account the bond market, and
he does not determine time-varying credit risk and liquidity premia.
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with default risk. In the CDS market, the dynamics of the liquidity premia depend on the
rating class. The investment grade sector becomes more dominated by protection sellers
during times of high default risk. For the subinvestment grade sector, increasing credit risk
coincides with a lower demand pressure for credit protection, thus decreasing CDS liquidity
premia in the subinvestment grade sector. This analysis complements the cross-sectional
evidence by Dunbar (2007).
Third, we extend the empirical evidence of Nashikkar et al. (2007) on the relation between
the liquidity of the bond and the CDS market by disentangling the credit risk and liquidity
premia. Instead of the absolute or relative CDS bid-ask spread which are affected by credit
risk, our model allows us to determine comparable pure liquidity premia for the bond and
the CDS market. For these, we obtain a significant relationship in excess of the liquidity
spill-over which is immanent to our model.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.1 presents the setup of
the base case model, the measures of credit risk and liquidity and a simulation analysis.
Section 4.2 presents the empirical results of the model calibration and a detailed analysis of
the estimated credit risk and liquidity premia. Section 4.3 contains several stability analyses,
and a discussion of the shortcomings of the base case model is provided in Section 4.4.
4.1 Model Framework
In this section, we develop our approach to measure the size of the default and the liquidity
component in CDS premia and corporate bond prices.
4.1.1 Base Case Model
We assume a standard Duffie and Singleton (1997) arbitrage-free capital market in which
default-free zero coupon bonds, default-risky coupon-bearing bonds, and CDS written on the
issuers of the coupon-bearing bonds are traded. The liquidity of these instruments can differ.
We choose the default-free zero coupon bond as the liquidity nume´raire. This choice implies
that the liquidity of each instrument is measured relative to the default-free zero coupon
bond. We therefore circumvent the problem of specifying a perfectly liquid instrument in
comparison to which each illiquid instrument must trade at a discount.
In the setting of Duffie and Singleton (1997), we can write the stochastic discount
factors in the well-known multiplicative exponential-affine form. We use rt to denote the
instantaneous default-free interest rate process that determines the price of the default-free
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zero coupon bond. λt refers to the credit risk hazard rate which governs the default
probability and which is assumed to be reflected in CDS premia and bond prices. We use
γt as the illiquidity process which determines the fraction of an asset’s price due to liquidity
deviations from the reference liquidity of 1. Then
D˜ (t, τ) = exp
(
−
∫ τ
t
r (s) ds
)
is the stochastic risk-free discount factor from time t to τ ,
P˜ (t, τ) = exp
(
−
∫ τ
t
λ (s) ds
)
denotes the stochastic credit risk discount factor from time t to τ , and
L˜ (t, τ) = exp
(
−
∫ τ
t
γ (s) ds
)
equals the stochastic liquidity discount factor that causes the price of an illiquid instrument
to deviate from that of the liquidity nume´raire. Consequently, the time-t value of a unit
payment that occurs at time τ conditional upon survival until t and taking into account
illiquidity equals
Et
[
P˜ (t, τ) L˜ (t, τ) D˜ (t, τ)
]
where Et denotes the expectation with respect to the risk-neutral measure. Note that the
choice of an identical instantaneous credit risk intensity λt for bonds and CDS implies that
the default and survival probability are issuer -specific instead of instrument-specific.
In Appendix 4.5.1, we show that modelling the liquidity discount as a stochastic discount
factor for each future payment in the same way as the survival probability is appropriate.
Since we model mid bond prices and CDS ask and bid premia, we specify three illiquidity
processes γb, γask, and γbid which describe the liquidity of the two instruments. We denote
the associated discount factors by L˜b, L˜ask, and L˜bid.
If default occurs at time τ , the bondholder recovers a fixed fraction R of the face value
F . This assumption causes the delivery option to be worthless. Default can occur at any
time, and recovery takes place on the first trading day following the default event. Then, the
time-t price of a coupon-bearing bond with fixed coupon c paid at times t1, . . . , tn, notional
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F , maturity in tn, and possible recovery at time θj (t ≤ θ1 < . . . < θN ≤ tn) is given by
CB
(
λ, γb, t
)
= c ·
n∑
i=1
Et
[
P˜ (t, ti) D˜ (t, ti) L˜
b (t, ti)
]
+ FEt
[
P˜ (t, tn) D˜ (t, tn) L˜
b (t, tn)
]
+ R · F ·
N∑
j=1
Et
[
∆P˜ (t, θj) D˜ (t, θj) L˜
b (t, θj)
]
(4.1)
where θ0 := t and ∆P˜ (t, θj) := P˜ (t, θj−1) − P˜ (t, θj) denotes the probability of surviving
from t until θj−1 and then defaulting between θj−1 and θj given that the current date is t.
Equation (4.1) can be interpreted as the expected present value of all future bond cash-flows:
The first summand gives the expected present value of the coupon payments at each coupon
date. The second summand equals the expected present value of the principal payment in
the last period. The last term is the expected present value of the recovery rate payment.
Each future payment is therefore discounted with regard to the default risk of the bond and
to the illiquidity which affects the instrument.
The value of the fixed leg of a CDS contract at time t with fixed premium
payments sask made in arrear at times T1, . . . , Tm, maturity in Tm, and recovery at θj
(t ≤ θ1 < . . . < θM ≤ Tm) equals
CDSfix (t) = s
ask
(
m∑
i=1
Et
[
P˜ (t, Ti−1) D˜ (t, Ti) L˜ask (t, Ti)
]
+
M∑
j=1
δjEt
[
∆P (t, θj) D˜ (t, θj) L˜
ask (t, θj)
])
, (4.2)
where δj accounts for the premium fraction accrued in the interval between the last payment
date and the recovery date θj. L˜
ask is defined like L˜b with the bond liquidity intensity γb
replaced by the CDS ask liquidity intensity γask.
Equation (4.2) suggests that the payment of all ask premia sask from the protection buyer
to the protection seller has to be discounted for the default probability since the payment
at time Ti−1 only occurs with a probability P (t, Ti−1). The CDS-specific liquidity discount
factor for the ask premium L˜ask (t, Ti) is added since we assume that a part of the CDS ask
premium is not due to default risk but to the fact that the protection seller demands an
additional premium because of illiquidity.
The value of the floating leg, that is the payment of the protection seller contingent upon
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default, equals
CDSfloat (t) = F
M∑
j=1
Et
[
∆P˜ (t, θj) D˜ (t, θj)−R∆P˜ (t, θj) D˜ (t, θj) L˜b (t, θj)
]
.
(4.3)
The first summand in (4.3) equals the discounted present value of the face value F which we
assume the protection seller pays out in cash. Since physical delivery of the defaulted bond
constitutes the CDS market standard, the second summand equals the discounted present
value of the defaulted bond which the protection seller has to sell in the market upon the
bond’s delivery. Therefore, the second summand contains the discounting factor for the bond
liquidity in addition to the credit risk discounting factor. Note that the floating leg is not
discounted with regard to the CDS-specific liquidity.
Setting equal (4.2) and (4.3) and solving for sask, we obtain
sask =
F
∑
j Et
[(
1−RL˜b (t, θj)
)
∆P˜ (t, θj) D˜ (t, θj)
]
∑
iEt
[
P˜ (t, Ti−1) D˜ (t, Ti) L˜ask (t, Ti)
]
+
∑
j δjEt
[
∆P˜ (t, θj) D˜ (t, θj) L˜ask (t, θj)
] .
(4.4)
The solution for the CDS bid premium is identical to that for the ask premium only with
L˜ask replaced by L˜bid:
sbid =
F
∑
j Et
[(
1−RL˜b (t, θj)
)
∆P˜ (t, θj) D˜ (t, θj)
]
∑
iEt
[
P˜ (t, Ti−1) D˜ (t, Ti) L˜bid (t, Ti)
]
+
∑
j δjEt
[
∆P˜ (t, θj) D˜ (t, θj) L˜bid (t, θj)
] .
(4.5)
Equations (4.4) and (4.5) differ only with regard to the liquidity discount factor. If, as
the absence of arbitrage implies, the bid quote lies below the ask quote, L˜bid must exceed
L˜ask. Technically, the relation that the bid quote lies below the ask quote could be included
into our model by demanding that the CDS ask liquidity intensity γask always exceeds the
CDS bid liquidity intensity γbid, i.e. by assuming that γbid equals γask minus a non-negative
stochastic process. This, however, would complicate the identification of the non-negative
credit risk component λ, the ask liquidity intensity γask, and the non-negative difference
process. Therefore, our model does not formalize this relation, but our empirical study
never yields values of γask and γbid that imply arbitrage opportunities.
The Credit Risk and Liquidity Model 77
4.1.2 Specification of Intensity Processes
The second step in the specification of the model consists of choosing the dynamics of the
default and the liquidity intensities. As Longstaff et al. (2005), we assume a square-root
process for the credit risk intensity λ (t) with
dλ = (α− βλ) dt+ σ
√
λdWλ,
where α, β, and σ > 0 are real numbers, and Wλ is a standard Brownian motion.
The dynamics of the liquidity intensities γlt, l ∈ {b, ask, bid}, for the liquidity discount
factors of the bond (b), the CDS ask premium (ask), and the CDS bid premium (bid) are
given by
dγl = µldt+ ηldWηl ,
with µl and ηl > 0 constants, andWηl a standard Brownian motion. This specification allows
the liquidity process to take on both positive and negative values. The above specification
of the liquidity intensity dynamics can be favored over the simple White-Noise process in
Longstaff et al. (2005) since it additionally allows for liquidity trends which may be more
appropriate for the maturing CDS markets.
It is convenient from an econometric point of view to assume that the instantaneous
default-free interest rate rt, the default intensity λt, and the liquidity intensities are
independent in order to obtain a parsimonious model with closed-form solutions. However,
we do not need to assume that the liquidity intensities themselves are independent.
Economically, this potential correlation is especially important for the liquidity intensities
in the CDS market since an increasing liquidity of the CDS market would move both the
bid and the ask quote closer to each other independently of the default intensity.
Given the above independence assumption, we know that
Et
[
P˜ (t, τ) D˜ (t, τ) L˜l (t, τ)
]
= Et
[
P˜ (t, τ)
]
Et
[
D˜ (t, τ)
]
Et
[
L˜l (t, τ)
]
=: P (t, τ, λ)D (t, τ)L
(
t, τ, γl
)
,
where l ∈ {b, ask, bid} and D (t, τ) is the time-t price of a default-free liquidity nume´raire
zero bond with maturity in τ .
For P (t, τ, λ) and L
(
t, τ, γl
)
, the following well-known analytical solutions arise:
P (t, τ, λ) := a1 (t, τ) · exp [−λt · a2 (t, τ)] , (4.6)
L
(
t, τ, γl
)
:= al3 (t, τ) · exp
[−γlt · al4 (t, τ)] , (4.7)
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where the functions a1 (t, ti), a2 (t, ti), a
l
3 (t, ti), and a
l
4 (t, ti), l ∈ {b, ask, bid}, are given in
Appendix 4.5.2.
Substituting these functions in Equations (4.1), (4.4), and (4.5) yields the analytical
solutions CB (t) = CB
(
t, λ, γb
)
for the bond price, sask = sask
(
t, λ, γb, γask
)
for the CDS
ask premium, and sbid = sbid
(
t, λ, γb, γbid
)
for the CDS bid premium. These closed-form
solutions can be calibrated to our set of bond prices and CDS ask and bid quotes to obtain
estimates of the default and liquidity intensities.
4.1.3 Measures for Credit Risk and Liquidity Premia
The model developed in Sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 allows us to disentangle the total bond spread
cs into a pure credit risk component csdef and a liquidity component csliq. By an analogous
procedure based on CDS bid and ask quotes, we compute a pure credit risk component sdef
and a liquidity component sliq for the CDS. The rationale for this decomposition is most
obvious for the bond. The credit risk premium csdef equals the yield spread that would apply
if credit risk were the only priced factor (excepting, of course, r). The liquidity premium
csliq then measures the additional yield spread that is incurred because of illiquidity.
As mentioned in Chapter 3, even in a perfectly liquid bond and CDS market, the bond
yield spread is directly comparable to the CDS premium only if the maturity of both
instruments is identical and if, in addition, the bond price equals its face value. This second
condition is important to avoid the difficulties discussed by Duffie (1999) and Duffie and Liu
(2001) who show that the yield spreads on fixed-coupon corporate bonds cannot be directly
compared to CDS premia. Therefore, we define a bond’s pure credit risk premium csdef for
a given value of λ in two steps. First, we assume that γb equals 0 and determine the coupon
cpar that makes the theoretical bond price in Equation (4.1) equal to par, i.e., CB (t, λ, 0)
equals F for cpar. Second, we compute csdef as the bond spread over the risk-free rate for
this bond:
CB (t, λ, 0) =
n∑
i=1
cpar
(1 + y (t, Ti) + csdef)
(Ti−t) +
F
(1 + y (t, Tm) + csdef)
(Tm−t) (4.8)
where y (t, Ti) = D (t, Ti)
− 1
Ti−t − 1 equals the yield-to-maturity of a default-free zero bond
with reference liquidity and maturity Ti − t.
The bond liquidity premium csliq follows as the premium increase in excess of csdef if
the impact of the bond liquidity intensity γb is included, i.e., the bond spread increase for
CB
(
t, λ, γb
)
.
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We define the credit risk and liquidity components of a CDS analogously to the procedure
in the bond market. First, we compute the pure credit risk premium sdef by assuming that
the liquidity discount factors L˜ask or L˜bid are equal to 1. Equations (4.4) and (4.5) illustrate
that in this case, sdef is exclusively determined by the default-free interest rates, the default
probability, and the bond liquidity. Note that the bond liquidity affects the CDS both in
the case of physical delivery and cash settlement as described in Section 2.3. A less liquid
bond has a lower post-default price compared to an otherwise identical bond with higher
liquidity. The CDS premium therefore is higher to compensate the protection seller for the
lower value of the bond should default occur. This effect pertains even if the CDS market is
perfectly liquid.
In a CDS market whose liquidity differs from the liquidity nume´raire, the ask and bid
premia differ from the pure credit risk premium sdef. In line with the literature on market
microstructure, it seems apparent to select the absolute or relative size of the bid-ask spread
as a measure of illiquidity. This is not an appropriate approach in our context for two
reasons. First, a comparison of (4.4) and (4.5) shows that the absolute bid-ask spread is
also affected by credit risk. Assume that only the default intensity increases, then the ask
premium increases more strongly than the bid premium does. Therefore, an increasing credit
risk results in a larger absolute bid-ask spread which would be contributed inconsistently to
a decreasing liquidity of the CDS. Second, the bid-ask spread, even if taken relatively to sdef,
is not comparable to our liquidity measure csliq in the bond market.
We therefore proceed analogously to the bond market and define the liquidity premium
in the CDS market sliq by
sliq =
1
2
(
sask + sbid
)− sdef, (4.9)
i.e., sliq is the difference between the mid premium – which may include illiquidity – and
the pure credit risk premium sdef. This definition of sliq corresponds fully to the definition
of the bond liquidity premium csliq. In addition to this formal analogy, sliq allows for an
inventory-related interpretation: If a trader has entered into a number of CDS contracts as
protection seller, she moves the ask premium and the bid premium at which she is willing
to trade upwards in order to balance her inventory. Since the pure credit risk premium sdef
remains at its initial value while sask and sbid increase, sliq increases as well. If, on the other
hand, demand for transactions on the bid side increases and the trader ends up with an
increased short credit risk position, she sets lower bid and ask quotes in order to cancel out
this inventory imbalance. This effect results in lower values of sliq.
Our measure of CDS liquidity is thus consistent with the measure of the bond liquidity
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premia: if a large number of investors want to sell credit risk by selling bonds — which
can be interpreted as buying credit protection — the liquidity premium in the bond market
increases and vice versa.
In the next section, we turn to a simulation analysis of our model. In particular, we show
how changes in the credit risk and liquidity processes affect our credit risk and liquidity
measures in the bond and CDS market. In this way, we demonstrate that our model does
not automatically yield credit risk and liquidity premia which are cointegrated. If we obtain
cointegration relations between the premia in a calibration to observed data, we can therefore
deduce that these relations are data-driven instead of model-driven.
4.1.4 Model-Implied Credit Risk and Liquidity Premia Relation
Due to the form of the model, a fully analytic derivation of the comparative-static premia
behavior is not feasible. A numerical comparative-static analysis is mostly redundant because
of the straightforward relation between the credit risk and liquidity intensities and the credit
risk and liquidity premia: If the instantaneous credit risk intensity increases, csdef and sdef
increase to a similar extent as the intensity. The liquidity premia csliq and sliq decrease when
the credit risk intensity increases, but the effect is very small (csliq by about 2 bp, sliq by
about 0.5 bp for an intensity increase from 10 bp to 1,000 bp). A higher bond liquidity
intensity does not affect csdef or sliq, but csliq increases to a similar extent as the intensity.
sdef also increases slightly through the direct liquidity spillover (6 bp for an intensity increase
from 10 bp to 1,000 bp). An increase in the CDS ask intensity and a decrease in the CDS
bid intensity increase sliq in a similar way, but the sensitivity is very small with a change of
4 bp for an intensity change from 10 bp to 1,000 bp.
Instead of a more extensive comparative-static analysis, we therefore conduct an
exemplary simulation analysis. In this way, we simultaneously demonstrate the sensitivity of
csdef, csdef, csliq, and sliq to the intensities and explore how a given dependence between the
intensities translates into a time series relation between the credit risk and liquidity premia.
The reference parameter values are chosen as follows: We assume that the default
free interest rate is flat at 5%. The default intensity parameters equal (α, β, σ) =
(0.05, 0.10, 0.15), and the bond and CDS liquidity parameters are
(
µb, ηb
)
=
(
µask, ηask
)
=
(0.05, 0.15), and
(
µbid, ηbid
)
= (−0.05, 0.15). This parameter choice leads to increasing credit
risk and decreasing bond liquidity over time, resulting in increases of csdef, sdef, and csliq.
The effect on CDS liquidity is not ex ante clear. As the bid and the ask liquidity intensity
move in opposite directions, sliq can either increase or decrease, depending on which intensity
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is larger. We choose the starting values identically at 10 bp for λ, γb, and γask, and at -10
bp for γbid. The recovery rate equals 40%. Using these values, we simulate a single time
series of length 252 for λ, γb, γask, and γbid each using a discretized version of the dynamics
described in Section 4.1.2. The mean values of the simulated intensities equal λ¯ = 247 bp,
γ¯b = 90 bp, γ¯ask = 189 bp, and γ¯bid = −232 bp. From the time series, we compute the
resulting credit risk and liquidity premia. The results are displayed in Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1: Simulated Credit Risk and Liquidity Premia
The figure shows the credit risk (solid line) and liquidity premia (dashed line) in
bond yield spreads (black) and CDS mid premia (grey) for the base case intensity
time series. The time-to-maturity remains constant at 1 year. The CDS liquidity
premium is measured on the secondary (right-hand side) axis.
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As Figure 4.1 shows, the direct impact of the bond liquidity which we derived in
Equation (4.3) causes the CDS credit risk premium sdef to exceed the bond credit risk
premium csdef, but the overall effect is small. csdef has a mean value of 270.99 bp which sdef
exceeds with a mean of 285.70 bp.33 The difference of 14.71 bp between these mean values
equals 5% of the mean bond liquidity premium csliq which lies at 298.07 bp. Because of its
comparably small value, the CDS liquidity premium sliq is depicted on the secondary axis.
The absolute mean value of γbid is larger than that of γask for the simulated path, thus sliq
has a negative mean of -0.65 bp. Overall, sliq fluctuates between -1.82 bp and 0.13 bp. The
33Doubling the default-free interest rate leads to an average value for sdef of 284.63 bp.
82
average value of sask equals 290.72 bp, and sbid has a mean of 279.38 bp. Therefore, the
mean of sdef is closer to the mean of sbid by exactly the mean of the liquidity premium sliq,
-0.65 bp. Economically, this result would imply that transactions the the CDS market are
mostly bid-initiated.
The process parameters translate to a premium increase of 189% for csdef, 175% for sdef,
and 90% for csliq over time. The standard deviation of the premium change equals 0.54
bp for csdef, 0.51 bp for sdef, 2.75 bp for csliq, and 0.06 bp for sliq. Neither the augmented
Dickey-Fuller test nor the Phillips-Perron test can reject the hypothesis of a unit root in any
of the premia time series at the 10% significance level. The Phillips-Ouliaris cointegration
test yields a cointegration coefficient of 0.99 which is significant at the 1% level for csdef and
sdef. The coefficient estimates for the liquidity premia and the credit risk premia with one
another and that for the liquidity premia with each other is not significant.
We now demonstrate the effect of a higher default intensity by doubling it. To do so, we
multiply α, σ, and the time series of λ (t), t = 1, . . . , 252, by 2 while β remains the same as
in the base case. In the second step, we double the bond liquidity intensity by multiplying
µb, ηb, and the time series of γb (t), t = 1, . . . , 252, by 2 but the credit risk intensity and the
CDS bid and ask liquidity intensities are the same as in the base case. The resulting premia
time series are depicted in Figure 4.2.
As Panel A of Figure 4.2 shows, doubling the default intensity approximately doubles csdef
and sdef. The average of csdef increases to 550.54 bp and that of sdef to 567.74 bp. The
increase in sdef is therefore somewhat smaller. Interestingly, csliq and sliq also change even
though γb, γask, and γbid are the same as in the base case. This shows that the identical
liquidity intensity translates into a larger asymmetry because of the higher credit risk. The
mean of csliq changes from of 298.07 bp in the base case to 295.96 bp for the doubled default
intensity. The decrease is clear from Equation (4.1), illiquidity has a higher impact on the
coupon and the face value payment than on the recovery payment. Therefore, decreasing the
probability that the coupon and the face value payments occur also decreases the liquidity
premia. For sliq, the mean decreases from -0.65 bp to -1.28 bp.
The effect of doubling γb can be seen in Panel B of Figure 4.2. csdef is completely
unaffected. sdef also reflects the change in the bond liquidity, but its mean only increases
from 285.70 bp to 288.40 bp. This demonstrates that the effect of γb on sdef is highly
non-linear which is both due to the definition of L as an exponential-affine function and
to the way in which L enters Equation (4.4). The bond liquidity affects the floating leg of
the CDS contract weighted with the default probability, and this limits the impact of γb.
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Figure 4.2: Doubled Default and Bond Liquidity Intensities
The figure shows the credit risk (solid line) and liquidity premia (dashed line) in bond
yield spreads (black) and CDS mid premia (grey) for the doubled default intensity
in Panel A and the doubled bond liquidity intensity in Panel B. The CDS liquidity
premium is measured on the secondary (right-hand side) axis.
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Panel B: Doubled Bond Liquidity Intensity
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csliq approximately doubles from a mean of 298.07 bp to 594.23 bp, and sliq remains mostly
unchanged. In each panel, the cointegration relationship is the same as in the base case.
We now explore the effect of changing the CDS bid and ask liquidity. We use the same
default and bond liquidity intensities as in the base case. In Panel A of Figure 4.3, we double
the CDS ask intensity by multiplying the process parameter values µask and ηask and the
time series of γask (t), t = 1, . . . , 252, by 2 and use the base case CDS bid intensity. In Panel
B, we use the base case CDS ask intensity and double the CDS bid intensity.
Figure 4.3: Doubled CDS Liquidity Intensities
The figure shows the credit risk (solid line) and liquidity premia (dashed line) in bond
yield spreads (black) and CDS mid premia (grey) for the doubled CDS ask intensity
in Panel A and the CDS bid intensity in Panel B. The CDS liquidity premium is
measured on the secondary (right-hand side) axis.
Panel A: Doubled CDS Ask Intensity
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As Figure 4.3 shows, the impact of doubling the CDS ask and bid intensity yields different
CDS liquidity premia but the credit risk and the bond liquidity premia remain unaffected.
Panel A presents sliq for the doubled ask intensity γask and the original bid intensity γbid. The
resulting average CDS liquidity premium of 1.88 bp is caused by the asymmetric position of
sdef with its original mean of 285.70 bp between sask with a mean 295.78 bp and sbid which
remains at its original mean of 279.38 bp. In Panel B of Figure 4.3 where γbid is doubled and
γask is at its original value, sliq decreases to a mean of -3.78 bp with a mean value of 273.13
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Panel B: Doubled CDS Bid Intensity
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bp for sbid. These values illustrate that even high asymmetries between γask and γbid only
translate to small absolute values of sliq. As before, the cointegration relation is unaffected
by the doubling of the intensities.
In the next section, we turn to the empirical application of our model.
4.2 Empirical Analysis
In this section, we calibrate our model to the bond and CDS data. The purpose of this
empirical analysis is not to validate or test our model, but to disentangle the credit risk
and liquidity components of bond yield spreads and CDS premia and to explore the relation
between these components. Due to its flexible stochastic structure, a formal test for the
model is only of limited interest in any event, and we focus on the economic plausibility of
our results instead.
4.2.1 Data and Calibration Procedure
We use the same data set we described in Section 3.2. For the current term structure of
the default-free interest rates, we use the estimates which are provided by the Deutsche
Bundesbank on a daily basis by means of the Nelson-Siegel-Svensson method from prices of
86
German government bonds.34 From this term structure of interest rates, we compute prices
of default-free zero-coupon bonds which we assume to have the reference liquidity discount
factor of 1. Therefore, for the empirical study we do not explicitly consider the stochastic
nature of rt. The recovery rate is assumed to equal 40%.
We estimate the parameters and the current factor values of the 4 intensity processes
individually for each of the 171 reference entities from the observed senior unsecured bond
prices and CDS bid and ask premia. In total, we estimate for each firm the 9 parameters(
α, β, σ, µb, ηb, µask, ηask, µbid, ηbid
)
, and for each date t the current value of the intensities(
λ, γb, γask, γbid
)
(t), t = 1, . . . , 1548. In order to keep the model tractable, we assume that
the instantaneous default and liquidity intensity are equal for bonds of the same issuer
with identical seniority but different time-to-maturity and coupon rate.35 This identification
assumption makes our parameters issuer-specific.
The calibration procedure consists of two basic steps. In the first step, we initiate a
base grid for the process parameters
(
α, β, σ, µb, ηb, µask, ηask, µbid, ηbid
)
. In the second step,
we then determine the values
(
λ, γb, γask, γbid
)
(t), t = 1, . . . , 1548, which simultaneously
minimize the sum of squared errors between the time series of the observed and the theoretical
CDS premia and bond yield spreads. This second step matches all values at the basis point
level, and estimation is conditional on the presumed process parameters. We follow this
procedure in each grid point and determine the point associated with the smallest sum of
squared errors. Around this point, we initiate a finer local grid as in the first step and repeat
the second step in each point of the new grid. We stop this two-step calibration procedure
when the minimal sum of squared errors twice decreases by less than 1% on two subsequent
grid specifications. In order to control for local optima, we repeat the analysis for the points
in the base grid associated with the second and third smallest sum of squared errors.
Given the estimates of the process parameters and the intensity time series, we compute
the credit risk and liquidity premia for CDS and for bonds in the third step as explained in
Section 4.1.3.
34As an alternative, we also used the interest rate swap curve. On average, we obtained slightly lower
credit risk premia of about 1.40 bp, lower bond liquidity premia of about 6.28 bp, and an almost identical
CDS liquidity premium which is on average 0.01 bp lower. Since the dynamics are almost identical, we only
present the results for the German government bonds.
35It is natural that bonds of the same issuer with identical seniority have the same default probability
during the next infinitesimally small time interval. The liquidity, on the other hand, may well depend on
the maturity and the coupon of a bond. We expect the homogeneity of the bonds of the same issuer to limit
the differences. In addition, the functional form of the stochastic liquidity process results in larger liquidity
premia for bonds with a longer maturity.
The Credit Risk and Liquidity Model 87
4.2.2 Credit Risk and Liquidity Premia: Cross-Sectional Results
We display the estimated premium components by industry sector and rating class in
Table 4.1. The premia are attributed to the rating class to which the reference entity
belonged on each reference date.
As Table 4.1 shows, csdef on average amounts to 52.21 bp and csliq to 26.26 bp. Therefore,
the total bond yield spread consists to 67% of credit risk and to 33% of liquidity. sdef exceeds
csdef by on average 0.48 bp with a mean value of 52.69 bp, and the mean of sliq lies at 2.04 bp.
As explained in Section 4.1.3, we measure the liquidity of the CDS market by the asymmetry
between bid and the ask quotes relative to the credit risk premium. The positive average of
sliq shows that CDS ask premia are further away from the pure credit risk premia sdef than
CDS bid premia. This suggests that most transactions in the CDS market are ask-initiated.
Compared to the sample mean of 54.82 bp presented in Table 3.2, we underestimate the
mid CDS premium by 0.09 bp. This small error implies that the model fits the CDS data
very well, suggesting that the stochastic structure is reasonably specified. The error with
regard to the yield spread is larger, the sum of csdef and csliq equals 78.47 bp and thus falls
below the interpolated yield spread by 21.43 bp. However, as discussed in Section 4.1.3, the
theoretical par yield spread which we compute from the parameter estimates is not directly
comparable to the interpolated yield spreads.
Industry Sectors Regarding the results for the different industry sectors, Table 4.1 shows
that csdef only slightly exceeds csliq for financial reference entities. On average, csdef equals
17.73 bp and csliq equals 12.34 bp. This translates into a premium decomposition of 59%
due to credit risk and 41% due to liquidity. sdef on average exceeds csdef by 0.17 bp, and
sliq fluctuates between -22.79 bp and 44.94 bp with a mean of 0.71 bp. The positive mean
suggests that there is on average a demand pressure for credit risk protection in the CDS
market. However, the small value of the mean and the negative minimum values imply that
the asymmetry is not very pronounced and that in some periods, a supply pressure prevails.
In the non-financial corporate sector, credit risk has a higher relative impact than bond
liquidity. On average, csdef amounts to 67% and csliq to 33% of the yield spread, and the
total levels are higher than for financial reference entities. This higher level of csliq also
translates into a higher difference between csdef and sdef of 0.62 bp. The largest difference
occurs for sliq which is on average about 4 times higher than for financial reference entities
with a mean of 2.56 bp. In conjunction with the higher absolute values of sliq, this suggests
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that demand-supply asymmetries are more prevalent for non-financial reference entities. The
fraction of the averages, however, is identical as for financial reference entities with a credit
risk premium of 96% and a liquidity premium of 4%.
For sovereign reference entities, bond liquidity has almost no impact which agrees with
the economic intuition. The average liquidity premium of 2.17 bp only amounts to 5% of
the total yield spread, and the negative values for csliq with a minimum of -0.55 bp are only
attained for this sector. This suggests, as explained in Section 3.2, that the liquidity of the
observed government bonds is partly higher than the liquidity which is measured by the
default-free term structure of interest rates. Since the difference between the bond and the
CDS credit risk premium is only due to the bond liquidity, sdef only exceeds csdef by 0.03 bp
on average for the sovereign sector. The relatively high value of sliq with a mean of 2.55 bp,
on the other hand, points at an asymmetry between protection buyers and sellers similar to
that in the non-financial corporate sector.
Rating Classes With regard to the different rating classes, we see that the credit risk and
liquidity premia increase as the rating deteriorates. For the AAA rating class, csdef has an
average of 6.04 bp which approximately doubles for each rating downgrade in the investment
grade segment. The subinvestment grade segment exhibits values of csdef which are at least
4 times as large as for the investment grade segment. For csliq, the difference between the
investment grade and the subinvestment grade average is less pronounced than for the credit
risk premia. The maximum average bond liquidity premia are observed in the BBB and BB
rating class. The A and B rating class exhibit similar average liquidity premia. Overall, we
obtain strictly positive estimates for the liquidity premia except for the sovereign reference
entities in the AAA and AA rating class. It is also interesting to note that the minimum
of csliq is not monotonously increasing as credit risk increases. These findings indicate that
even though the liquidity premia tend to be higher for more risky bonds (at least in the
investment grade sector), the relation is not a simple one-to-one mapping.
Comparing the CDS credit risk premia sdef, we find that they consistently exceed csdef
but that the difference, caused by the bond liquidity premia, is very limited. The average
difference is smallest for the AAA rating class with 0.03 bp and maximal for the B rating
class with 3.71 bp. This agrees with our results in the simulation analysis in Figure 4.2.
Even though csliq is on average higher for the BBB than for the B rating class, the fact that
the delivery of the defaulted, illiquid bond is more likely for the B-rated reference entities
leads to a stronger effect on the CDS premium than for the BBB-rated reference entities.
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The most noteworthy results of Table 4.1 concern the CDS-specific liquidity premia. As
explained in Section 4.1.3, we measure the liquidity of the CDS market by the asymmetry
between the ask and the bid quotes relative to the pure credit risk premium: If our estimate
of sdef is closer to the bid than to the ask quote, sliq has a positive value and vice versa.
On average, the liquidity premium sliq is positive for each rating class which suggests that
most transactions in the CDS market are ask-initiated. On an absolute level, the asymmetry
increases as the rating deteriorates with the average of sliq actually close to the average of
csliq for the B and CCC rating class. If we take them relative to the pure credit risk premia,
however, sliq is on average smaller for the subinvestment grade segment, and the difference
is particularly pronounced for the gap between the investment and the subinvestment grade
segment where the ratio descends from 4% to 2%. In addition, 19% of the liquidity premia
in the subinvestment grade segment are negative, suggesting that the asymmetry between
buyers and sellers may effectively be smaller. In the next section, we attribute the negative
liquidity premia to unusual market events.
As for the bond market, the relative liquidity premia decrease in a particularly
pronounced way for the transition from the investment grade to the subinvestment grade
sector. In contrast to the bond market, on the other hand, we find that the CDS liquidity
premia are much smaller for all rating classes. Their average size across all rating classes is
only 2.04 bp compared to 26.26 bp in the bond market.
In the next section, we further explore how credit risk and liquidity premia behave over
time.
4.2.3 Credit Risk and Liquidity Premia: Time Series Results
In this section, we first present the time series of the premia estimates for the the different
industry sectors and rating segments. We next explore the relation between the premia
across the bond and the CDS market. The section concludes with an empirical analysis
of the impact of market-wide credit risk and liquidity measures on the dynamics of the
estimated premia time series and the comparison of periods with increasing and decreasing
credit risk.
Time Series Graphs
The estimated credit risk and liquidity premia are depicted in Figure 4.4. For ease of
presentation, the three industry sectors and the investment and subinvestment grade rating
classes are summarized into a single time series each.
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Figure 4.4: Credit Risk and Liquidity Premia Time Series
The figure shows the estimated credit risk and liquidity components in yield spreads
and CDS premia for all rating classes. The estimates are computed with regard to a
constant time-to-maturity of 5 years and a synthetical par bond.
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Panel C: Sovereign
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Figure 4.4 shows that the pure credit risk premia csdef and sdef, depicted in the solid lines,
cannot be visually distinguished either for any of the industry sectors in Panel A to C nor
for the investment grade and the subinvestment grade segment in Panel D and E. Overall,
we observe a flattening of the pure credit risk premia curves of csdef and sdef over time with
much lower average levels at the end of the observation interval. In the financial sector,
the rating-class average of csdef and sdef fluctuates between 15 bp and 60 bp in the early
part of the observation interval and decreases to approximately 15 bp towards the end of
the observation interval. The decrease and flattening of the credit risk premia is even more
prevalent for the sovereign sector in Panel C, and for the investment and the subinvestment
grade subsamples in Panel D and E. In the non-financial corporate sector, the effect is less
pronounced. We also observe distinct spikes in the time series of csdef and sdef, in particular
for the non-financial corporate sector, in late 2001 and late 2002 which can be associated
with the defaults by Enron and WorldCom. The reaction of the financial sector’s credit risk
premia to the Enron default in late 2001 is almost negligible while the investment grade
segment as a whole reacts less sensitively to the WorldCom default.
The bond liquidity premia csliq exhibit a different behavior across the industry sectors
and rating classes. During the high credit risk periods, csliq is high and rather volatile for the
financial and sovereign sector and the subinvestment grade segment while they are mostly
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stable in the non-financial corporate sector and the investment grade segment. Towards
the end of the observation interval, we obtain an increase of csliq for the financial and the
non-financial corporate sector while liquidity premia in the sovereign sector were highest
during the period of high credit risk premia in mid 2003. A similar result holds for the
subinvestment grade segment where csliq had the highest level and volatility in late 2002
around the WorldCom default.
Visual inspection of the CDS-specific liquidity premia sliq is more difficult since the
absolute values are small. For all industry sectors and rating classes, we observe a trend
towards 0 as the CDS market matures. Overall, the level of sliq is closer to 0 near the end
of the observation interval for all industry sectors and rating sectors and higher when credit
risk is high. But while the behavior of sliq is also similar over time for all industry sectors, it
differs strongly between the investment grade and the subinvestment grade segment during
times of high credit risk. For the investment grade segment, sliq is higher during times of
high credit risk. In the subinvestment grade segment, sliq becomes large and more negative
when credit risk is high. This finding suggests that the ask-initiated transactions are partly
replaced by bid-initiated transactions for the subinvestment grade sector, pointing at a high
number of investors who attempt to take on credit risk synthetically in the CDS market.
Johansen VAR Analysis
In order to study the dynamic interaction between the bond and the CDS market, we perform
a Johansen VAR analysis.36 To do so, we first test for each reference entity whether csdef,
sdef, csliq, and sliq are stationary. If the augmented Dickey-Fuller test cannot reject a unit
root at the 10% level for each time series, we test whether the first differences of csdef, sdef,
csliq, and sliq are stationary. If the augmented Dickey-Fuller test can reject a unit root in
the first differences at the 10% level for each time series, we perform the Johansen test for
cointegration between csdef, sdef, csliq, and sliq. Since csdef and sdef mostly contain the same
information, we only include either csdef in the estimation equation sdef.
This procedure identifies 164 reference entities for which we cannot reject cointegration of
csdef, csliq, and sliq and of sdef, csliq, and sliq at the 10% significance level. Since cointegration
suggests that a linear combination of the level variables is stationary, we estimate the
following system of equations:
36See Johansen and Juselius (1990) and Johansen (1991). For a textbook illustration, see chapters 6.7 and
6.8 in Enders (1995).
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∆csdeft =
5∑
j=1
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5∑
j=1
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t−j +
5∑
j=1
y2jcs
def
t−j +
5∑
j=1
y3j∆cs
liq
t−j +
5∑
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y4jcs
liq
t−j
+
5∑
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y5j∆s
liq
t−j +
5∑
j=1
y6js
liq
t−j + ε4,t. (4.10)
We demand that the parameters are identical for all, respectively all financial, non-financial,
sovereign, investment grade, or subinvestment grade reference entities.37 Time lags up to 5
days are considered to capture a weekly time interval, and the resulting parameter estimates
are transformed into a single estimate for ease of presentation. We subsequently test whether
the regression residuals are stationary.
The results of the estimation are displayed in Table 4.2. We first discuss the results for
the entire sample, then the results for the investment and subinvestment grade segment, and
last the results for the different industry sectors.
As the coefficient estimates for the entire sample in Panel A of Table 4.2 show, ∆csdef and
∆sdef are negatively autocorrelated and negatively correlated with their lagged level. The
negative correlation with the previous level implies that credit risk premia have decreased
over time. The level of csliq−1 and its changes positively affect ∆s
def, but the coefficients
are only statistically significant at the 10% level, and the economic impact is small with
a coefficient estimate of 0.02 for ∆csliq−1 and 0.01 for cs
liq
−1. The adjusted R
2 of 12.93% for
37This estimation restriction could result in non-stationary residuals for reference entities for which the
residuals of the cointegrated variables were stationary in the first test. We therefore additionally test whether
the residuals of the restricted estimation were stationary for each of the 164 reference entities.
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∆csdef and 12.46% for ∆sdef is rather low, suggesting that the negative autocorrelation and
the correlation with the lagged level in addition to the cross-market impact only explain a
low amount of variation.
The changes of the bond and CDS liquidity premia ∆csliq and ∆sliq are also negatively
autocorrelated and negatively correlated with their lagged level. This level correlation is
stronger for the CDS premia with a coefficient estimate of -0.24 which suggests that CDS
liquidity premia decrease more strongly on an absolute level. We interpret this as a sign
that the CDS market matures over time. Both ∆csliq and ∆sliq are positively associated
with ∆csdef−1, suggesting that increases in credit risk premia also increase liquidity premia in
both markets. ∆sliq also exhibits a positive dependence on the level of csdef. This relation
implies that the intensities governing credit risk and liquidity implicitly capture a data-driven
correlation, even though they are assumed to be independent. We explore the impact of
including a formal covariance structure for the intensities in our model in Section 5.1.
With regard to the liquidity spillover between the bond and the CDS market, we find
that ∆sliq reacts to ∆csliq−1, and the positive sign of the coefficient estimate suggests that
liquidity premia move in the same direction. Even though the estimate is small at 0.01,
it is economically significant since bond liquidity premia are on average higher than CDS
liquidity premia. Reversely, the CDS market’s liquidity does not seem to affect the bond
market’s liquidity. This relation suggests that a lower bond market liquidity causes a higher
number of ask-initiated transactions in the CDS market and that the ask premium moves
further away from the liquidity-free CDS premium. The adjusted R2 of ∆csliq and ∆sliq is
about double and triple the size we obtain for the credit risk premia at 27.83% and 36.33%.
Liquidity premia seem to be more adequately described in the VAR model than credit risk
premia, and the dependence on credit risk and, for CDS, on the bond market’s liquidity, is
an important source of premia variation.
Rating Classes As Figure 4.4 already indicated, the time series behavior of the premia
differs between the investment and the subinvestment grade segment. The results of the VAR
analysis for the investment grade segment in Panel A of Table 4.2 show that the dynamics
of the premia are similar to those for the entire sample, but that the size of the coefficients
and the explanatory power changes. ∆csdef and ∆sdef remain negatively autocorrelated and
negatively correlated with their lagged level, but the coefficients of the previous change and
the adjusted R2 decrease (on the absolute level). The impact of ∆csliq−1 on ∆s
def becomes
insignificant even at the 10% level which supports our earlier result that the impact of bond
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liquidity on CDS premia is higher for a higher default probability. ∆csliq exhibits the same
dependence on csdef−1 as ∆s
liq with a coefficient estimate of 0.01.
With regard to the cross-market liquidity spillover, ∆csliq remains unaffected by sliq−1 and
∆sliq−1, but the reverse is not true. Both cs
liq
−1 and ∆cs
liq
−1 significantly affect ∆s
liq, and the
positive coefficient estimate implies that a lower bond market liquidity also causes liquidity
premia in the CDS market to increase. Accordingly, the adjusted R2 of ∆csliq remains
virtually unaffected while that for ∆sliq increases by 7 percentage points.
Overall, the investment grade segment exhibits a lower connection between the premia
in the bond and the CDS market than the entire sample. These findings suggest that the
premia for investment grade reference entities may be affected by market-specific conditions
in excess of the firm-specific ones. We further explore this possibility below.
The time series behavior of the subinvestment grade credit risk premia also resembles
that of the entire sample, but the adjusted R2 increases to 17.97% for ∆csdef and 17.62% for
∆sdef. Besides, ∆sdef now exhibits a positive dependence on csliq−1.
The central difference to the investment grade segment lies in the relation of the liquidity
premia. The coefficient estimate for the cross-market liquidity impact becomes negative and
significant for both bonds and CDS at the 5% significance level. A lower liquidity level of
one market therefore causes the other market to become more liquid, suggesting that taking
on and selling off credit risk occurs interchangeably on the bond and the CDS market.
Economically, this relation seems more plausible. If liquidity in the bond market decreases,
taking on credit risk directly through the bond becomes cheaper, and short-selling credit risk
directly through the bond becomes more expensive. Therefore, the price for taking on credit
risk in the CDS market should decrease while and selling off credit risk should become more
expensive. This relation translates into lower CDS ask premia and higher CDS bid premia,
reducing the asymmetry between sask and sbid with regard to sdef and, consequently, sliq.
Moreover, ∆sliq also reacts negatively to the level of credit risk, suggesting that high
credit risk in the subinvestment grade segment effectually reduces the demand for credit risk
protection in the CDS market and thus the amount of ask-initiated transactions.
In comparison to the investment grade segment, the adjusted R2 implies that the credit
risk premia are more closely interconnected while liquidity premia are less adequately
explained in the VAR setting.
Industry Sectors With regard to the different industry sectors in Panel B of Table 4.2,
we observe that ∆csdef and ∆sdef exhibit a larger negative autocorrelation and correlation
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with their lagged level for financial reference entities with coefficient estimates of -0.20 for
the previous change and -0.07, respectively -0.08, for the level.
The liquidity premia become more closely interdependent. Both ∆csliq and ∆sliq react
positively to the level and the change of the other market’s liquidity premia. Interestingly,
∆csliq only exhibits a weak dependence on ∆csdef−1, suggesting that liquidity in the bond
market evolves partly independent from credit risk.
The time series of the credit risk premia in the non-financial corporate sector only differs
from the behavior of the entire sample in the impact of csliq−1 on ∆s
def which is positive but
only significant at the 10% level. The liquidity premia exhibit a higher sensitivity to credit
risk than for the financial sector with a coefficient estimate of 0.02 and 0.03 for ∆csdef−1.
csdef−1 also affects ∆cs
liq more strongly than for the entire sample, but its impact on ∆sliq
decreases from 0.02 to 0.01. Concerning the liquidity spillover, the evidence is not wholly
conclusive because the investment and subinvestment grade classes are treated jointly. ∆sliq
reacts positively to csliq−1 and ∆cs
liq
−1 while the coefficient of s
liq
−1 with regard to the impact
on ∆csliq is negative at -0.02 and significant at the 10% level. This result implies that we
need to distinguish between investment and non-investment grade rating classes if we want
to explore the liquidity spillover between bond and CDS markets. The adjusted R2 for the
credit risk premia are similar to those in the financial sector, but the explanatory power for
csliq increases and that for sliq decreases.
The time series behavior of the sovereign sector differs strongly from those of the corporate
sectors. We do not find evidence of negative autocorrelation in csdef and sdef, only the
negative correlation with the lagged level persists. For csliq, we find no further impact of
credit risk, and neither of the liquidity premia reflects a spillover from the other market.
Hence, we infer that both markets evolve independently. The explanatory power for the
credit risk premia is very low, but the liquidity premia exhibit an adjusted R2 in line with
that for investment grade segment.
In summary, our time series analysis reveals that the credit risk premia in the bond
and the CDS market behave almost identically, further confirming that the model-immanent
impact of the bond liquidity on sdef is limited. The largest dependence applies for the
subinvestment grade segment and the non-financial corporate sector which suggests that
the level of the bond liquidity is less important for the direct spillover than the probability
of default. Over time, the credit risk premia decrease for all rating classes and industry
sectors. The credit risk premia show strong reactions to the Enron and the WorldCom
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default, financial reference entities in particular to the WorldCom default.
One result of the time series analysis is that the liquidity premia exhibit a strong
dependency on the credit risk premia. This result is delicate since the intensities are assumed
to be independent. The link is more pronounced for non-financial reference entities and the
investment grade segment. In addition, the liquidity premia also show a cross-market impact
on one another. In the investment grade segment and for the non-financial and sovereign
sector, only CDS liquidity reacts to changes in bond liquidity while the subinvestment grade
segment and financial sector also feature a dependency of the bond liquidity on the CDS
liquidity. The dependency may partly be due to the joint sensitivity to credit risk, in
particular since the coefficient sign for the relation between the two liquidities always agrees
with the dependency on credit risk: In the investment grade segment, both ∆csliq and ∆sliq
depend positively on the credit risk premia, and the relation between the liquidity premia
is also positive. In the subinvestment grade segment where ∆sliq becomes negatively related
to credit risk, the relation between the liquidity premia is also negative.
4.3 Stability Analysis
In this section, we perform a stability analysis of the estimated credit risk and liquidity
premia for bonds and CDS. To this purpose, we first explore how bond premia react if we
ignore liquidity in the CDS market. We then compare the pure credit risk premia which are
obtained if the default and liquidity intensities are estimated either from CDS ask or from
bid quotes only to the estimate which uses both the bid and the ask quote simultaneously.
Eventually, we analyze the effect of market-wide credit risk and liquidity measures on the
time series dynamics of the credit risk and liquidity premia and compare the behavior in
periods with increasing and decreasing credit risk.
4.3.1 Effect of Excluding CDS Illiquidity
As Table 4.1 shows, our model yields almost exclusively positive estimates of the bond
liquidity premia csliq. In contrast, Longstaff et al. (2005) who do not account for CDS
liquidity in their model obtain large negative estimates of the bond liquidity intensity which
would be associated with large negative estimates of csliq.
We therefore explore whether the positive bond liquidity premia we obtain in our
estimation are a result of including stochastic liquidity in CDS ask and bid premia or
simply a property of our data set. To do so, we propose the following modification of
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our model: First, we shift our focus to the CDS mid premia in our calibration procedure
since there is no theoretically compelling reason why sdef must differ systematically from the
mid premium. Second, we re-estimate the default and bond liquidity intensity time series
under the restriction γl = µl = ηl = 0, l = ask, bid. This is basically the approach by
Longstaff et al. (2005) and suggests that the CDS market is the liquidity nume´raire. Last,
we compute the bond credit risk and liquidity premia csdef and csliq and compare them to
the results from the initial estimation which includes illiquidity in CDS premia.
Since the effect only pertains when bonds are liquid relative to the CDS, we first present
the estimated time series for a single firm, the Dutch communications company The Nielsen
Company (formerly VNU Group B.V.).38
Figure 4.5: Effect of Excluding Stochastic CDS Illiquidity
The figure shows the bond credit risk (black) and liquidity premia (grey) estimated
for the communications firm Nielsen when stochastic CDS illiquidity is included (solid
line) and ignored (dashed line).
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As we see from Figure 4.5, the estimated default risk premium in the bond yield spread
csdef has similar dynamics whether CDS liquidity is included or not, but there are clear level
differences. Overall, when stochastic CDS liquidity is excluded, csdef is higher, fluctuating
between 34.98 bp and 537.71 bp with a mean of 127.02 bp and a standard deviation of 97.56
38The Nielsen Company is active in marketing and media information, business publications, and trade
shows in over 100 countries and has a total of 42,000 employees.
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bp. When stochastic CDS liquidity is included, csdef lies between 35.74 bp and 429.29 bp,
the mean equals 105.94 bp, and the standard deviation 73.36 bp. The differences are most
pronounced during the beginning of our observation interval when the CDS market was still
relatively illiquid.
Conversely, the bond liquidity premium csliq that results from excluding stochastic CDS
liquidity is consistently and considerably lower than when CDS liquidity is modelled with a
mean of 3.74 bp versus 24.69 bp, a minimum of -95.95 bp (5.26 bp), a maximum of 81.82 bp
(79.78 bp) and a standard deviation of 32.55 bp (16.11 bp).
We repeat the above analysis for the entire sample, i.e. we re-estimate the default and
bond liquidity intensity time series under the assumption that the CDS market is the liquidity
nume´raire for each firm. Overall, this re-estimation gives 12,285 negative bond liquidity
estimates out of 137,816 estimates for 136 out of 171 reference entities. Out of these 136,
123 have an average investment grade rating, and all 13 subinvestment grade rated reference
entities have negative bond liquidity estimates. With regard to the industry sectors, all
sovereign reference entities, 27 financial reference entities, and 93 non-financial corporate
reference entities exhibit negative bond liquidity estimates. We determine the resulting bond
credit risk and liquidity premia csdef and csliq as described in Section 4.1.3. The resulting
mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum are displayed in Table 4.3.
A comparison of the estimates in Table 4.3 to the original estimates that allow for CDS
liquidity in Table 4.1 shows that the average bond credit risk premium csdef tends to be
slightly higher if CDS liquidity is ignored. Across all rating classes, the mean value of csdef
is higher at 54.13 bp by 1.92 bp than in Table 4.1 which is approximately equal to the
mean CDS pure liquidity premium sliq of 2.04 bp. The main difference, however, lies in the
higher averages and the negative minimal values for the bond liquidity premia csliq. For each
industry sector and each rating class, the minimal value of csliq is negative with a minimum
of -206.72 bp for a BB-rated sovereign reference entity.
These results suggest that neglecting stochastic CDS liquidity can yield underestimates
of liquidity premia in the bond market and, for above time series, bond price surcharges
instead of discounts. Besides, the default intensity is overestimated when the bond liquidity
premium becomes negative, and this results in overestimates of a firm’s default probability.
As neglecting CDS liquidity attributes yield differences between the bond and the CDS
market directly to bond liquidity in our model, the effect is especially pronounced when
the bond liquidity is high relative to the CDS liquidity. As the CDS market matures, the
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erroneous results of neglecting CDS liquidity becomes less striking as long as the net liquidity
premium in the bond market remains positive.
4.3.2 Estimation from CDS Ask or Bid Premia
In Section 4.2, we use the CDS ask and bid premia simultaneously in order to extract the pure
credit risk and liquidity components from CDS premia and bond yield spreads. However,
only the sum of these two components can be observed, and our estimates could therefore
differ significantly from the true values.
As a robustness test, we repeat the firm-specific calibration procedure described in
Section 4.2.1 once using only CDS ask premia and once using only CDS bid premia instead
of both. We then compare the resulting estimates of csdef, csliq, sdef, and sliq with those we
obtained for the entire sample. In particular, we compute the mean, standard deviation,
and mean absolute difference between the estimates which are obtained using only one CDS
premium and the estimates which use both simultaneously. If the estimates do not differ
too strongly, we take this as an indication that our model allows us to adequately separate
the credit risk and liquidity components.
The results are displayed in Table 4.4.
Table 4.4 shows that the estimates of the credit risk and liquidity components are almost
identical regardless of which CDS premia are used in the estimation. On average, the mean
estimate of csdef from the CDS ask premium of 51.75 bp falls below the one using both premia
by 0.46 bp, but the similar standard deviation and the mean absolute difference of 1.48 bp
imply that the sign is not indicative of a systematic error. The same is true for the estimate
which uses only the bid premia with a mean difference between the credit risk premia of 0.77
bp and a mean absolute difference of 1.45 bp. For the bond liquidity premia csliq, we observe
the reverse result, the mean estimates which only use ask premia are slightly higher and the
ones using only bid premia are slightly lower. The difference, however, does not appear to be
systematic in this case either which is supported by the low mean absolute difference of 1.13
bp and 1.14 bp, respectively. The results for the CDS credit risk premia sdef and liquidity
premia sliq are similar to those for the bond. Again, the use of ask premia leads to a very
slight underestimation of the credit risk premia and overestimation of the liquidity premia
while bid premia yield slightly higher values for sdef and lower ones for sliq. Therefore, CDS
ask premia suggest a higher demand pressure and bid premia a lower demand pressure in
the CDS market.
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Table 4.4: Estimated Credit Risk and Liquidity Premia using CDS Ask or Bid
Premia
The table presents the sample mean, standard deviation, and mean absolute difference between the
credit risk and liquidity premia estimated from CDS bid and ask premia simultaneously (column
2), using only CDS ask premia (column 3), and using only CDS bid premia (column 4). csdef is
the credit risk and csliq the liquidity component in the yield spread of a synthetical 5-year par
bond. sdef is the credit risk and sliq the liquidity component in the mid premium for a 5-year CDS
contract. All values are in basis points.
Bid and Ask Ask Only Bid Only
Mean(csdef) 52.21 51.75 52.98
Std. Dev.(csdef) 83.04 85.76 85.99
Mean Abs. Difference – 1.48 1.45
Mean(csliq) 26.26 26.71 25.49
Std. Dev.(csliq) 47.27 48.90 50.02
Mean Abs. Difference – 1.13 1.14
Mean(sdef) 52.69 51.40 53.93
Std. Dev.(sdef) 83.79 84.01 84.16
Mean Abs. Difference – 1.58 1.55
Mean(sliq) 2.04 2.54 1.70
Std. Dev.(sliq) 9.91 10.25 10.29
Mean Abs. Difference – 0.57 0.55
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Overall, we find that the choice of ask or bid premia in the CDS market does not
significantly affect the size and the dynamics of the estimated credit risk and liquidity premia.
Since these premia are not directly observable in the market, we take the robust behavior
of the estimates as a sign that our estimation does not result in a systematic deviation from
the true premia.
4.3.3 Impact of Market-Wide Credit Risk and Liquidity Factors
We explore whether the time series of the credit risk and liquidity premia are exclusively
driven by firm- and instrument-specific changes or whether aggregate market conditions have
an additional impact. We therefore analyze the effect of market-wide credit risk and liquidity
measures on the VAR dynamics. Our previous findings in Table 4.2 suggest that the impact
of these measures is higher for the investment grade segment and the financial sector.
As a proxy for credit risk, we choose the S&P Creditweek Corporate Bond Index yield
spreads described in Appendix 3.5. Liquidity is proxied by the ECB Financial Market
Liquidity Indicator. Since the level of the premia are not stationary, we estimate a
Johansen VAR similar to the one in Equation (4.10) with the changes of the credit risk
and liquidity premia as endogenous variables and the index yield spreads and the liquidity
indicator as exogenous variables. The procedure yields three additional investment-grade
reference entities with stationary residuals, two of them from the financial and one from the
non-financial corporate sector. The results are displayed in Table 4.5.
As Table 4.5 shows, the inclusion of the aggregate credit risk and liquidity measures does not
affect the dynamics of the firm-specific credit risk premia. Both ∆csdef and ∆sdef depend
positively on market-wide credit risk and negatively on liquidity, but the increase of the
adjusted R2 from 12.93% to 13.32% shows that the explanatory power of the market-wide
measures is small. The impact is stronger for the investment grade segment: the adjusted
R2 almost doubles from 8.20% to 14.20% for ∆csdef and from 7.88% to 16.90% for ∆sdef. For
the subinvestment grade segment, the coefficient estimates are either insignificant or only
significant at the 10% level. Clearly, changes in the credit risk premia in the subinvestment
grade segment almost completely depend on the reference entity’s idiosyncratic default risk.
A similar result as for the investment grade segment holds with regard to the financial,
non-financial, and sovereign sector. For the financial sector, ∆csdef and ∆sdef depend
positively on credit risk and liquidity at the 1% significance level, and the adjusted R2
increases by approximately 10 percentage points compared to the entire sample. Credit risk
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premia in the non-financial and the sovereign sector are more sensitive to the liquidity than
to the credit risk measure, and the adjusted R2 is mostly unaffected.
The impact of the market-wide measures on the liquidity premia is stronger than on the
credit risk premia as measured by the adjusted R2. We obtain a positive dependence on
the credit risk and a negative one on the liquidity measure for the entire sample, and the
adjusted R2 for ∆csliq increases by approximately 7 percentage points for the entire sample.
For the investment grade segment, ∆csliq and ∆sliq both react positively to increases
of credit risk and negatively to increases of liquidity, but the effect on the bond liquidity
premium is more pronounced. We partly attribute this to the fact that the CDS market is,
on average, rather liquid, and partly to the increasing overall liquidity in the CDS market
throughout the observation interval.
In the subinvestment grade segment, on the other hand, ∆csliq reacts with more
pronounced increases to increases in aggregate credit risk and with only slight decreases
to increases in overall market liquidity. However, the additional explanatory power of the
market-wide measures is low. For CDS liquidity premia, we obtain a low dependence on
market-wide credit risk and liquidity, and the adjusted R2 decreases from the Johansen
VAR analysis without exogenous variables in Table 4.2.
As for the credit risk premia, the liquidity premia in the financial sector exhibit a
higher dependence on the market-wide variables with the expected coefficient signs. The
explanatory power, however, is lower with an increase of 4 percentage points in comparison
to the increase of 7 percentage points for the entire sample. This difference suggests that
liquidity premia in the financial sector do not necessarily move in unison with the entire
market. The non-financial corporate sector’s liquidity premia are unaffected by the liquidity
measure, but interestingly, credit risk has a positive impact. The reverse result applies for
the sovereign sector, only the liquidity indicator has an impact on ∆csliq and ∆sliq.
4.3.4 Impact of Increasing and Decreasing Market-Wide Risk
To conclude the stability analysis, we explore how the relation between the credit risk and
liquidity premia and the relation between the liquidity premia across the two markets are
affected by increasing and decreasing credit risk conditions. We measure the integration of
the premia by the cointegration coefficient and the speed of adjustment by the coefficient of
the error correction term in a VECM. We rewrite Equation (4.10) in the following form:
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∆csdeft = u1
(
csdeft−1 + ρ1cs
liq
t−1
)
+
5∑
j=1
u2j∆cs
def
t−j +
5∑
j=1
u3j∆cs
liq
t−j + ε1,t,
∆csliqt = v1
(
csdeft−1 + ρ1cs
liq
t−1
)
+
5∑
j=1
v2j∆cs
def
t−j +
5∑
j=1
v3j∆cs
liq
t−j + ε2,t, (4.11)
∆sdeft = w1
(
sdeft−1 + ρ2s
liq
t−1
)
+
5∑
j=1
w2j∆s
def
t−j +
5∑
j=1
w3j∆s
liq
t−j + ε3,t,
∆sliqt = x1
(
sdeft−1 + ρ2s
liq
t−1
)
+
5∑
j=1
x2j∆s
def
t−j +
5∑
j=1
x3j∆s
liq
t−j + ε4,t, (4.12)
∆csliqt = y1
(
csliqt−1 + ρ3s
liq
t−1
)
+
5∑
j=1
y2j∆cs
liq
t−j +
5∑
j=1
y3j∆s
liq
t−j + ε5,t,
∆sliqt = z1
(
csliqt−1 + ρ3s
liq
t−1
)
+
5∑
j=1
z2j∆cs
liq
t−j +
5∑
j=1
z3j∆s
liq
t−j + ε6,t, (4.13)
where ρi, i ∈ {1, . . . , 3} are the cointegration coefficients and u1, v1, w1, x1, y1, and z1 are
the coefficients of the error correction term. Lags of up to 5 days are considered in order to
capture a weekly time interval.
We estimate the above equations for increasing and decreasing risk phases. Increasing
risk phases are defined as time intervals with 4 consecutive weekly increases in the S&P
Creditweek Corporate Bond Index yield spread for the rating class to which a firm belonged
during that interval. Decreasing risk phases are analogously defined as intervals with 4
consecutive weekly decreases. Overall, we obtain 21 4-week intervals with increasing and 17
with decreasing risk for which we perform a VECM analysis of the premia at the daily level.39
As above, we demand that the coefficient estimates are identical for all reference entities,
all investment grade, all subinvestment, all financial, and all non-financial reference entities
during the increasing, respectively decreasing, risk phases. We do not treat the sovereign
sector separately because we do not have sufficient data during the increasing risk phase.
The results of the estimation are given in Table 4.6. For ease of presentation, we denote u1,
w1, and y1 as ECT1 and v1, x1, and z1 as ECT2.
For the entire sample, we find that the relation between csdef and csliq, sdef and sliq, and csliq
and sliq is quantitatively similar both during increasing and decreasing credit risk phases.
In each case, we obtain a negative cointegration coefficient which implies that the premia
39Alternatively, we have used the JPMorgan Aggregate Index Europe yield spreads and the ICMA
European Corporate Bond All Maturities Index yield spreads to define the increasing and the decreasing
risk phases. The results were virtually identical.
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themselves move in the same direction. The error correction term which is positive and
significant at 0.01 for csliq in relation to csdef, 0.04 for sliq in relation to sdef, and 0.01 for
sliq in relation to csliq, shows that liquidity premia react to the credit risk premia and CDS
liquidity to bond liquidity. The reverse impact is not significant both in increasing and
decreasing risk phases. Only the adjusted R2 shows that the link between credit risk and
liquidity premia and between the liquidity of the two markets is stronger when credit risk
increases.
A similar result holds for the investment grade segment, the largest difference between
increasing and decreasing risk phases lies in the weaker explanatory power during the latter.
The subinvestment grade segment, on the other hand, exhibits a different behavior during
times of increasing and decreasing phases. In the former, the positive cointegration coefficient
and the negative error correction terms show that sdef and sliq as well as csliq and sliq move
in opposite directions, and this changes in decreasing risk phases.
For financial reference entities, the relation between credit risk and liquidity premia is
invariant across the increasing and the decreasing risk phases, they move in the identical
direction and liquidity premia adjust to credit risk premia. The relation between the
liquidity premia, however, is sensitive to the increasing and the decreasing risk phase.
During increasing risk phases, the cointegration coefficient of 85.75 is significant at the
5% significance level, but neither error correction term is significant. This implies that
liquidity premia move in opposite directions but that deviations from the equilibrium relation
are not smoothed out over time. When overall credit risk decreases, the relation reverts
to movements in the same direction, and sliq reacts to csliq. In the non-financial sector,
increasing and decreasing risk phases do not differ systematically either except for the higher
adjusted R2 in the increasing risk phase.
To summarize, the results imply that the relation between the credit risk and liquidity
premia and between the liquidity premia across the two markets is mostly unaffected by the
increasing and decreasing risk phases. Only for the subinvestment grade segment and for
the financial sector, sdef and sliq as well as csliq and sliq exhibit a comovement in decreasing
and a countermovement in increasing risk phases.
4.4 Shortcomings of the Base Case Approach
Due to its simple structure, the base case model exhibits some shortcomings in the empirical
analysis. First, the time series analysis reveals a dependence of the liquidity premia on
the credit risk premia. The analytical pricing equations, however, are determined under
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the assumption of independence of the intensities from which we determine the premia.
This difference points to a misspecification of the model’s risk factor structure. A potential
secondary effect of the impact of the credit risk on the liquidity premia is the autocorrelation
of the latter. Since the liquidity intensity does not allow for this behavior, it is possible
that the data-driven correlation of the credit risk and liquidity premia causes the liquidity
premia to be autocorrelated. In Section 5.1, we explore the effect of explicitly modelling the
correlation between the credit risk and liquidity intensities.
A second shortcoming pertains to the assumption of an identical post-default price for
all bonds of a given issuer. This assumption renders the protection buyer’s delivery option
which is included in a standard CDS contract worthless. As a consequence, CDS premia
should on average be higher when the delivery option is included. It is possible that the CDS
liquidity premium is mostly positive simply because we do not model the delivery option
and that, given an appropriate adjustment, the liquidity premium would decrease. This
possibility is explored in Section 5.2.
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4.5 Appendix to Chapter 4
4.5.1 Derivation of the Bond Pricing Equation
The crucial assumption in our model is that the value CBdef of the default-risky bond is a
fraction P of the default-free bond value, CBnodef, and that the illiquid bond’s value CBilliq
is a fraction L of the perfectly liquid bond’s value CBliq:
CBdef = P · CBnodef,
CBilliq = L · CBliq
Naturally, the size of the factors P and L will depend on the period during which the bond
is subject to default risk or illiquidity and to the extent of the default risk and illiquidity. A
simple interpretation for P is developed by Duffie and Singleton (1997) who view P (t, t +
∆t) = Et
[
exp
(
− ∫ t+∆t
t
λ (s) ds
)]
as the conditional survival probability between t and
t+∆t.
Attaching an interpretation to L is somewhat more difficult. For our purposes, it will
suffice to assume that selling an illiquid bond involves random searching costs (1− L)
proportional to the bond value. This yields the relation CBilliq = L · CBliq. We
assume that L has a similar exponential-affine representation as P , i.e. L(t, t + ∆t) =
Et
[
exp
(
− ∫ t+∆t
t
γ (s) ds
)]
. The liquidity intensity γ can then be interpreted as the
continuous-time rate formulation of the searching costs which arise for each infinitesimally
small time interval until the maturity of the bond.
We now show our argument in a three-period model with independent interest rate,
default risk, and liquidity factors for notational simplicity. However, this model can easily
be extended to dependent risk factors by replacing the expectations operator for D, P,
and L with the joint expectations operator. Our goal is then to price a coupon-bearing,
default-risky, illiquid bond at time 0 with a fixed coupon c paid at times t = (1, 2, 3),
notional F , and maturity in 3. For ease of exposition, we also assume a recovery rate of 0.
This bond will pay the coupon c and the face value F at time 3 if no default has occurred
prior to 3. Therefore, the dirty price of the bond at time 3, CB (t = 3) is equal to the
payment F + c since there is no default or liquidity risk as well as no time delay until the
payment is made.
If we go back one time step to 2, the value of the bond is equal to the coupon c plus
the value of the claim on the payment F + c at 3. The (dirty) price of a perfectly liquid,
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default-free bond with identical payment structure at 2 is given by
CBnodefliq (t = 2, dirty) = c+ CB
nodef
liq (t = 2, clean)
= c+ E2
[
CBnodefliq (t = 3, dirty)
]
= c+D2,3 · CBnodefliq (t = 3, dirty)
= c+D2,3 · (F + c),
where D2,3 is the default-free interest rate discount factor that applies between 2 and 3.
If the claim is subject to default risk between 2 and 3, then the price is equal to
CBdefliq (t = 2, dirty) = c+ CB
def
liq (t = 2, clean)
= c+ P2,3 · CBnodefliq (t = 2, clean)
= c+ P2,3 · E2
[
CBnodefliq (t = 3, dirty)
]
= c+ P2,3 ·D2,3 · CBnodefliq (t = 3, dirty)
= c+ P2,3 ·D2,3 · (F + c)
= c + P2,3 ·D2,3 · c
+ P2,3 ·D2,3 · F.
If, in addition, the claim is also subject to liquidity risk, that is searching, trading, or
transaction costs are incurred if the claim on the payment at time 3 is sold prior to time 3,
the price is given by
CBdefilliq(t = 2, dirty) = c+ CB
def
illiq(t = 2, clean)
= c+ L2,3 · CBdefliq (t = 2, clean)
= c+ L2,3 · P2,3 · CBnodefliq (t = 2, clean)
= c+ L2,3 · P2,3 ·D2,3 · CBnodefliq (t = 3, dirty)
= c+ L2,3 · P2,3 ·D2,3 · (F + c)
= c + L2,3 · P2,3 ·D2,3 · c
+ L2,3 · P2,3 ·D2,3 · F.
One time-step earlier at time 1, the price of a claim on the bond’s cash flows that is subject
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to default risk and illiquidity both between 2 and 3 but not between 1 and 2 equals
CBdef,t=2illiq,t=2(t = 1, dirty) = c+ CB
def,t=2
illiq,t=2(t = 1, clean)
= c+ E1
[
CBdef,t=2illiq,t=2(t = 2, dirty)
]
= c+D1,2 · CBdefilliq(t = 2, dirty)
= c+D1,2 · [c+ L2,3 · P2,3 ·D2,3 · (F + c)]
= c + D1,2 · c
+ L2,3 · P2,3 ·D1,2 ·D2,3 · c
+ L2,3 · P2,3 ·D1,2 ·D2,3 · F.
If above claim is also subject to default risk between 1 and 2, the value equals
CBdef,t=1illiq,t=2(t = 1, dirty) = c+ CB
def,t=1
illiq,t=2(t = 1, clean)
= c+ P1,2 · CBdef,t=2illiq,t=2(t = 1, clean)
= c+ P1,2 ·D1,2 · CBdefilliq(t = 2, dirty)
= c+ P1,2 ·D1,2 · [c+ L2,3 · P2,3 ·D2,3 · (F + c)]
= c + P1,2 ·D1,2 · c
+ L2,3 · P1,2 · P2,3 ·D1,2 ·D2,3 · c
+ L2,3 · P1,2 · P2,3 ·D1,2 ·D2,3 · F.
Adding liquidity risk between 1 and 2 gives the value of the default-risky, illiquid bond as
CBdef,t=1illiq,t=1(t = 1) = c+ L1,2 · CBdef,t=1illiq,t=2(t = 1, clean)
= c+ L1,2 · P1,2 · CBdef,t=2illiq,t=2(t = 1, clean)
= c+ L1,2 · P1,2 ·D1,2 · CBdef,t=2illiq,t=2(t = 2, dirty)
= c + L1,2 · P1,2 ·D1,2 · c
+ L1,2 · L2,3 · P1,2 · P2,3 ·D1,2 ·D2,3 · c
+ L1,2 · L2,3 · P1,2 · P2,3 ·D1,2 ·D2,3 · F.
The choice of the form of the default-free discount factor, the survival probability and the
liquidity discount factor yields that D1,2 ·D2,3 = D1,3, P1,2 ·P2,3 = P1,3, and L1,2 ·L2,3 = L1,3.
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Therefore, we can write above equation as
CBdef,t=1illiq,t=1(t = 1) = c ·
3∑
i=1
L1,i · P1,i ·D1,i + F · L1,3 · P1,3 ·D1,3,
where L1,1 = P1,1 = D1,1 = 1.
Adding a non-zero recovery rate and allowing for pricing at any point-in-time t yields
the bond pricing equation.
4.5.2 Analytical Solutions for the Discount Factors in the Base
Case
Our model specification results in the following well-known analytical solutions for the credit
risk discount factor and the liquidity discount factor P (t, ti, λ) and the liquidity discount
factor L
(
t, ti, γ
l
)
, l ∈ {b, ask, bid}:
P (t, ti, λ) := a1 (t, ti) · exp [−λt · a2 (t, ti)] ,
L
(
t, ti, γ
l
)
:= al3 (t, ti) · exp
[−γlt · al4 (t, ti)] ,
a1 (t, ti) =
(
1− κ
1− κ exp [φ (ti − t)]
) 2α
σ2
exp
[
α (β + φ)
σ2
(ti − t)
]
,
a2 (t, ti) =
φ− β
σ2
+
2φ
σ2 (κ exp [φ (ti − t)]− 1) ,
al3 (t, ti) = exp
[
ηl
2
(ti − t)3
6
+
µl (ti − t)2
6
]
,
al4 (t, ti) = ti − t,
φ =
√
2σ2 + β2,
κ =
β + φ
β − φ.
Chapter 5
Model Extensions
In this chapter, we describe two extensions to the basic reduced-form model developed in
Section 4. The first extension concerns an explicit modelling of the correlation structure of
the credit risk and the liquidity intensity. The second extension includes the cheapest-to-
deliver option into our valuation framework.
5.1 Explicit Modelling of the Correlation Structure
The VAR and the VECM analysis of the estimated credit risk and liquidity premia in
Section 4.2 show that these two premia are cointegrated. This relation is unlikely to be
inherent to our model since the simulation study in Section 4.1.4 did not result in credit risk
and liquidity premia which were cointegrated with one another. In this section, we introduce
a specific structure for the cross-dependence of the credit risk and liquidity premia. In detail,
we assume that the credit risk and the liquidity intensity are affected by the same latent
factors but to a degree that can differ. We then estimate the strength of the impact of these
latent factors and compute a specific correlation-induced premium in bond yield spreads and
mid CDS premia. Our results imply that the correlation premia were mostly subsumed in
the liquidity premia in the previous section. Regarding the premium size, the credit-risk
independent liquidity component is about 6 times larger than the correlation component for
bonds and 5 times larger for CDS.
5.1.1 Extended Model with Correlated Intensities
Specification of Intensity Processes
Instead of directly modelling the default and liquidity intensities, we now assume that they
are determined by 4 independent latent risk factors x, yb, yask, and ybid. The default-free
instantaneous interest rate r constitutes the last risk factor, and we assume that it evolves
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independently of the other factors and that the time-t price of the default-free liquidity
nume´raire is given by D (t, τ) = Et
[
D˜ (t, τ)
]
.
We model x as a square root process, and yb, yask, and ybid as arithmetic Brownian
motions. The default intensity λ and the liquidity intensities for the bond (γb), the CDS ask
premium (γask), and the CDS bid premium (γbid) are determined by the following model:

dλ(t)
dγb(t)
dγask(t)
dγbid(t)
 =

1 gb gask gbid
fb 1 ωb,ask ωb,bid
fask ωb,ask 1 ωask,bid
fbid ωb,bid ωask,bid 1


dx(t)
dyb(t)
dyask(t)
dybid(t)
 (5.1)
=

1 gb gask gbid
fb 1 ωb,ask ωb,bid
fask ωb,ask 1 ωask,bid
fbid ωb,bid ωask,bid 1



α− βx (t)
µb
µask
µbid
 dt+

σ
√
x (t)dWx(t)
ηbdWyb(t)
ηaskdWyask(t)
ηbiddWybid(t)

 ,
with parameters α, β, µl, fl, gl, σ > 0, and η
l > 0. Wx and Wyl are independent Brownian
motions, l ∈ {b, ask, bid}. The matrix of the factor sensitivities is assumed to be of full rank
in order to ensure parameter identification.
fl and gl determine the correlation between λ and γ
l. If both coefficients equal 0, credit
risk and liquidity are uncorrelated. If fl 6= 0, credit risk directly affects liquidity, and the
reverse applies if gl 6= 0. There are two links that determine the correlation between the
liquidity intensities. First, there can be an indirect link through the impact of x via the
factor sensitivity fl. Second, the coefficients ωl,k imply a direct link between the liquidity
intensities through the latent risk factors yl and yk. Economically speaking, a correlation
between the liquidity intensities which is not directly due to x allows us to determine the
channel through which pure liquidity effects are transmitted from one market into the other.
A potential relation between the CDS ask and bid liquidity intensities as measured by
ωask,bid can be attributed to a similar inventory argument as the one given in Section 4.1.3.
If a trader enters into transactions on the ask side, thus taking on credit risk, she is likely to
adjust the ask and bid premia accordingly in order to retain a balanced inventory, and vice
versa. The bond liquidity intensity and the CDS ask and bid liquidity intensities, on the other
hand, can be interdependent due to non-zero values of ωb,ask and ωb,bid because long (short)
credit risk positions can be incurred either by buying (short-selling) the bond or by selling
(buying) credit protection in the CDS contract on the ask (bid) side. A liquidity-driven price
or premium change in one market presumably leads to corresponding changes in the other
market: If the bond price falls due to a lower liquidity, buying credit risk becomes cheaper
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which is likely to drive down the CDS ask premium, and vice versa. The reverse effect applies
for the CDS bid premium. Due to the symmetric nature of these direct liquidity spillover
effects, we choose a symmetric structure of the factor sensitivity matrix with regard to the
ωl,k-coefficients.
Due to the independence of x and yl, the expected values of P˜ (t, τi)·L˜l (t, τi) and P˜ (t, τi)·
L˜l (t, τi+1) in Equations (4.1), (4.4), and (4.5) can be represented by analytical functions
which are linear-exponential in x and yl, l ∈ {b, ask, bid}. We denote these functions by
P l (t, τi, x; f) and L
l (t, τ, y; g), respectively P l (t, τi, τi+1, x; f) and L
l (t, τi, τi+1, y; g), and
derive their form in Appendix 5.3.1.
Substituting these functions in Equations (4.1), (4.4), and (4.5) yields the analytical
solutions CB (t) = CB (t, x, y; f, g) for the bond price, sask = sask (t, x, y; f, g) for the CDS
ask premium, and sbid = sbid (t, x, y; f, g) for the CDS bid premium, where y =
(
yb, yask, ybid
)
,
f = (fb, fask, fbid), and g = (gb, gask, gbid).
Measures for Credit Risk, Liquidity, and Correlation Premia
In addition to the credit risk and liquidity premia, we now additionally determine a
correlation-induced component of the observed premia. The rationale for this decomposition
is again most easily seen with regard to the bond. As in Section 4.1.3, the pure credit risk
premium equals the yield spread that would apply if credit risk were the only priced factor
(again excepting r). In this case, the latent factor yb is identical to 0, all factor sensitivities
g become irrelevant, and the default intensity λ and the latent factor x coincide.
The pure liquidity premium equals the yield spread that would apply if liquidity were the
only priced factor, i.e. x is identical to 0, and the latent factor yb and the liquidity intensity
γb coincide.
The correlation premium then measures the part of the yield spread that is incurred
because the default intensity λ and the liquidity intensity γb do not evolve independently. If,
as our empirical analysis shows, x affects γb but λ is mostly independent of y, the liquidity
discount may increase not because y changes but because liquidity declines due to the impact
of x.
Consequently, we determine the pure credit risk premia csdef and sdef by setting y
and the factor sensitivities equal to 0, i.e. from CB (t, x, 0; 0, 0) and sask (t, x, 0; 0, 0) =
sbid (t, x, 0; 0, 0). The pure liquidity premia csliq and sliq follow as the premium increase
above csdef and sdef if the latent factor y is included but the factor sensitivities remain at 0.
The correlation premia cscor and scor then arise naturally as the difference between the total
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yield spread, respectively the mid CDS premium, including the non-zero factor sensitivities
f and g, and the sum of the credit risk and the correlation premia.
5.1.2 Empirical Analysis including Correlation Premia
Calibration Procedure
We calibrate the model developed in Section 5.1.1 to the identical data as before, i.e. we
estimate for each firm the 9 parameters
(
α, β, σ, µb, ηb, µask, ηask, µbid, ηbid
)
, the 9 factor
sensitivities f = (fb, fask, fbid), g = (gb, gask, gbid), and ω = (ωb,ask, ωb,bid, ωask,bid), and for
each date t the current value of the intensities
(
λ, γb, γask, γbid
)
(t), t = 1, . . . , 1548.
Compared to the calibration described in Section 4.2.1, the procedure now contains
an additional step. In the first step, we initiate a base grid for the process parameters(
α, β, σ, µb, ηb, µask, ηask, µbid, ηbid
)
, and set all factor sensitivities f , g, and ω to 0. This
corresponds to the case of uncorrelated intensities. In the second step, we then determine
the values
(
λ, γb, γask, γbid
)
(t), t = 1, . . . , 1548, which simultaneously minimize the sum of
squared errors between the time series of the observed and the theoretical CDS premia and
bond yield spreads. As before, we match all values at the basis point level. Estimation is
conditional on the presumed process parameters and, additionally, the factor sensitivities.
In the third step, we determine the factor sensitivities f , g, and ω which are implied by the
estimated time series of the intensities using a discrete version of equation (5.1). We iterate
between the second and the third step using the updated factor sensitivities and intensity
values until we obtain no further absolute change larger than 0.01 in the factor sensitivities
in each of two subsequent steps.40 We follow this procedure in each grid point and determine
the point associated with the smallest sum of squared errors. Around this point, we initiate
a finer local grid as in the first step and repeat the second and the third step in each point
of the new grid. We stop this three-step procedure when the minimal sum of squared errors
twice decreases by less than 1% on two subsequent grid specifications. In order to control
for local optima, we repeat the analysis for the points in the base grid associated with the
second and third smallest sum of squared errors.
Factor Sensitivities
We first discuss the coefficient estimates for the factor matrix in equation (5.1). This allows
us to demonstrate how credit risk affects liquidity, how liquidity affects credit risk, and how
the liquidity of the bond and the CDS market affect one another.
40Convergence is usually achieved in less than 10 iteration steps.
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Table 5.1: Factor Sensitivities
The table presents the estimates for the factor sensitivities. fb, fask, and fbid measure the impact
of the latent credit risk factor x on the bond, CDS ask, and CDS bid liquidity intensities γb,
γask, and γbid. gb, gask, and gbid measure the impact of the latent bond, CDS ask, and CDS bid
liquidity factors yb, yask, and ybid on the default intensity λ. ωb,ask, ωb,bid, and ωask,bid measure
the cross-impact of the latent bond, CDS ask, and CDS bid liquidity factors yb, yask, and ybid on
the bond, CDS ask, and CDS bid liquidity intensities γb, γask, and γbid. The first row of each
panel gives the number of reference entities for which the sensitivity estimate was significantly
different from 0, the second row the number of estimates significantly larger than 0, the third row
the number of estimates significantly smaller than 0. The fourth and fifth row present the mean
estimate and the standard deviation. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
level for a standard t-test across firms.
Panel A: All
fb fask fbid gb gask gbid ωb,ask ωb,bid ωask,bid
# Firms 156 148 76 1 3 2 134 95 139
# > 0 147 147 33 1 2 1 6 89 16
# < 0 9 1 43 - 1 1 128 6 123
Mean 0.17*** 0.38*** -0.07*** 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01*** 0.01*** -0.39***
Std. Dev. 0.02 0.03 0.02 - 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.04
Panel B: Financial Sector
# Firms 48 44 26 - - - 45 36 47
# > 0 46 44 10 - - - 1 34 5
# < 0 2 - 16 - - - 44 2 42
Mean 0.08*** 0.31*** -0.13*** - - - -0.02*** 0.02*** -0.47***
Std. Dev. 0.02 0.03 0.03 - - - 0.02 0.02 0.03
Panel C: Non-Financial Corporate Sector
# Firms 92 94 40 1 3 1 78 49 84
# > 0 92 94 19 1 2 - 4 46 10
# < 0 - - 21 - 1 1 74 3 74
Mean 0.20*** 0.43*** -0.06*** 0.00 0.01 -0.00 -0.02*** 0.01*** -0.30***
Std. Dev. 0.02 0.03 0.03 - 0.01 - 0.01 0.01 0.04
Panel D: Sovereign Sector
# Firms 16 10 10 - - - 11 10 8
# > 0 9 9 4 - - - 1 9 1
# < 0 7 1 6 - - - 10 1 7
Mean -0.10*** 0.09*** 0.01*** - - - -0.06*** 0.09*** -0.49***
Std. Dev. 0.04 0.04 0.03 - - - 0.03 0.02 0.05
Panel E: Investment Grade
# Firms 146 140 71 1 3 1 123 91 127
# > 0 137 140 33 1 2 - 2 86 14
# < 0 9 - 38 - 1 1 121 5 113
Mean 0.10*** 0.36*** -0.07*** 0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.02*** 0.01*** -0.38***
Std. Dev. 0.02 0.03 0.03 - 0.01 - 0.02 0.02 0.04
Panel F: Subinvestment Grade
# Firms 10 8 5 - - 1 11 4 12
# > 0 10 7 - - - 1 4 3 2
# < 0 - 1 5 - - - 7 1 10
Mean 0.20*** 0.46*** -0.06*** - - 0.00 -0.06*** 0.03*** -0.22***
Std. Dev. 0.03 0.03 0.02 - - - 0.02 0.01 0.03
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As the estimates for the factor sensitivities for the entire sample in Panel A of Table 5.1
show, credit risk has an impact on both the bond liquidity intensity and the CDS liquidity
intensities, but not vice versa. The latent factor x affects the bond liquidity intensity γb
through fb significantly for 156 out of 171 firms. 147 of these estimates for fb are positive, and
the positive mean factor sensitivity estimate of 0.17 suggests that the liquidity of the bond
market dries up as credit risk increases. We quantify the impact on the premia components
in more detail below. The impact of x on the CDS ask intensity γask, measured by fask, is
significant for 148 and positive for 147 firms with a mean estimate of 0.38. The CDS bid
intensity γbid, in turn, is significantly affected by x for only 76 firms with a negative estimate
for fbid for 43 firms. The mean estimate of -0.07 is, however, significantly different from 0 at
the 1% level and implies that the CDS bid quotes decrease disproportionately when credit
risk increases.
The impact of the latent factors yb, yask, and ybid on the default intensity λ, on the other
hand, is almost negligible. In Panel A of Table 5.1, we obtain only one significant coefficient
estimate for gb, three for gask – out of which two are positive – and two for gbid with a positive
and a negative one. These results illustrate that credit risk increases illiquidity in the bond
market but not vice versa. We can also conclude that higher credit risk leads to a higher
distance between the pure credit risk CDS premium and the ask premium. CDS bid premia,
on the other hand, are not as unilaterally affected.
The liquidity spillover between the bond and the CDS market can be inferred from the
estimates of ωb,ask and ωb,bid in Panel A of Table 5.1. The coefficient estimate for ωb,ask is
significant for 134 firms and negative for 128. The mean value of -0.01 implies that increasing
illiquidity in the bond market results in lower CDS ask premia. This is consistent with a
substitution effect in the bond and the CDS market. A decreasing liquidity in the bond
market implies that buying credit risk through the bond becomes cheaper due to decreasing
bond prices and increasing bond spreads, and thus more attractive. If a trader intends to
take on credit risk synthetically by selling protection in a CDS contract, she accordingly
decreases her ask quote compared to the case with high bond market liquidity.
The estimate for the CDS bid liquidity coefficient ωb,bid which is significant for 95 firms
and positive for 89 with a mean value of 0.01 for the full sample is also consistent with
the substitution of bonds and CDS. Lower bond prices due to decreasing liquidity which
correspond to higher bond spreads make shorting credit risk via the bond more costly and
thus lead to higher bid quotes in the CDS market.
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The estimate for ωask,bid is significant for 139 firms and negative for 123 firms. The
negative mean of -0.39 implies that the bid and ask quote tend to move in opposite directions.
This finding agrees with an overall increasing liquidity in the CDS market with decreasing
bid-ask spreads as the market matures.
With regard to the different industry sectors in Panel B to D and the investment grade
and subinvestment grade rating classes in Panel E and F of Table 5.1, we mostly observe a
similar results as for the entire sample. Only the absolute values of the coefficient estimates
for fb, fask, and fbid tend to be smaller for the financial and the investment grade sector.
This points to a weaker relation between credit risk and liquidity.
Interestingly, we obtain 7 negative estimates for fb and a mean of -0.10 for the sovereign
sector, and two negative estimates for the financial sector. The negative estimates are
obtained for AAA, respectively AA, rated reference entities which suggests that the liquidity
of the very highly rated debt issues increases for higher credit risk. This finding points at a
flight-to-quality effect.
The link between the liquidity of the bond and the CDS market, as shown by the
coefficient estimates for ωb,ask, ωb,bid, and ωask,bid seems to be stronger for the sovereign
sector as shown by the higher absolute value of the coefficient estimates.
Overall, the estimates of the factor sensitivities suggest that credit risk mostly affects
liquidity and not vice versa. A higher latent credit risk factor x directly translates into a
higher illiquidity in the bond market and a higher demand pressure in the CDS market which
leads to higher ask premia. CDS bid premia, on the other hand, are not as symmetrically
affected. The coefficient estimates for the cross-market impact of the latent liquidity factors
are consistent with a substitution between bonds and CDS, and the relation between the
CDS ask and bid liquidity imply that ask and bid premia move towards each other.
Credit Risk, Liquidity, and Correlation Premia: Cross-Sectional Results
In Table 5.2, we present the premia decomposition we obtain using the model that explicitly
accounts for the factor sensitivities.
A comparison of Table 5.2 with Table 4.1 shows that the average estimates of csdef and sdef
are almost identical. The largest difference occurs for the A rating class where we obtain an
average pure credit risk premium that falls below the original estimate by 3.75 bp for csdef
and by 3.89 bp for sdef. With regard to the different industry sectors, the change is largest
for the sovereign sector where we obtain a decrease of 0.98 bp for csdef and of 0.55 bp for
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sdef. Across all observations, the estimate of csdef decreases by 0.13 bp to 52.08 bp and that
of sdef by 0.35 bp to 52.36 bp.
The small change in the credit risk premia implies that the correlation premia were
subsumed in the liquidity premia in Table 4.1. On average, csliq decreases by 3.77 bp. The
maximal change for the bond pure liquidity premium occurs for the BBB, BB, and B rating
class. In particular, csliq is now largest for the BBB rating class at 33.81 bp. Regarding the
different industry sectors, the highest absolute change is given in the non-financial corporate
sector, but on an absolute level, csliq decreases to 51% of its original value for the sovereign
sector which signifies a stronger decrease than the 14% decrease for both the financial and
the non-financial corporate sector.
The average bond correlation premium cscor of 3.94 bp approximately agrees with the
joint decrease of csdef and csliq of 3.90 bp. The average of cscor increases monotonously across
the different rating classes up to the B rating class which agrees with the increasing pure
credit risk premia. For the AAA rating class, we obtain a negative mean which is due to
the negative factor sensitivities we discussed above. Relative to csdef, the mean of cscor is
highest for the BBB rating class at 13% with values between between -0.03% and 10% for
the remaining investment grade and 1% to 6% for the subinvestment grade rating classes.
The financial sector has the highest percentage part of correlation premia with regard to the
pure credit risk premia at 9%. This, however, is not necessarily a sign of a higher correlation
between credit risk and liquidity since the overall pure liquidity premia are also highest for
this sector. With regard to these, cscor amounts to 16% for the financial sector, 17% for the
non-financial corporate sector, and 186% for the sovereign sector. This high percentage is
especially noteworthy since for 7 sovereign reference entities credit risk and liquidity are, in
fact, negatively correlated.
For the total yield spread, we find that csdef attributes 66%, csliq 29%, and cscor 5%.
Recall that in Table 4.1, csdef amounted to 67%, suggesting that almost the entire correlation
premium was subsumed in the liquidity premium.
For CDS premia, the pure liquidity premium sliq remains positive with an average of 1.55
bp which suggests that transactions in the CDS market are, as before, mostly ask-initiated.
In addition, the minimal pure liquidity premia for the AA to BBB rating class become
positive, suggesting that the protection sellers dominate in each phase. In contrast to our
earlier result, however, sliq in Table 5.2 is now on average maximal for the A rating class
in the investment grade segment with a mean of 4.79 bp, suggesting that the asymmetry is
largest in this case. The subinvestment grade segment becomes more balanced if we exclude
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the effect of credit risk. In particular, the minimal and maximal values of sliq decrease on
an absolute level. Relative to the pure credit risk premia, sliq lies at 17% for the A rating
class and between 1% and 5% for the remaining classes.
Across the different industry sectors, we find that for financial reference entities sliq
actually increases from an average of 0.71 bp in Table 4.1 to 1.01 bp in Table 5.2 with a
negative average of scor at -0.41 bp. The economic interpretation of this finding is as follows.
On average, protection sellers in the CDS market set disproportionately higher ask quotes
for financial reference entities as well as for non-financial reference entities. If credit risk
increases, however, selling protection becomes less profitable, decreasing the supply relative
to the demand and leading to a negative average of scor. The negative value is due to the
fact that the correlation of both the bid and the ask liquidity with the default intensity are
positive. Therefore, the CDS bid premium can at times increase more strongly than the ask
premium. A similar result is obtained for the AAA rating class.
On average, the correlation premium scor is rather small with a mean value of 0.41 bp.
For the investment grade segment, the mean values lie consistently below 0.50 bp and grow
in excess of a factor of 10 for the subinvestment grade segment. Relative to the pure credit
risk premia, they amount to 2%, but relative to the pure liquidity premia, they exceed
50%. We conclude that the pure liquidity premia in the subinvestment grade segment are
relatively low and that changes in credit risk have a strong impact on the correlation premium
because the changes are reflected differently in the bid and the ask premium. Concerning
the decomposition of the total CDS premia, we observe that on average 96% of the total
premium is due to sdef, 3% to sliq, and 1% to scor.
Credit Risk, Liquidity, and Correlation Premia: Time Series Results
In order to explore the dynamic link between the premia, we again perform a Johansen VAR
analysis. In contrast to our earlier analysis, the independence of the latent risk factors makes
an analysis of the relation of the pure credit risk premia csdef and sdef with the pure liquidity
premia csliq and sliq redundant.41 Therefore, we analyze the pairwise relation between the
pure credit risk premia, the pure liquidity premia, and the correlation premia of the two
markets. This changes our earlier focus from the relation between credit risk and liquidity
premia to the relation between the bond and the CDS market.
As in Section 4.2.3, we first test for each reference entity whether the levels and first
differences of the pure credit risk, the pure liquidity, and the correlation premia are stationary
41The Johansen cointegration analysis which we perform as in Section 4.2.3 reveals that the pure credit
risk and pure liquidity premia remain cointegrated for only 7 out of 171 reference entities.
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and whether they are cointegrated. The VAR specification is as follows:
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(5.4)
We demand that the parameters are identical for all, respectively all investment grade or
subinvestment grade reference entities. As before, time lags up to degree 5 are considered
to capture a weekly interval, and the resulting parameter estimates are transformed into a
single estimate. We subsequently test whether the residuals are stationary.
The results of the estimation are displayed in Table 5.3. We first discuss the results for
the entire sample, then the results for the investment and subinvestment grade segment.
The industry sectors are not discussed separately for brevity.
As the coefficient estimates in Panel A of Table 5.3 show, ∆csdef and ∆sdef are negatively
autocorrelated and negatively correlated with their lagged level, and the coefficients estimates
are absolutely larger for ∆csdef. The sensitivity of ∆csdef to ∆sdef−1 is also higher, and we
attribute both these effects to the impact of the bond liquidity on sdef. The adjusted R2 of
9.95% for ∆csdef and 9.02% for ∆sdef is low, suggesting that the autoregressive time series
relation in addition to the cross-market impact only explain a low amount of variation.
The changes of the bond and CDS pure liquidity premia ∆csliq and ∆sliq are also
negatively autocorrelated and negatively correlated with their lagged level, and the relation
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Table 5.3: The Dynamic Relationship of Credit Risk, Liquidity, and Correlation
Premia
The table shows the estimated coefficients for the Johansen VAR model in Equations (5.2) to (5.4).
csdef is the pure credit risk, csliq the pure liquidity, and cscor the correlation component in the
yield spread of a synthetical 5-year par bond. sdef is the pure credit risk, sliq the pure liquidity,
and scor the correlation component in the mid premium for a 5-year CDS contract. The dependent
variables are the premium changes, the explanatory variables are the lagged premium changes and
the lagged premium levels. The top row of each panel displays the number of reference entities for
which 1) the augmented Dickey-Fuller test cannot reject a unit root in the premia time series at
the 10% significance level, 2) the augmented Dickey-Fuller test can reject a unit root in the first
differences at the 10% level, 3) the Johansen test cannot reject cointegration of the time series at
the 10% level, 4) the augmented Dickey-Fuller can reject a unit root in the residuals at the 10%
level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Coefficients are for premia
in basis points, the adjusted R2 are in percentage points.
Panel A: All
∆csdef ∆sdef ∆csliq ∆sliq ∆cscor ∆scor
#Firms 156 158 148
∆cs−1 -0.96*** 0.34*** -0.44*** -0.02*** -0.30*** 0.01**
∆s−1 0.71*** -0.60*** -0.01 -0.58*** 0.13*** -0.03***
cs−1 -0.06*** 0.03*** -0.04*** 0.00 -0.01*** 0.00**
s−1 0.05*** -0.03*** 0.01 -0.31*** 0.00 -0.02***
Adj. R2 9.95 9.02 19.18 27.00 8.81 0.97
Panel B: Investment Grade
#Firms 148 159 142
∆cs−1 -0.41*** 0.18*** -0.45*** -0.01* -0.32*** 0.01*
∆s−1 0.14*** -0.07*** -0.02 -0.53*** 0.15*** -0.02***
cs−1 -0.02*** 0.00 -0.03*** 0.00 -0.01*** 0.00
s−1 0.00 -0.01*** -0.01 -0.14*** 0.00* -0.02***
Adj. R2 7.67 6.80 19.17 25.35 9.28 1.00
Panel C: Subinvestment Grade
#Firms 8 9 6
∆cs−1 -2.54*** 1.79*** -0.46*** -0.08*** -0.30*** 0.03***
∆s−1 2.28*** -1.51*** -0.01* -0.63*** 0.51*** -0.17***
cs−1 -2.29*** 1.86*** -0.08*** -0.02*** -0.01*** 0.01***
s−1 2.32*** -1.88*** 0.03 -0.45*** 0.00 -0.03***
Adj. R2 18.62 16.55 19.95 30.87 4.95 2.06
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is stronger for the CDS premia with a coefficient estimate of -0.58 for ∆sliq−1 and -0.31 for s
liq
−1.
This suggests that the pure liquidity premia’s autocorrelation is not due to the impact of
the factor x but a property of the data set.42 In addition, ∆sliq reacts significantly to ∆csliq−1,
and the negative sign of the coefficient estimate suggests that liquidity moves in opposite
directions. Even though the estimate is small at -0.02, it is economically significant since
csliq is on average much higher than sliq.
The negative estimate for the relation between ∆sliq and ∆csliq−1 shows that the positive
comovement of the liquidity premia in the base case model in Section 4.2.3 was in fact due
to the impact of credit risk on the liquidity premia.
Reversely, the CDS pure liquidity premia do not seem to affect the bond pure liquidity
premia. The adjusted R2 is about twice as high for ∆csliq at 19.18% and three times as high
for ∆sliq with 27.00% than for ∆csdef and ∆sdef, suggesting that the interdependence between
the markets’ liquidity remains significant even if the impact of credit risk is excluded. In
comparison to the higher adjusted R2 in the base case in Panel A of Table 4.2, the results
in Panel A of Table 5.3 suggest that a substantial part of the variation in that case was due
to changes in credit risk.
The changes of the bond and CDS correlation premia ∆cscor and ∆scor are also negatively
autocorrelated and negatively correlated with their lagged level. The behavior is similar to
that of ∆csdef and ∆sdef. For ∆cscor, this is due to the fact that x affects γb but yb does not
affect λ, i.e. that credit risk affects bond liquidity but not vice versa. ∆scor, on the other
hand, exhibits a different behavior with the autocorrelation coefficient estimates being close
to 0 and the impact of ∆cscor−1 and cs
cor
−1 on ∆s
cor being significant at the 5% level only. The
adjusted R2 reflects this time series behavior as well; for ∆cscor, the adjusted R2 of 8.81% is
close to that of ∆csdef while the value of 0.97% for ∆scor is very small.
Rating Classes In the base case, the time series analysis in Table 4.2 revealed that the
behavior of the premia differs between the investment and the subinvestment grade segment.
The results of the Johansen VAR analysis for the investment grade segment in Panel B of
Table 5.3 show that the dynamics of the premia are the same as in Panel A but that the
size of the coefficients and the explanatory power decrease. This is similar to our result in
Table 4.2. ∆csdef and ∆sdef remain negatively autocorrelated and negatively correlated with
their lagged level, but the level of the premia in one market does not affect the premia changes
42Unfortunately, it also suggests that the dynamics of the latent factors governing liquidity are not specified
correctly. We have also included mean reversion in the latent factors, but this made identification of the
processes in the calibration almost impossible.
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in the other market significantly any more. The adjusted R2 decreases by approximately 2
percentage points for both ∆csdef and ∆sdef compared to the full sample.
The changes of the CDS pure liquidity premia ∆sliq now also exhibit a negative
dependency on ∆csliq−1 which, however, decreases to -0.01 and is only significant at the 10%
level compared to the entire sample. As a result, the adjusted R2 for ∆sliq decreases to
25.35% while that for ∆csliq remains virtually unaffected. In comparison to the base case
model, this suggests that the positive link between the liquidity premia in Table 4.2 for the
investment grade segment was due to the effect of credit risk.
The correlation premia show almost the identical behavior in the investment grade
segment as they do for the entire sample, only the adjusted R2 is slightly higher.
Overall, the investment grade segment exhibits a lower connection between the premia in
the bond and the CDS market. These findings suggest that the premia for investment grade
reference entities remain affected by market-specific conditions in excess of the firm-specific
ones. We further explore this possibility below.
Panel C of Table 5.3 shows the coefficient estimates for the subinvestment grade segment.
For the changes of the pure credit risk premia ∆csdef and ∆sdef, the coefficients and the
explanatory power are almost double the size we find for the investment grade segment.
As expected from the results for the entire sample, the sign of the coefficient for the
impact of ∆csliq−1 on ∆s
liq is negative and the estimate itself large at -0.08. Because of lower
bond market liquidity, the CDS market becomes a more attractive substitute for taking on
credit risk. In addition, csliq−1 negatively affects ∆s
liq with a coefficient estimate of -0.02,
further strengthening this result. The explanatory power for ∆sliq also increases to 30.87%.
∆sliq itself also has a slight reverse effect on ∆csliq, but both the economic and the statistical
significance of the coefficient estimate of -0.01 are limited. In comparison to the base case,
we observe a strengthening of the negative impact of bond liquidity on CDS liquidity but
less evidence for the reverse impact.
The correlation premia become more closely interconnected, but the explanatory power
decreases for ∆cscor and increases for ∆scor. In comparison to the investment grade segment,
the higher coefficient estimates and the higher adjusted R2 imply that the bond and the CDS
market for the subinvestment grade segment are more closely interconnected.
In summary, the time series analysis for the pure credit risk, the pure liquidity, and the
correlation premia shows that the positive relation between the bond and CDS liquidity
premia in Section 4.2.3 was caused by the implicit relation of the credit risk and liquidity
intensities. If we disentangle the pure liquidity from the correlation-induced component of
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the liquidity component, we observe a negative relation between the pure liquidity premia
which is stable across the different rating sectors.
Stability Analysis
Impact of Market-Wide Credit Risk and Liquidity Factors We first repeat the
Johansen VAR analysis with exogenous variables in order to explore the impact of market-
wide conditions on the time series relation between the two markets. As in Section 4.3.3, we
choose the S&P Creditweek Corporate Bond Index yield spreads described in the previous
chapter. Liquidity is proxied by the ECB Financial Market Liquidity Indicator. The results
are displayed in Table 5.4.
As in the base case, the inclusion of the aggregate credit risk and liquidity measures hardly
affects the dynamics of the firm-specific pure credit risk premia as measured by the increase
of the adjusted R2 and, excepting the relation of ∆sdef with ∆csdef−1 and ∆s
def
−1, the size of the
coefficient estimates. Both ∆csdef and ∆sdef depend positively on market-wide credit risk
and negatively on liquidity, but the increase of the adjusted R2 from 9.95% to 10.91% shows
that the explanatory power of the market-wide measures is small. The impact is stronger
for the investment grade segment: the adjusted R2 almost doubles from 7.67% to 12.65%
for bonds and from 6.80% to 11.81% for CDS. For the subinvestment grade segment, the
coefficient estimates are either insignificant or only significant at the 10% level. Clearly, the
pure credit risk premia in the subinvestment grade segment almost completely depend on
the reference entity’s idiosyncratic default risk.
As in the base case analysis in Section 4.3.3, the impact of the market-wide measures on
the pure liquidity premia remains higher than on the pure credit risk premia as measured by
the increase of the adjusted R2. We obtain a positive dependence on the credit risk and a
negative one on the liquidity measure, and the adjusted R2 for ∆csliq increases by almost 10
percentage points for the entire sample. For the investment grade segment, ∆csliq and ∆sliq
both react positively to increases of credit risk and negatively to increases of liquidity, and
the effect on the bond pure liquidity premium is more pronounced. This result is the same
as in the base case. In the subinvestment grade segment, on the other hand, ∆csliq reacts
with strong increases to an increase in aggregate credit risk and with very slight decreases
to an increase in overall market liquidity. For CDS pure liquidity premia, we observe a
negative dependence on market-wide credit risk and a positive one on the market-wide
liquidity increases. Therefore, the CDS market becomes more liquid during times of low
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Table 5.4: Impact of Market-Wide Credit Risk and Liquidity Factors
The table shows the estimated coefficients for the VAR with exogenous variables. The rating
class-specific S&P Creditweek Corporate Bond Index yield spread is used to proxy for credit risk,
the ECB financial market liquidity indicator for liquidity. csdef is the pure credit risk, csliq the pure
liquidity component, and cscor the correlation component in the yield spread of a synthetical 5-year
par bond. sdef is the pure credit risk, sliq the pure liquidity, and scor the correlation component in
the mid premium for a 5-year CDS contract. The dependent variables are the premium changes,
the explanatory variables are the lagged premium changes, the lagged premium levels, and the
credit risk and liquidity measures. The top row of each panel displays the number of reference
entities for which 1) the augmented Dickey-Fuller test cannot reject a unit root in the premia time
series at the 10% significance level, 2) the augmented Dickey-Fuller test can reject a unit root in
the first differences at the 10% level, 3) the Johansen test cannot reject cointegration of the time
series at the 10% level, 4) the augmented Dickey-Fuller can reject a unit root in the residuals at
the 10% level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Coefficients are
for premia in basis points, the adjusted R2 are in percentage points.
Panel A: All
∆csdef ∆sdef ∆csliq ∆sliq ∆cscor ∆scor
# Firms 159 159 158
∆cs−1 -0.95*** 0.59*** -0.44*** -0.01*** -0.30*** 0.01***
∆s−1 0.70*** -0.33*** -0.01 -0.58*** 0.12*** -0.03***
cs−1 -0.06*** 0.03*** -0.04*** 0.00 -0.01*** 0.01***
s−1 0.05*** -0.03*** 0.01* -0.32*** 0.00 -0.02***
Credit Risk 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.10*** 0.01* 0.00
Liquidity -0.18*** -0.18*** -0.17*** -0.16*** -0.01* 0.00
Adj. R2 10.91 9.99 28.38 31.10 8.87 0.98
Panel B: Investment Grade
# Firms 151 150 143
∆cs−1 -0.40*** 0.18*** -0.45*** 0.00 -0.32*** 0.01***
∆s−1 0.14*** -0.08*** -0.01 -0.54*** 0.04*** -0.02***
cs−1 -0.02*** 0.00 -0.03*** 0.00 -0.01*** 0.00
s−1 0.00 -0.01*** -0.01 -0.14*** 0.00 -0.02***
Credit Risk 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.05*** 0.01* 0.00
Liquidity -0.20*** -0.20*** -0.15*** -0.07*** -0.01* 0.00
Adj. R2 12.65 11.82 31.56 35.45 10.40 1.04
Panel C: Subinvestment Grade
# Firms 8 9 5
∆cs−1 -2.55*** 1.79*** -0.46*** -0.08*** -0.30*** 0.03***
∆s−1 2.29*** -1.51*** 0.01 -0.64*** 0.51*** -0.18***
cs−1 -2.31*** 1.86 -0.08*** -0.02*** -0.02*** 0.01*
s−1 2.34*** -1.88*** 0.03 -0.45*** 0.00 -0.03***
Credit Risk 0.74* 0.64 0.22*** -0.29*** 0.04 0.00
Liquidity -0.17 -0.48 -0.02** 0.63** -0.22 -0.04
Adj. R2 18.67 16.59 21.96 30.89 5.03 2.09
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overall liquidity which agrees with the flight-to-liquidity effect described by Longstaff (2004)
since, in comparison to the bond market, the CDS market is consistently more liquid.
For the correlation premia, the impact of the aggregate market measures is almost
negligible. ∆cscor is significantly affected by the credit risk and liquidity measures at the
10% level only, and ∆scor is entirely unaffected. This reveals the correlation premia to be a
pure measure of the firm-specific credit risk and liquidity.
Impact of Increasing and Decreasing Market-Wide Risk The last step in our
empirical analysis of the extended model consists in the differentiation between phases of
increasing and decreasing credit risk which we define as in Section 4.3.4. We estimate a
VECM of the form
∆csdeft = u1
(
csdeft−1 + ρ1s
def
t−1
)
+
5∑
j=1
u2j∆cs
def
t−j +
5∑
j=1
u3j∆s
def
t−j + ε1,t,
∆sdeft = v1
(
csdeft−1 + ρ1s
def
t−1
)
+
5∑
j=1
v2j∆cs
def
t−j +
5∑
j=1
v3j∆s
def
t−j + ε2,t,
(5.5)
∆csliqt = w1
(
csliqt−1 + ρ2s
liq
t−1
)
+
5∑
j=1
w2j∆cs
liq
t−j +
5∑
j=1
w3j∆s
liq
t−j + ε3,t,
∆sliqt = x1
(
csliqt−1 + ρ2s
liq
t−1
)
+
5∑
j=1
x2j∆cs
liq
t−j +
5∑
j=1
x3j∆s
liq
t−j + ε4,t,
(5.6)
∆cscort = y1
(
cscort−1 + ρ3s
cor
t−1
)
+
5∑
j=1
y2j∆cs
cor
t−j +
5∑
j=1
y3j∆s
cor
t−j + ε5,t,
∆scort = z1
(
cscort−1 + ρ3s
cor
t−1
)
+
5∑
j=1
z2j∆cs
cor
t−j +
5∑
j=1
z3j∆s
cor
t−j + ε6,t,
(5.7)
where, as in the base case, ρi, i ∈ {1, . . . , 3}, are the cointegration coefficient and u1, v1, w1,
x1, y1, and z1 are the coefficients of the error correction term. The results of the estimation
are given in Table 5.5.
Table 5.5 shows that the relation between csdef and sdef is, as in the base case, stable across
the increasing and decreasing risk phases. The cointegration coefficient estimate is close to
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-1 which shows that pure credit risk premia in both markets move jointly in spite of the
impact of bond liquidity on sdef. The coefficient estimates for the error correction term,
on the other hand, are considerably higher during phases of increasing credit risk. This
result implies that the effect of the bond liquidity on ∆sdef becomes dominated by the effect
of credit risk for deteriorating market conditions which is further supported by the higher
adjusted R2 for periods with increasing risk.
The connection between csliq and sliq differs across periods with increasing and decreasing
risk. During increasing risk phases, the cointegration coefficient is positive, hence the pure
liquidity premia tend to move in opposite directions. For the subinvestment grade segment,
this finding also holds when risk decreases. Investment grade pure liquidity premia, on the
other hand, move in the same direction when risk decreases. In comparison to the base case
analysis in Table 4.6, this result underlines the impact of splitting up the liquidity premium
into the pure liquidity premium and the correlation premium. When we do not account for
the correlation in Section 4.3.4, the pure liquidity premia only move in opposite directions
for the subinvestment grade segment in the increasing risk phase.
Comparing the error correction coefficients, we observe that ∆csliq is affected more
strongly in decreasing and ∆sliq in increasing risk phases. For ∆sliq, this is true both for
the investment grade and the subinvestment grade segment, but ∆csliq is not significantly
affected by the error correction term in the investment grade segment. This is further
evidence that the liquidity of the investment grade bond market is unaffected by that of the
CDS market while the reverse is not true. For the subinvestment grade segment, liquidity
premium deviations in one market have a consistently reverse effect on the other market’s
liquidity. As before, the bond market reacts less strongly than the CDS market. In particular
when credit risk decreases, the sensitivity of the bond market becomes lower and that of the
CDS market becomes larger on an absolute level.
The negative estimate for the cointegration coefficient of cscor and scor are consistent
with our earlier finding that correlation premia are mostly due to the effect of the credit
risk intensity on the liquidity intensity. Interestingly, the absolute value of the cointegration
coefficient is higher when credit risk decreases. We take this as a sign that the dynamics
of the CDS bid and ask premia become more dissimilar in increasing risk phases, therefore
a smaller fraction of the CDS premia can be attributed to the correlation of the liquidity
intensity with the default intensity.
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Summarizing the results of Section 5.1, we find clear evidence that credit risk has an
effect on liquidity both in the bond and the CDS market but that the reverse is not true.
For all non-sovereign reference entities, credit risk increases liquidity premia, and we obtain
a premium composition of 66% due to pure credit risk, 29% due to pure liquidity, and 5%
due to correlation. The effect on CDS premia is more intricate since both the ask and the
bid liquidity can be affected by credit risk. Overall, the CDS mid premium consists of on
average 96% credit risk, 3% liquidity, and 1% correlation.
The small percentages associated with the correlation premia initially seem to suggest
that explicitly modelling the correlation is not worthwhile, but the time series analysis reveals
the importance of doing so. Subsuming the correlation between credit risk and liquidity in
the liquidity premium gives misleading results about the relation of the liquidity of the bond
and the CDS market. If we explicitly account for the correlation, the previous comovement
between the liquidity premia is identified as a countermovement. This effect is especially
pronounced for investment grade reference entities and increasing risk phases. Since the
liquidity of the CDS market is higher than that of the bond market, this result agrees with
the flight-to-liquidity effect described by Longstaff (2004) and Vayanos (2004). In the base
case, the effect is obscured by the simultaneous dependence of the liquidity premia on credit
risk and market-wide liquidity.
The correct identification of the relation between the liquidity premia is most important
for trading strategies that are aimed at exploiting differences between the bond and the
CDS market, e.g. in a basis trade as Bu¨hler and He (2007) describe. Assuming that the
liquidity of the markets moves in the same direction underestimates the actual risk of these
strategies because the liquidity premia which are incurred to cancel out the initial positions
are negatively associated.
5.2 The Delivery Option
The price of a default-risky security is affected simultaneously by the probability of a default
and the value of the residual which can be recovered given that default occurs. Standard asset
pricing models often assume that debt issues of the same issuer with identical seniority also
have the same residual value contingent upon default, thus putting the focus exclusively on
the default probability. As a result, the recovery rate is assumed to be fixed, usually at 40%,
for all issuers and across all issues. Empirical evidence, however, shows that recovery rates
are far from constant both over time and across different issuers. The Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision has acknowledged the importance of this issue by recommending that
Model Extensions 137
market participants estimate both the risk of default and recovery in the case of default in
the extended internal ratings based approach.
When assessing recovery rates, two modelling choices have to be made. First, a recovery
regime43 must be chosen. Second, a possibly random recovery rate must be determined. In
this section, we focus on the effects of modelling the recovery rate as a random variable on
bond yield spreads and CDS premia.
In particular, we extend the reduced-form model developed in Chapter 4 from the
constant recovery rate assumption to a beta-distributed random recovery rate. This
difference has an important implication for CDS premia since it introduces the CTD option
into the CDS contract as described in Sections 2.3 and 3.4. Since a fixed, issuer-specific
recovery rate under the recovery of face value (RFV) regime leads to identical post-default
prices, the CTD option is worthless in the base case model. If, on the other hand, we suppose
that post-default bond prices can differ in a non-deterministic way, the option to choose the
cheapest deliverable asset has a positive value which leads to a potential increase in the
CDS premium relative to the constant and identical recovery rate assumption. Allowing the
recovery rate to vary stochastically across different issues of the same issuer thus allows us to
gain insight into the differences between yield spreads on corporate bonds which only reflect
their own post-default price, and CDS premia which are affected by the differences of the
post-default prices of all deliverable bonds.
The contribution of this section is twofold. First, we determine a term structure of the
default probability and of the post-default prices of corporate bonds for a single issuer.
Most of the theoretical and empirical literature is concerned with a estimation of default
probabilities and recovery rates for sovereign issuers since this group usually has a larger
number of debt securities outstanding than corporate issuers. Zhang (2003) calibrates a
reduced form-model to the term structure of US interest rate swap yields and CDS premia
on Argentine sovereign debt and quantifies the CDS-implied recovery value at 73%. Pan and
Singleton (2007) simultaneously determine default probabilities and recovery rates from the
term structure of sovereign debt CDS premia for Mexico, Turkey, and Korea. The implied
recovery rates fluctuate between 17% and 77%. Das and Hanouna (2007) derive a forward
term structure of default probabilities and recovery rates using a structural-form model
link between these curves, equity prices, and return volatilities. They obtain recovery rates
which are inversely related to default probabilities (the mean recovery rate for the highes
43The term recovery regime is used in the literature to distinguish between the different bases with regard
to which the recovery rate is measures, i.e. recovery of face value, recovery of treasury, and recovery of
market value.
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default risk quintile lies at 47.13%, the mean for the lowest quintile at 81.68%) and show a
strong relation to the level of the risk-free interest rate and a measure of overall market risk.
With regard to the corporate sector, Gu¨ntay et al. (2003) propose a model for estimating
risk-neutral recovery rate distributions which can differ for junior and senior debt. Their
empirical results show that the risk-neutral expected recovery rates fall below the observed
industry average recovery rates by approximately 30%.
The second contribution in this section is the analysis of the differences between bond
yield spreads and CDS premia in excess of the liquidity differences. In Section 3.4, we have
explored the impact of a basic empirical proxy for the delivery option on CDS premia and
yield spreads, but due to the close link to the bond liquidity, the results we obtained are
somewhat ambiguous.
Our approach in this section is most closely related to Jankowitsch et al. (2007). These
authors develop a reduced-form model in which all bonds of a given issuer are priced
assuming that the expected post-default prices are identical. The value of a CDS contract,
however, is determined under the assumption that the actual post-default bond prices can
differ, and that the CDS premium reflects the expected minimum post-default bond price.
The authors then determine the implied default probability of a given issuer from bond
prices and subsequently infer the expected minimum post-default bond price from CDS
premia conditional on the estimated default probability. The CDS market-implied expected
minimum recovery rate lies between 8% and 47%. Furthermore, the model-implied CDS
premia which do not take into account the CTD option are on average approximately 50%
lower than the observed premia. A cross-sectional regression of the implied recovery rates
on liquidity proxies suggests that there is no direct link between recovery rates and liquidity.
However, the range of this implicit delivery option value estimate is difficult to interpret,
in particular since it partly becomes negative and partly constitutes almost the entire CDS
premium. Therefore, our approach differs from Jankowitsch et al. (2007) as we do not
implicitly estimate the expected minimum recovery rate from CDS premia.
In the theoretical part of our analysis, we assume that the recovery rates for all
bonds of a given issuer that are deliverable under the CDS contract are independently
and identically beta-distributed random variables. We include the resulting terms for the
bond-specific recovery rates and the minimal recovery rates into our reduced-from model
from Section 4.1.1. Thus, we also account for stochastic liquidity in bond and CDS markets.
The bond price reflects the same expected recovery rate for all bonds of a given issuer. In
the CDS pricing equation, we explicitly consider the delivery of the defaulted bond with
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the lowest post-default price. Therefore, the CDS premium reflects the expected minimum
recovery rate.
This approach allows us to quantify the size of the CTD option value in observed
CDS premia under a stochastic recovery rate R while avoiding two problems incurred by
Jankowitsch et al. (2007). First, since we explicitly determine the distribution of the minimal
recovery rate, we cannot obtain negative CTD option values as the expected minimum
recovery rate cannot exceed the expected recovery rate. Second, Jankowitsch et al. (2007)
account only for the CTD option as a differentiating factor between bond prices and CDS
premia. In order to be consistent, their approach should always yield higher CDS premia
than bond yield spreads. However, our analysis in Chapter 3 revealed that bond yield
spreads tend to be higher than CDS premia which cannot be explained by the CTD option.
As we additionally account for bond and CDS liquidity, our model can be calibrated to the
observed data and not only to a subset where CDS premia — for any reason — exceed yield
spreads.
The empirical part of our analysis consists of three steps. In the first step, we analyze
an original sample of 65 European firms that defaulted on senior unsecured debt between
January 1, 2000 and December 31, 2006. We collect price quotes for at least two deliverable
bonds during the 30 days after the default event which constitute the delivery period under
a standard CDS contract. From these post-default prices, we estimate the parameters of the
beta distribution. In the second step, we calibrate our extended model that accounts for
the delivery of the cheapest defaulted bond to our earlier sample of bond prices and CDS
premia for non-defaulted issuers from Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. Eventually, we analyze the
estimated credit risk, liquidity, and CTD premia.
The remainder of this section is organized as follows. In Section 5.2.1, we discuss
theoretical models and empirical evidence regarding post-default bond price behavior.
Section 5.2.2 introduces the model extension which allows us to quantify the credit risk,
liquidity, and CTD premia. The empirical analysis follows in Section 5.2.3.
5.2.1 Post-Default Prices
As described in Section 2.3, the economic rationale behind a CDS contract is that the
protection seller agrees to refund the protection buyer for the loss incurred upon a given
reference asset or a basket of such assets through the default of the issuing entity in exchange
for periodical premium payments. In practice, the protection seller pays a specified cash
amount, typically the face value of the asset, to the protection buyer if a credit event occurs.
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The protection buyer, in turn, can deliver any asset out of the delivery basket. The remaining
accrued CDS premium since the last payment date is paid to the protection seller, and the
CDS contract ceases.
This procedure shows that at the time the CDS contract is entered into, for any possible
given default time both the payment of the face value and the payment of the accrued
premium is certain and its discounted present value can be computed. The value of the
defaulted asset, however, is unknown prior to default. Therefore, it is necessary to make
assumptions about the post-default price. From the specification of the CDS contract, the
RFV regime naturally arises, but the recovery rate R itself is unknown ex ante. The CDS
should therefore be valued with regard to the minimal recovery rate while each bond should
be valued with regard to its own recovery rate distribution.
On the aggregate level, a higher recovery rate for debt issues with a higher seniority
and higher collateral values is a stylized fact. Gupton et al. (2000) analyze syndicated loan
recovery for senior secured and unsecured debt and find averages of 70% versus 52%. The
effect of monitoring is explored by Asarnow and Edwards (1995) who show that recovery
rates for standard loan contracts are 65% while structured loans recover on average 87%.
In a study which explores the impact of the rating history prior to default, Moody’s (2003)
show that the length of the time interval during which a firm was rated subinvestment grade
prior to default has neither a consistently positive nor a consistently negative impact on the
average recovery rate.
However, empirical evidence on recovery rates of different defaulted debt issues from the
same issuer is scarce even for the US debt market on which most of the recovery rate studies
focus. Gu¨ntay et al. (2003) develop a pricing model for junior and senior debt which allows
them to estimate different risk-neutral expected recovery rates from the market prices of
debt issues. Gupton and Stein (2002) explicitly state that instrument-specific information is
not included in the LossCalc
TM
model for recovery rates either because of lower explanatory
power or data sufficiency issues. Acharya et al. (2003) analyze a sample of defaulted US
bonds and bank loans and document that the coupon, issue size, and time-to-maturity do
not significantly affect the recovery rate of a defaulted debt instrument.
For the European corporate debt market, no similar studies exist. This is partly due to
the lower number of defaulted large firms with freely traded debt since non-traded bank loans
constitute a much larger fraction of the corporate debt than in the US, as Moody’s (2003)
claims. A potentially more important reason lies in the differences between the bankruptcy
codes. In the US, the absolute priority rule (APR) prevails both under chapter 7 and under
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chapter 11. If a debtor defaults on any debt class, all issues of the same and of higher
seniority also default and become immediately due and payable. Therefore, all creditors
holding debt from this issuer of the same and of higher seniority forfeit all right to future
coupon payments and retain only the right to the face value. Only owners of secured debt
retain the right to coupon payments until the bankruptcy settlement. Since all debt of the
same seniority is settled in identical terms under the US bankruptcy code, issues of the same
seniority tend to converge quickly to an identical price, regardless of their initial coupon and
remaining time-to-maturity. A stochastic recovery rate which implies violations of the APR
(some claims of the same seniority are settled more favorably than others) is therefore less
likely.
The convergence of the prices of defaulted debt issues takes place rather quickly: For
US reference entities, Moody’s (2005) defines the default price as the 30-day post-default
bid price and finds that the median bond price at the date on which a firm emerges from
default (i.e. through a court settlement), which on average took 20 months, is identical
to the median default bond price. The sample is, however, strongly skewed to the right
with a ratio of the mean to the median value of 1.17. Du¨llmann and Trapp (2006) compare
average annual recovery rates computed from prices for defaulted US bank loans to small
and medium firms at emergence and at default and find that neither consistently exceeds
the other over time. On average, however, they find that recovery rates at emergence are
higher and exhibit a higher standard deviation. Guha (2003) studies defaulted bond prices
for Enron and WorldCom. For Enron, bond prices have converged to a span of less than one
USD on the 5th day preceding the default, and on the first day after the bankruptcy filing, all
bonds are quoted at the identical bid price. A similar result holds true for WorldCom where
bond prices differed by less than 25 cents on the day of the missed interest rate payment,
and were identical on the date of the bankruptcy filing 7 calendar days later.
European bankruptcy codes differ from one another as well as from the US code regarding
the settlement of different claims. We will discuss factors which may have a bearing on our
valuation model, i.e. the treatment of accrued interest, the remaining time-to-maturity, and
the priority of different claims.
Under the current German insolvency code,44 coupon payments for defaulted claims
accumulate at the original rate until the opening of the bankruptcy proceedings. Coupons
which accumulate during the bankruptcy proceedings constitute subordinate claims. The
French bankruptcy code45 specifies that coupon payments are forfeited as of the opening of
44See Foerste (2006).
45See Sonnenberger and Dammann (2008), pp. 504-528, and Creditreform (2006).
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the bankruptcy proceedings for debt instruments with an original time to maturity of one
year or less; coupons on instruments with a longer time to maturity accumulate until the
bankruptcy settlement. The Dutch liquidation-based bankruptcy law provides suspension
of payments for firms with sufficiently good prospects to recover economic health within a
short time period if there are no secured or preferred creditors. In the standard liquidation
procedure, secured instruments are first satisfied by collateral sales, and the remaining
secured claims, unsecured debt instruments, and coupon payments accruing during the
bankruptcy proceedings are treated identically as unsecured claims.46 The United Kingdom
administrative receivership is only aimed at creditors with claims which are secured with
a floating charge and ends after three months. If the realized value from the collateral
sale or the going concern sale of the defaulted reference entity suffices to pay principal and
coupon payments accumulated until this date, the administrative receivership ends. Holders
of unsecured claims must subsequently file for liquidation whereas coupon payments stop
upon the beginning of the liquidation process.47
Due to these differences between the bankruptcy codes, post-default bond prices in
Europe may well exhibit a very different behavior than in the US. Average recovery rates
across all debt classes for under different bankruptcy codes have been compared by the
Worldbank (2005). In an analysis of data from Germany, France, the United Kingdom,
and the US, they observe that default proceedings are resolved most quickly in the United
Kingdom and in Germany with on average 1.0 and 1.2 years. For the US and France, they
document an average time interval of 1.5 and 1.9 years until the resolution. The average
recovery rates do not fully reflect this relation. While average recovery is highest in the
United Kingdom with 84.6% and lowest in France with 47.4%, the US exhibits higher average
recovery rates than Germany with 75.9% compared to 53.4%. The authors attribute this
relation to the on average lower costs of the bankruptcy proceedings in the US.
5.2.2 Extended Model with Stochastic Recovery Rates
Value of the Cheapest-to-Deliver Option
The value of the CTD option arises from the fact that the protection buyer does not need
to specify at the inception of the CDS contract which bond she will deliver if a credit event
occurs at time τ . We assume that an issuer has a fixed number K ≥ 2 of bonds outstanding
which are deliverable under the CDS contract. For simplicity, we assume that the delivery
46See Creditreform (2005) and Creditreform (2006).
47See Davydenko and Franks (2008).
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basket is time-invariant: If one bond matures, another bond with the same bond-specific
random recovery rate R˜k, k = 1, . . . , K, is issued.
48 For a given bond k, the value of the
CTD option at the default date τ relative to specified delivery of this bond naturally arises
as the difference between the recovery rate of bond k and the minimal recovery rate across
the delivery basket:
C˜TDk (τ) = R˜k (τ)− min
k∈{1,...,K}
R˜k (τ) .
The expected value of the delivery option with respect to a specific bond k, given that default
occurs at time τ , is therefore given by
CTDk (τ) = E
[
R˜k (τ)
]
− E
[
min
k∈{1,...,K}
R˜k (τ)
]
.
Instead of with respect to a specific bond, we define the value of the delivery option with
respect to the entire delivery basket as the average across all bonds k, k = 1, . . . , K,
conditional on default at time τ :
CTD (τ) = E
[
1
K
K∑
k=1
R˜k (τ)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=E[R¯(τ)]
−E
[
1
K
K∑
k=1
min
k∈{1,...,K}
R˜k (τ)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=E

min
k∈{1,...,K}
R˜k(τ)

, (5.8)
where R¯ denotes the average recovery rate across the delivery basket (which, however, is
itself a random variable).
As an alternative, we could also specify the value of the CTD option with regard to
the entire delivery basket as the maximum or minimum across the delivery basket. This
procedure would give us an upper and lower bound for the delivery option. The lower
bound illustrates the difficulty regarding the result of Jankowitsch et al. (2007) of expected
minimum recovery rates larger than 40%. By Jensen’s inequality, the expected recovery
rate is at least as large as the expected minimum recovery rate. If all expected recovery
rates are assumed to equal 40%, a CDS-implied expected minimum recovery rate of 47% as
Jankowitsch et al. (2007) find points at a misspecification.
48As explained in Section 2.3, the set of deliverable obligations usually is a subset of all outstanding bonds
of the reference entity. In addition, the total number of outstanding bonds at the default date is unknown
at the inception date of the CDS contract for two reasons. First, the reference entity can issue new bonds
during the lifetime of the CDS. Second, a number of bonds may have matured before the default date. Since
the default date is not known in advance, it is neither clear how many bonds have matured nor how many
new ones have been issued before default occurs, i.e. the set of outstanding bonds is unknown the inception
of the CDS contract. We abstract from this uncertainty.
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Bond Prices and CDS Premia with Stochastic Recovery Rates
The risk structure of the market is modelled as in the base case but with stochastic recovery
rates added. The time-t price of bond k, k ∈ {1, . . . , K} with fixed coupon c paid at times
t1, . . . , tn, notional F , maturity in tn, and recovery at θj (t ≤ θ1 < . . . < θN ≤ tn) is given by
CBk (t) = c ·
n∑
i=1
Et
[
P˜ (t, ti) D˜ (t, ti) L˜
b (t, ti)
]
+ FEt
[
P˜ (t, tn) D˜ (t, tn) L˜
b (t, tn)
]
+ F ·
N∑
j=1
Et
[
R˜k (t, θj)∆P˜ (t, θj) D˜ (t, θj) L˜
b (t, θj)
]
, (5.9)
where R˜k (t, θj) is the random recovery rate of bond k conditional upon default at time θj,
Et denotes the expectation with respect to the risk-neutral measure, and all other variables
are defined as in Equation (4.1). The difference of Equation (5.9) to the base case consists
in the additional uncertainty with regard to the bond-specific and time-dependent recovery
rate.
The value of the fixed leg of the CDS contract is identical as in the base case:
CDSfix (t) = s
ask
(
m∑
i=1
Et
[
P˜ (t, Ti−1) D˜ (t, Ti) L˜ask (t, Ti)
]
+
M∑
j=1
δjEt
[
∆P˜ (t, θj) D˜ (t, θj) L˜
ask (t, θj)
])
, (5.10)
but the value of the floating leg now reflects the value of the CTD option. At θj, the CDS
protection buyer delivers the bond with the lowest post-default price, that is the bond i where
R˜i (t, θj) = min{R˜k (t, θj) : k ∈ {1, . . . , K}}. This leads to the following representation for
the floating leg of the CDS contract:
CDSfloat (t) = F
M∑
j=1
Et
[
∆P˜ (t, θj) D˜ (t, θj)
− min
k∈{1,...,K}
R˜k (t, θj) L˜
b (t, θj) ∆P˜ (t, θj) D˜ (t, θj)
]
. (5.11)
The second summand in Equation (5.11) reflects the protection buyer’s option to choose the
bond with the cheapest post-default price after the credit event.
Setting equal Equation (5.10) and (5.11) yields the solution for the CDS ask premium:
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sask =
F
∑
j Et
[(
1− min
k∈{1,...,K}
R˜k (t, θj) L˜b (t, θj)
)
∆P˜ (t, θj) D˜ (t, θj)
]
∑
iEt
[
P˜ (t, Ti−1) D˜ (t, Ti) L˜ask (t, Ti)
]
+
∑
j δjEt
[
∆P˜ (t, θj) D˜ (t, θj) L˜ask (t, θj)
] .
(5.12)
The solution for the bid premium follows as
sbid =
F
∑
j Et
[(
1− min
k∈{1,...,K}
R˜k (t, θj) L˜b (t, θj)
)
∆P˜ (t, θj) D˜ (t, θj)
]
∑
iEt
[
P˜ (t, Ti−1) D˜ (t, Ti) L˜bid (t, Ti)
]
+
∑
j δjEt
[
∆P˜ (t, θj) D˜ (t, θj) L˜bid (t, θj)
] .
(5.13)
Specification of the Stochastic Structure
We assume that the recovery rates R˜k (t, θj) for all bonds k, k ∈ {1, . . . , K}, are
independently and identically distributed. We also assume that the recovery rates lie between
0% and 100%49 and model it as a standard beta-distributed random variable on the interval
[0, 1]. The density and the distribution function which we denote by β (p (t, θj) , q (t, θj)) and
B (p (t, θj) , q (t, θj)) are explicitly given in Appendix 5.3.3.
As demonstrated in Appendix 5.3.3, the iid assumption allows us to write the distribution
function of the minimal recovery rate R˜min (t, θj) as a function of B (p (t, θj) , q (t, θj)):
R˜k (t, θj) ∼ B (p (t, θj) , q (t, θj)) , k ∈ k ∈ {1, . . . , K}
⇒ R˜min (t, θj) ∼ 1− [1−B (p (t, θj) , q (t, θj))]K .
Therefore, we have an explicit representation of the density and the distribution function of
the minimal recovery rate.
The dynamics of the credit risk and liquidity intensities are defined as in the base case,
and we model the dependence between the default intensity λ and the recovery rates only
indirectly. As our empirical analysis in the next section will show, the mean and the standard
deviation of the defaulted bond prices in the 30 calendar days after the default event depends
on how quickly the creditworthiness of an issuer has deteriorated. The shorter the time
49If costs such as lawyers’ fees or court fees are deducted from recovery rates, it is possible to arrive at
values below 0%. If, on the other hand, bondholders are awarded a tangible asset in the default settlement,
it is possible to arrive at a recovery exceeding 100%.
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period between the downgrade of a reference entity to the subinvestment grade and the
actual default, the higher is the variability across the post-default bond prices.
We therefore assume that λ and R˜k (t, θj) evolve independently. In order to adjust for
the dependency of the recovery rates’ mean and variance on the creditworthiness of an issuer
at the inception of the CDS contract, we assume that the distribution of R˜k (t, θj) depends
on the rating at time t. To capture the effect of the speed of the deterioration of the
creditworthiness, we additionally assume that the distribution depends on the time between
the inception of the contract and the potential default date, i.e. on θj − t. Technically,
we use a stepwise function for the mean and the variance which depends on the issuer’s
rating at time t and on θj − t. These mean and variance levels are then used to determine
the parameters p (t, θj) and q (t, θj) and, using these parameters, the expected minimum
recovery rate.
As an illustrative example, assume that a two-year CDS contract is written on a reference
entity which is rated investment grade at time t and has 5 bonds outstanding. Our
empirical analysis shows that it is a plausible assumption that a quick deterioration of
the creditworthiness which leads to a default in the first year is associated with lower and
more diverse recovery rates, e.g. a mean recovery rate of 30% and a standard deviation
across the recovery rates of 10%. If a default occurs in the second year, the recovery rates
may be higher and less diverse with a mean of 35% and a standard deviation of 5%. We
estimate the parameters p (t, θj) and q (t, θj) from the mean and the variance through the
relation given in Appendix 5.3.3 and obtain for a default in the first year p (t, t+ 1) = 6 and
q (t, t+ 1) = 14. For 5 outstanding bonds, this translates into an expected minimum recovery
rate of 18.93%. For a default in the second year, the parameters equal p (t, t+ 2) = 31.50
and q (t, t+ 2) = 58.50 which translates into an expected minimum recovery rate of 29.27%.
Under the independence assumption, the analytical solutions for Et
[
P˜ (t, θj)
]
and
Et
[
L˜l (t, θj)
]
, l ∈ {b, ask, bid}, are the same as in the base case in Section 4.5.2. Substituting
the expected recovery rate, the expected minimum recovery rate, and the expectations terms
for the default probability and the liquidity discount factors in Equations (5.9), (5.12), and
(5.13) yields the solutions for CB, sask, and sask:
CB (t) = c ·
n∑
i=1
P (t, ti)D (t, ti)L
b (t, ti) + FP (t, tn)D (t, tn)L
b (t, tn)
+ F ·
N∑
j=1
E
[
R˜ (t, θj)
]
∆P (t, θj)D (t, θj)L
b (t, θj) , (5.14)
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sask =
F
∑
j
(
1− E
[
min
k∈{1,...,K}
R˜k (t, θj)
]
Lb (t, θj)
)
∆P (t, θj)D (t, θj)∑
i P (t, Ti−1)D (t, Ti)Lask (t, Ti) +
∑
j δj∆P (t, θj)D (t, θj)Lask (t, θj)
, (5.15)
sbid =
F
∑
j
(
1− E
[
min
k∈{1,...,K}
R˜k (t, θj)
]
Lb (t, θj)
)
∆P (t, θj)D (t, θj)∑
i P (t, Ti−1)D (t, Ti)Lbid (t, Ti) +
∑
j δj∆P (t, θj)D (t, θj)Lbid (t, θj)
, (5.16)
where P , L, and D are defined as in the base case.
These solutions can then be calibrated to our set of bond prices and CDS ask and bid
quotes to obtain estimates of the default and liquidity intensities when the CTD option is
accounted for.
Measures for Credit Risk, Liquidity, and CTD Option Premia
Regarding the premium decomposition, the bond yield spread is again split into two parts
as in the base case. The pure credit risk premium csdef follows from Equation (5.14) with
Et
[
R˜k (t, θj)
]
=
p (t, θj)
p (t, θj) + q (t, θj)
,
for the (pre-estimated) parameters p (t, θj) and q (t, θj). The bond liquidity premium cs
liq is
then defined as the difference between the total yield spread and csdef.
The CDS premium, on the other hand, is decomposed into three parts. The first part
sdef constitutes the default risk premium. We compute it from Equation (5.15) by setting
the CDS liquidity discount factor equal to 1 and replacing Et
[
min
k∈{1,...,K}
R˜k (t, θj)
]
with
Et
[
R¯ (t, θj)
]
. Therefore, csdef and sdef again differ only because of the direct impact of
the bond liquidity on sdef.
The CTD component in the CDS premium, sCTD, is computed as the difference between
sdef and the premium that results from Equation (5.15) when we use the expected minimum
recovery rate but hold the CDS liquidity discount factor fixed at 1. The CDS liquidity
premium sliq then arises as the difference between the mid CDS premium smid = s
ask+sbid
2
,
and the sum of sdef and sCTD, where sask and sbid follow from Equations (5.15) and (5.16)
for CDS liquidity discount factors different from 1.
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5.2.3 Empirical Analysis with Stochastic Recovery Rates
Post-Default Prices
Before we calibrate the model in Equations (5.15) to (5.16) to our original data sample, we
need to pre-estimate the parameters of the recovery rate distribution in order to determine
the expected minimum recovery rate. If we estimate the parameters from observed post-
default bond prices, this implies that we use the physical distribution of recovery rates. Our
model, on the other hand, is formulated with regard to risk-neutral expectations. Therefore,
any input for the recovery rate distribution should also be determined with regard to the
risk-neutral measure. To the best of our knowledge, only Gu¨ntay et al. (2003) develop a
model for issue-specific risk-neutral recovery rates for different debt classes. However, it is
not clear how this model could be generalized to stochastic recovery rates for the identical
debt class.
Therefore, we follow the argument by Acharya et al. (2007) who assume that the price of
an instrument at default is an unbiased estimate of its actual recovery at emergence. This is
equivalent to assuming that the recovery rate dynamics are equivalent under the risk-neutral
and the physical measure, i.e. that recovery risk is not priced. Even though this assumption
is rather restrictive, the CTD option mostly gathers value through the standard deviation
of the recovery rates which should not differ too strongly under the risk-neutral and the
physical measures.
Relevant Time Interval We shortly discuss our choice of the post-default time interval
which we take into account to determine the parameters of the recovery rate distribution. As
described in Section 2.3, if a credit event occurs at time τ , either the protection buyer or the
protection seller can deliver a “Notification of a Credit Event”. After this notification, the
protection buyer has 30 calendar days until specifying in the “Notice of Physical Settlement”
which asset she will deliver. In the subsequent 30 calendar days of the settlement period,
she can deliver this asset to the protection seller at any date. We now deduce which phases
of the delivery process between the credit event and the actual delivery should affect the
value of the CTD option in our model.
During 30-day settlement period, the protection buyer can time her buying date of the
specified asset optimally. We do not take into account this timing component since it also
pertains when a CDS is written on a single bond instead of a basket of deliverable obligations.
The credit event notification can take place up to 14 calendar days after the scheduled
termination date of the CDS contract. This could theoretically be years after the credit event,
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thus making the CTD option value very difficult to determine. However, it is reasonable
to assume that the credit event notification takes place immediately after the credit event,
at least if the protection buyer and seller expect the same evolution of the recovery rates
after the credit event over time: If the protection buyer and seller assume that the value
of the cheapest deliverable bond decreases – as is usually the case – the protection seller
wants to obtain the CTD bond as soon as possible. She therefore immediately sends the
credit event notice to the protection buyer who then has 30 calendar days to specify which
bond she intends to deliver. If, on the other hand, both assume that the CTD bond’s price
increases,50 the protection buyer has an incentive to buy the CTD bond as soon as possible
after the default event.
In summary, we believe that the 30 calendar days of the period between the credit event
notification and the last possible date for the settlement notification constitute a reasonable
upper limit for the lifetime of the CTD option.
Data All defaulted bond price data is collected from Bloomberg. We first identify all
European-based reference entities that were downgraded to a non-performing rating with
regard to any non-senior, non-subordinated debt issue by Moody’s, S&P, or Fitch between
January 1, 2000 and December 31, 2006. This gives us a sample of 72 firms. For each of these
firms, we collect a rating history starting from January 1, 1995. As the default event, we
choose the date of the earliest non-performing rating. Contrary to the simple default rating,
the non-performing rating only includes the case of a missed coupon or principal payment
after the relevant grace period has elapsed and is thus consistent with the definition of a
credit event under the standard CDS contract specifications. If the earliest non-performing
rating differs by more than three business days from the next downgrade for the remaining
rating agencies, we determine which kind of default event has taken place and manually
check the default date from the Bloomberg news archives.
In the next step, we identify the set of deliverable debt obligations as described in
Section 2.3 and collect mid bond price quotes for the 30 calendar days which follow the
default event. Non-EUR bond price quotes are converted into EUR values at the spot
exchange rate. If no price quotes are observed for at least two deliverable bonds during this
time interval, we drop the firm from our sample. If the “Notification of a Credit Event”
had taken place at the default event, the absence of price quotes during this time interval
50Guha (2003) reports an increase of defaulted bond bid price quotes from the day on which it became
public information that a potential merger bid for Enron would fail to the day following the bankruptcy
filing.
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suggests that the maximal period until the “Notice of Physical Settlement” elapsed without
any observed bond price quotes which effectively prohibits the valuation of the defaulted
assets. This procedure leaves us with 65 firms51 for which mid price quotes of on average 7
deliverable bonds were available after the default event.
Defaulted Bond Price Time Series For each of the 65 defaulted firms, we compute the
average and the minimal bond price as well as the standard deviation across the delivery
basket on each of the 30 days prior to the default event and the 30 subsequent days. The
resulting time series of average and minimal bond prices and standard deviations for the
average across all firms, one investment grade firm (Parmalat), and one subinvestment grade
firm (Diamond Cable Communications) are presented in Figure 5.1.
Figure 5.1: Defaulted Bond Prices
The figure shows the average and minimal bond price and the standard deviation across
the bond prices for the 30 calendar days before and after the default event. The standard
deviation is determined first for all bonds of a given issuer for a given date, then the average
is computed across all issuers for which observations were available at that date. Panel
A gives the average across all firms, Panel B for Parmalat, Panel C for Diamond Cable
Communications. All values are in EUR.
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51Extending this period to the additional physical settlement period does not change the sample.
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Panel B: Parmalat
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Panel A of Figure 5.1 shows that the average and the minimal bond price tend to decrease
throughout the depicted period. However, the decrease is not very strong in the delivery
period with an average bond price of 42.47 EUR in the first 15 days after the default event
and an average of 38.27 EUR during the second 15-day interval. This change of -9.90%
is similar to that in the minimal bond prices which decrease by -8.94% from 39.39 EUR
between the default and the 15th day after the default to 35.87 EUR from the 16th to the
30th calendar day. In addition, the default event does not lead to an immediate and steep
decrease either in the average nor in the average minimal bond price. We obtain, however,
an average mean bond price of 55.23 EUR in the 30 calendar days before the default event
versus 40.49 EUR in the 30 days following the default. The average minimal prices decrease
from 48.48 EUR to 37.71 EUR for the same time interval.
The average standard deviation of the bond prices initially increases after the default
event but then decreases again towards the end of the delivery period. The average standard
deviation from the first to the 15th day after the default event equals 9.50 EUR and decreases
to 5.39 EUR between the 16th and the 30th calendar day. Comparing the 30 days before
and after the default event, the standard deviation decreases from an average value of 9.80
EUR to 7.51 EUR.
These values correspond to the observed difference between the average and the minimal
bond prices. During the 30 days before the default, the average and minimal bond prices
on average differ by 6.76 EUR and by 2.79 EUR after the default. The difference is higher
immediately after the default with 3.08 EUR during the first 15 days and 2.40 EUR in the
second post-default interval. Altogether, we observe that across all firms, bond prices are
only weakly affected by the default event itself but that the price range continues to decrease
throughout the lifetime of the delivery option.
Panel B and C of Figure 5.1 demonstrate that the immediate effect of the default event
strongly depends on how quickly the creditworthiness deteriorated.
Panel B shows the time series of average and minimal bond prices and the standard
deviation across the delivery basket for the Parmalat default. Until December 9th, 2003
(t=-15), Parmalat was rated investment grade at BBB-. On December 18th, 2003 (t=-6)
it became public knowledge that Parmalat had fraudulently claimed a 3.95 billion USD
account balance with Bank of America, and the trading of Parmalat shares was halted at
the Milan stock exchange. As a consequence, Parmalat was declared officially insolvent on
December 24, 2003, and we choose this as the default date (t=0). The delivery basket for
a standard CDS contract on Parmalat contained 35 obligations. As the behavior of the
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average bond price shows, the price deterioration started two weeks before the eventual
default event. 15 calendar days before default, the average bond price still lay at 88.66 EUR
and decreased to 29.37 EUR on the day before default. The minimal bond price and the
standard deviation were almost constant during the 30 calendar days preceding default with
a mean of 12.38 EUR and 18.53 EUR, respectively. After the default event, mean bond prices
and the standard deviation tended to increase while the minimal bond price decreased, and
the mean values were 29.97 EUR, 7.36 EUR, and 24.94 EUR, respectively. Starting from the
15th day after default, the prices were again almost constant with an average mean price of
21.41 EUR, a minimal price of 8.37 EUR, and a standard deviation of 4.54 EUR.
In comparison to the rapid price decrease before default and the subsequent period of
high price volatility for Parmalat, the default event hardly had any effect on the mean and
minimal bond prices as well as the standard deviation for the British telecommunications
firm Diamond Cable Communications. Starting from 1995, Diamond Cable Communications
exhibited a B rating and was downgraded to B- on February 1, 2002 and to CCC- on March
28, 2002. Together with its parent firm NTL Inc., Diamond Cable Communications filed for
bankruptcy under a prearranged reorganization plan on May 8, 2002. NTL Inc. had already
published its balance sheet statement showing 16.83 USD billion in total assets and 23.38
USD billion in total liabilities. Interest payments on senior notes were missed on April 1,
2002 (t=-2) and a financial restructuring was announced on April 16, 2002 (t=13).
Our default date is April 3, 2002, when the grace period of the missed interest rate
payments elapsed. 30 bonds were deliverable under a standard CDS contract. Prior to
the default, the mean and the minimal bond price as well as the standard deviation were
almost constant with a mean of 23.66 EUR, 15.76 EUR, and 11.02 EUR, respectively. At
the default date and for two subsequent days, price quotes for only one bond were available
which increases the average and the minimal price to 35.25 EUR. Afterwards, bond prices
were approximately constant with a mean of 29.86 EUR, 19.30 EUR, and 11.63 EUR for
the average and minimal bond price and the standard deviation. Two bonds were priced
within a 0.25 EUR span during the 30 days prior to the default, and one of them also had
the minimal post-default price across the delivery basket until the end of the delivery period.
In contrast, the bond which was cheapest before the Parmalat default was among the mean
priced ones after the default event, and a bond which was in the mean price range before
default subsequently had the lowest price.
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Cross-Section of Defaulted Bond Prices and Expected Minimum Recovery
Rates The differences between the post-default prices for Parmalat and Diamond Cable
Communications suggest that if the creditworthiness deteriorates more quickly, the CTD
option is more valuable. In order to capture this effect, we separate the sample by the
time of the firm’s downgrade to subinvestment grade before default. In particular, we first
pool all firms that were rated investment grade one year before default versus all firms that
were rated subinvestment grade one year before default. In the second step, we pool all
firms that were rated investment grade two years before default but subinvestment grade
one year before default versus all firms that were rated subinvestment grade two years before
default. We repeat this procedure for the third and fourth year, from then on our sample
does not change any more. We then determine the average post-default price, the minimal
post-default price, and the standard deviation across all deliverable bonds for the 30 calendar
days before the default event, the entire delivery period, the first 15 days, and the second
15 days of the delivery period.
Taking the average post-default price and the standard deviation as estimates for the
true mean and standard deviation of the beta-distributed recovery rates, we extract the
parameters of the beta distribution from the average and the standard deviation through
the relation given in Appendix 5.3.3. Using these parameter estimates, we compute the
expected minimum recovery rate for a delivery basket that contains the average number of
deliverable obligations of the subsample. The difference between the mean and the expected
minimum recovery rate then gives the value of the delivery option as defined in Equation (5.8)
that would have applied if a standard CDS contract had been written on the entire delivery
basket. In addition, we also display the average recovery rate of the senior unsecured bonds
which we need as input for the bond pricing equation. The results of the estimation procedure
are given in Table 5.6.
As Panel A of Table 5.6 shows, the average bond prices and the standard deviation across
the bond prices are higher for investment grade bonds than for the subinvestment grade
bonds in the 30 days prior to default. In conjunction with the higher number of deliverable
obligations, this leads to a higher value of the CTD option which amounts to up to 44% of
the average bond price. The expected minimum bond price of 38.00 EUR which is displayed
in Panel A of Table 5.6 for firms that were rated investment grade one year prior to default
is almost identical to the average minimal bond price of 38.15 EUR which was actually
observed for these firms.
For the 30 days after the default event, Panel B shows that the difference between the
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Table 5.6: Defaulted Bond Prices
The table presents the bond prices for 65 European firms which defaulted from 2000 to
2006, depending on the rating history. Values in the second column apply to firms rated
investment grade one year prior to default, values in the third column to firms that were
rated subinvestment grade one year prior to default. Column 4 applies to firms that were
rated investment grade two years before default but subinvestment grade one year before
default etc. R¯ gives the average deliverable bond price, Std. Dev. the standard deviation
across the deliverable bond prices, Rsen the average senior unsecured bond price, E
[
Rmin
]
the expected minimal bond price, and CTD the cheapest-to-deliver option value. All values
are in EUR per 100 EUR face value.
Pre-Default 1 Year 2 Years 3 Years 4 Years
Rating IG Sub-IG IG Sub-IG IG Sub-IG IG Sub-IG
# bonds 10 6 8 8 11 6 10 7
Panel A: Pre-Default Days 1-30
R¯ 68.03 48.22 73.84 44.48 66.80 44.33 69.37 40.08
Std. Dev. 17.91 7.67 16.75 7.80 15.24 5.72 15.20 5.69
Rsen 65.01 47.08 70.41 43.23 64.89 43.20 66.56 38.81
E
[
Rmin
]
38.00 38.53 47.16 33.52 40.86 37.13 43.94 32.50
CTD 30.03 9.69 26.68 10.96 25.94 7.20 25.43 7.58
Panel B: Post-Default Days 1-30
R¯ 31.87 42.69 47.24 37.08 49.61 34.40 50.07 33.99
Std. Dev. 10.85 5.49 10.01 5.13 9.50 4.42 8.51 4.21
Rsen 30.07 42.05 46.28 36.15 49.35 33.25 49.83 32.81
E
[
Rmin
]
16.52 35.79 33.13 29.92 34.64 28.89 37.05 28.40
CTD 15.35 6.90 14.11 7.16 14.97 5.51 13.02 5.59
Panel C: Post-Default Days 1-15
R¯ 36.23 44.26 51.10 39.31 52.26 37.31 53.17 36.55
Std.Dev. 17.52 6.47 16.85 6.24 13.98 5.36 12.01 5.11
Rsen 33.82 43.08 49.06 37.83 50.58 35.60 51.46 34.84
E
[
Rmin
]
12.27 36.13 27.22 30.60 30.15 30.63 34.61 29.77
CTD 23.96 8.13 23.88 8.71 22.11 6.68 18.56 6.78
Panel D: Post-Default Days 16-30
R¯ 28.44 41.04 44.05 34.72 47.35 31.30 47.35 31.30
Std. Dev. 4.18 4.66 4.39 4.52 5.43 3.60 6.38 3.60
Rsen 25.95 40.80 43.39 34.05 46.99 30.31 46.99 30.31
E
[
Rmin
]
22.23 35.19 37.85 28.42 38.79 26.82 37.60 26.68
CTD 6.21 5.85 6.20 6.30 8.56 4.48 9.75 4.62
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average and the expected minimum bond price strongly decreases from 30.03 EUR to 15.35
EUR through the lower standard deviation for firms that were rated investment grade one
year prior to default. For the remaining investment grade segment, the average CTD value
lies at approximately 15 EUR and between 5.51 and 7.65 EUR for the subinvestment grade
segment. We also find further evidence that the default event did not affect bond prices
for firms that were rated subinvestment grade previously as strongly as it did for those
which quickly deteriorated from an investment grade rating. For firms that were rated
subinvestment grade one year prior to default, the average bond price only decreases from
48.22 EUR to 42.69 EUR.
Comparing the first and the second half of the delivery period in Panel C and D, we
find that the average bond prices and the standard deviation decrease over time for both
the investment and the subinvestment grade. This has the effect of changing the behavior
of the expected minimum bond prices across the rating spectrum. In the investment grade
segment, the expected minimum bond price is smaller in the first half. For the subinvestment
grade segment, the lower expected minimum bond prices are attained in the second half of
the delivery period. Since the protection buyer wants to deliver an asset at the cheapest
possible price, she will on average deliver the subinvestment grade reference entities at a
later time even though the value of the CTD option is always higher in the first half of the
delivery period. In this case, the value of the delivery option does not directly affect the
timing of the actual delivery.
The average senior unsecured bond prices consistently lie below the average across the
entire delivery basket. This finding is consistent with our analysis in Section 2.3 where we
discuss that the delivery basket additionally contains bonds of a higher seniority or those
with additional creditor rights. The difference between the average across the delivery basket
and the senior unsecured bonds is more pronounced in the 30 days preceding default which
agrees with the economic intuition that most additional creditor rights become worthless
through default.
Impact of Stochastic Recovery Rates on Credit Risk and Liquidity Premia
We now demonstrate how the average post-default bond prices and the expected minimum
recovery rate across the entire delivery basket are used in the estimation of the model.
Calibration Procedure The calibration consists of three steps. In the first step, we
determine the expected senior unsecured bond recovery rate and the expected minimum
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recovery rate across the potential delivery basket for each year until the maturity of the
CDS contract conditional upon default happening in that year. If a reference entity is rated
investment grade at the current date, the expected senior unsecured recovery rate Rsen,
the expected average recovery rate R¯, and the standard deviation across the entire delivery
basket conditional upon default happening within the next year are taken from the second
column of Table 5.6. The recovery rate conditional upon default taking place in year 2 of
the CDS contract is taken from the third column and so forth. We proceed in the same way
for subinvestment grade reference entities.
Regarding from which panel of Table 5.6 the expected recovery rates Rsen and R¯ and the
standard deviation are chosen, we use the following procedure. Since the average of Rsen
is always higher in the first 15 days after default, we use the values from Panel C for the
bond pricing equation, assuming that bond holders try to sell the defaulted asset as soon as
possible. For the CDS contract, we choose the combination yielding the smallest expected
minimum recovery rate which, as discussed above, is in the first 15 days for investment grade
rated reference entities (Panel C) and in the second 15 days for subinvestment grade rated
ones (Panel D).
As the potential number of deliverable obligations, we do not use the values in Table 5.6.
Instead, we choose the number of obligations which would be currently deliverable upon
default under a standard CDS contract for the reference entity. From this number of bonds,
the value of R¯ from Table 5.6, and the standard deviation from Table 5.6, we compute the
expected minimum recovery rate for each reference entity conditional upon default happening
in a given year of the CDS contract. All values are then discounted to the default date at
the default-free forward interest rate computed implicitly from the Nelson-Siegel-Svensson
curve.52
In the second step of our calibration procedure, we initiate a base grid for the process
parameters
(
α, β, σ, µb, ηb, µask, ηask, µbid, ηbid
)
. In the third step, we determine the values(
λ, γb, γask, γbid
)
(t), t = 1, . . . , 1548, which simultaneously minimize the sum of squared
errors between the time series of the observed and the theoretical CDS premia and bond
yield spreads. As before, we determine the grid point associated with the smallest sum of
squared errors and initiate a finer local grid around it. We then repeat the third step in
52The assumption that the average and standard deviation of the post-default bond price only depend on
the rating history is rather restrictive. Sovereign debt, for example, often displays a different post-default
price behavior from corporate debt or that for financial reference entities. However, our default sample does
not contain a single financial or sovereign reference entity. Therefore, we make the assumption to keep our
estimation results comparable to those of the base case result. In addition, the delivery option is likely
to become more valuable for financial and sovereign reference entities since these generally have a higher
number of deliverable bonds.
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each point of the new grid. We stop iterating between the second and the third step when
the minimal sum of squared errors twice decreases by less than 1% on two subsequent grid
specifications.
Credit Risk, Liquidity, and CTD Premia: Cross-Sectional Results Given the
estimates of the process parameters and intensities, we then compute the pure credit risk
and liquidity premia for bonds and CDS as well as the CTD option component in the CDS
premia as explained above. The results are displayed in Table 5.7.
As a comparison of Table 5.7 to the base case results in Table 4.1 shows, the credit risk
premium csdef in the bond yield spread decreases from an average of 52.21 bp to an average
of 40.53 bp while the liquidity premium csliq increases from an average of 26.26 bp to an
average of 37.94 bp. This signifies that 52% of the yield spread are due to credit risk and
48% due to liquidity.
The change arises in two ways. First, we assume that the risk-neutral expected recovery
rate of the bond equals the average senior post-default bond priceRsen in Panel C of Table 5.6.
These values mostly exceed the recovery rate of 40% used in the base case. Due to the higher
post-default price, the credit risk premium decreases if the default probability remains fixed
because the bond holder loses a lower amount of money if default occurs. On average, a
change of the expected recovery rate from 40% as in the base case to the average investment
grade post-default price across 5 years of 47% from Table 5.6 leads to a decrease of about
13% for csdef.
The second effect is due to the simultaneous calibration of our model to CDS premia and
bond prices. Since a non-negative part of the CDS premium is by assumption caused by the
CTD option, the remainder of the premium must be explained by the credit risk and the
liquidity premium. Both the CDS bid and the ask premium reflect the CTD option value,
therefore our measure of CDS liquidity is less likely to be affected because it is derived via the
asymmetry of the bid and the ask premia regarding the credit risk component. Therefore, the
proportion of the CDS premium – and, consequently, the yield spread – that is exclusively
caused by credit risk decreases. In order to fit the observed bond prices, the liquidity premia
must increase simultaneously.
Across the different industry sectors, this effect is most pronounced for the sovereign
sector due to the higher number of deliverable bonds. The average of csliq increases from
2.17 bp to 13.26 bp, thus constituting 33% of the yield spread in comparison to 2% in the
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base case. For the financial sector, the mean of csliq increases from 41% to 54% of the yield
spread, and the increase for the non-financial corporate sector registers from 33% to 49%.
For the subinvestment grade segment, the two effects described above affect the
segmentation of the bond spread in different directions. The average subinvestment grade
post-default price lies below 40%, thus leading to a potentially higher value of csdef.53 The
CTD option effect continues to decrease csdef, albeit to a smaller extent because of the lower
number of deliverable bonds in the subinvestment grade sample. As Table 5.7 shows, the
second effect prevails but is mitigated by the first effect. On average, csdef amounts to 72%
of the yield spread for the BB rating class, 76% for the B rating class, and 75% for the
CCC rating class. In comparison to the investment grade rating classes where csdef accounts
for only 40% for the AA rating class, 45%, respectively 47%, for the A and BBB rating
class, and 71% for the AAA rating class, the effect of bond liquidity remains limited for the
subinvestment grade sample relative to the credit risk effect.
Naturally, the central results of Table 5.7 concern the distribution of the CDS premia
across the credit risk, liquidity, and CTD premia. In comparison to Table 4.1, the credit
risk premia sdef consistently decrease which agrees with the results for csdef. For the entire
sample, the average of 41.61 bp for sdef lies 11.08 bp below the estimate in the base case, and
a comparison across the industry sectors and rating classes shows that the average decreases
for every subset. A similar result applies for the minimum and maximum of sdef; the former
decreases by 1.02 bp to 4.07 bp, the latter by 134.98 bp to 1,714.64 bp. With regard to the
total decrease, the mean change of sdef is largest for the non-financial corporate sector and
the B rating class with on average 15.53 bp and 75.01 bp. These results show that the higher
the credit risk is, the higher is the impact of the CTD premium.
The average of the CDS liquidity premium sliq also increases to 2.13 bp, but the small
difference to the base case of 0.09 bp and a comparison of the different industry sectors and
rating classes implies that the increase is not systematic. The sovereign sector and the AAA,
BBB, and B rating class register a small decrease of the mean of sliq, the remaining sectors
slight increases.
Due to the unchanged liquidity premium, the CTD premium sCTD is almost identical to
the mean decrease of sdef with a mean of 11.57 bp. Overall, sCTD fluctuates between 0.00
bp54 and 398.03 bp with the maximum attained for the BB rating class and the non-financial
corporate sector. The average of sCTD is also highest for this sector at 15.43 bp and for the
53The same parameters as in the above example yield an associated increase of 5%.
54This value is obtained for a reference entity directly before the maturity of its penultimate bond. On
the following day, the reference entity is excluded from the sample.
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B rating class at 77.68 bp which approximately agrees with the largest average decreases for
sdef. With regard to the premium decomposition, we observe that the credit risk premium
accounts for 75% of the CDS premium. The liquidity proportion is, as in the base case,
equal to 4%, and the delivery option accounts for on average 21% of the CDS premium.
These percentages are almost identical for all different industry sectors and rating classes.
Due to its high number of deliverable bonds, the sovereign sector has the highest percentage
for sCTD at 25% and, consequently the lowest for sdef at 70% while the non-financial corporate
sector exhibits proportions of 75% for sdef and 22% for sCTD. Across the different rating
classes, the investment grade segment tends to have a somewhat higher proportion for sCTD
between 29% for the AAA rating class and 21% for both the A and BBB rating class. The
associated credit risk premia range between 72% and 75%. In the subinvestment grade
segment, the lower number of bonds leads to a lower percentage of the CDS premium due
the delivery option and thus to a higher percentage due to credit risk with values between
75% for the CCC rating class and 80% in the BB rating class.
The results of the time series analysis of the credit risk and liquidity premia are similar
to those in the base case, and we do not present them here. The similarity to the base
case is due to the way in which the value of the delivery option enters our model which
becomes evident in Equations (5.12) and (5.13). The expected minimal recovery rate is
determined from Table 5.6 for each potential default date, and the estimated credit risk and
liquidity intensities are mostly scaled versions of the intensities in the base case. Therefore,
the time series relation between the credit risk and liquidity premia is mostly unaffected by
our inclusion of the CTD option. The time series relation between the CTD premia and the
credit risk premia is also straightforward. There is a strong linear relation between the level
and changes which is again due to the way in which we model the effect of the CTD option
on the CDS premium.
Summarizing the results of Section 5.2, our most important findings are twofold. First,
the average post-default prices for European issuers are decreasing through the delivery
period of the CDS contract, but the minimal bond price exhibits a different behavior
depending on the rating class. For subinvestment grade issuers, the minimum decreases
over the delivery period, but the differences are limited. The investment grade segment
exhibits a high bond price volatility immediately after the default event which leads to a
higher potential value of the delivery option during the earlier part of the delivery period.
On average, the minimal expected bond price lies at 26% of the face value for investment
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grade debt and 29% for subinvestment grade debt. The higher value for the subinvestment
grade segment is due to the overall lower number of deliverable obligations.
Second, we obtain a CTD component that accounts for on average 17% to 29% of the CDS
mid premium. Its absolute value is higher, the lower the rating of an issuer is, but relative
to the mid premium, the impact is higher for the investment grade segment. The liquidity
premia in the bond market become much larger when the CTD option is accounted for while
they remain mostly unchanged in the CDS market. The overall demand pressure associated
with positive values of sliq which we identified both in the base case and in the case with
explicitly correlated intensities remains unaffected by modelling the delivery option. This
last result clarifies that the CTD option becomes subsumed in sdef when recovery rates are
assumed to be constant and identical for all issues of a single issuer. When estimating default
probabilities from CDS premia alone, it is therefore important to account for the CTD option
in order to avoid miscalculations.
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5.3 Appendix to Chapter 5
5.3.1 Analytical Solutions for the Discount Factors with Corre-
lated Intensities
The dynamics of the default and liquidity intensities are defined as follows. First, we
define the latent risk factors x and yl through the following system of stochastic differential
equations: 
dx (t)
dyb (t)
dyask (t)
dybid (t)
 =

α− βx (t)
µb
µask
µbid
 dt+

σ
√
x (t) dWx (t)
ηb dWyb (t)
ηask dWyask (t)
ηbid dWybid (t)
 , (5.17)
with parameters α, β, σ > 0, µl, ηl > 0, and Brownian motionsWx andWyl , l ∈ {b, ask, bid}.
The Brownian motions governing x and yl, l ∈ {b, ask, bid} are independent. The intensities
λ and γl are then defined as linear combinations of the latent factors
λ (t)
γb (t)
γask (t)
γbid (t)
 =

x (t) + gby
b (t) + gasky
ask (t) + gbidy
bid (t)
fbx (t) + y
b (t) + ωb,asky
ask (t) + ωb,bidy
bid (t)
faskdx (t) + ωb,asky
b (t) + yask (t) + ωask,bidy
bid (t)
fbiddx (t) + ωb,bidy
b (t) + ωask,bidy
bid (t) + ybid (t)
 .
We only show the derivation for Et
[
P˜ (t, τ) L˜b (t, τ)
]
, the other pricing factors are derived
in the same way. The joint expectation for the discount factors P˜ (t, τ) and L˜b (t, τ) is given
by:
Et
[
P˜ (t, τ) · L˜b (t, τ)
]
= Et
[
exp
(
−
∫ τ
t
λ (s) + γb (s) ds
)]
= Et
[
exp
(
−
∫ τ
t
(1 + fb)x (s) + (1 + gb) y
b (s)
+ (gask + ωb,ask) y
ask (s) + (gbid + ωb,bid) y
bid (s) ds
)]
= Et
[
exp
(
−
∫ τ
t
(1 + fb)x (s) ds
)]
· Et
[
exp
(
−
∫ τ
t
(1 + gb) y
b (s) ds
)]
·Et
[
exp
(
−
∫ τ
t
(gask + ωb,ask) y
ask (s) ds
)]
· Et
[
exp
(
−
∫ τ
t
(gbid + ωb,bid) y
bid (s) ds
)]
=: P (t, τ, x; 1 + fb)︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=P b(t,τ,x;f)
L
(
t, τ, yb; 1 + gb
)
L
(
t, τ, yask; gask + ωb,ask
)
L
(
t, τ, ybid; gbid + ωb,bid
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=Lb(t,τ,y;g)
,
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where P b and Lb are the solutions referenced in Section 5.1.1. The dynamics of the
scaled latent risk factors (1 + fb)x, (1 + gb) y
b, (gask + ωb,ask) y
ask, and (gbid + ωb,bid) y
bid are
identical to those of the original latent factors with the process parameters adjusted:
d (1 + fb)x (t) = [(1 + fb)α− β (1 + fb)x (t)] dt+ (1 + fb)σ
√
x (t) dWx (t) ,
d (1 + gb) y
b (t) = (1 + gb)µ
b dt+ (1 + gb) η
b dWyb (t) ,
d (gask + ωb,ask) y
ask (t) = (gask + ωb,ask)µ
ask dt+ (gask + ωb,ask) η
ask dWyask (t) ,
d (gbid + ωb,bid) y
bid (t) = (gbid + ωb,bid)µ
bid dt+ (gbid + ωb,bid) η
bid dWybid (t) ,
with initial values (1 + fb)x0, (1 + gb) y
b
0, (gbid + ωb,ask) y
ask
0 , and (gbid + ωb,bid) y
bid
0 .
Thus, the following well-known analytical solutions arise:
P (t, τ, x; k) := a1 (t, τ ; k) · exp [−a2 (t, τ ; k) k x (t)] ,
L
(
t, τ, yl; k
)
:= al3 (t, τ ; k) · exp
[−al4 (t, τ ; k) k y (t)] ,
where
a1 (t, τ ; k) =
(
1− κ (k)
1− κ (k) exp [φ (k) (τ − t)]
) 2α
σ2
exp
[
α (β + φ (k))
σ2
(τ − t)
]
,
a2 (t, τ ; k) =
φ (k)− β
σ2k
+
2φ (k)
σ2 k (κ (k) exp [φ (k) (τ − t)]− 1) ,
al3 (t, τ ; k) = exp
[
k2ηl
2
(τ − t)3
6
+
kµl (τ − t)2
6
]
,
al4 (t, τ ; k) = τ − t,
φ (k) =
√
2σ2 k + β2, κ (k) =
β + φ (k)
β − φ (k) .
The bond and CDS pricing equations also contain Et
[
P˜ (t, τi−1) · L˜b (t, τi)
]
. Since λ
and γl are correlated, we also have to determine the expectation of this non-simultaneous
discount factor. Without loss of generality, assume that τi−1 = τ1 and τi = τ2, τ1 ≤ τ2.
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Then, the definition of P˜ and L˜b implies that
P˜ (t, τ1) · L˜b (t, τ2) = exp
(
−
∫ τ1
t
x (s) + gby
b (s) + gasky
ask (s) + gbidy
bid (s) ds
−
∫ τ2
t
fbx (s) + y
b (s) + ωb,asky
ask (s) + ωb,bidy
bid (s) ds
)
= exp
(
−
∫ τ1
t
(1 + fb)x (s) ds−
∫ τ2
τ1
fbx (s) ds
−
∫ τ1
t
(1 + gb) y
b (s) ds−
∫ τ2
τ1
yb (s) ds
−
∫ τ1
t
(gask + ωb,ask) y
ask (s) ds−
∫ τ2
τ1
ωb,asky
ask (s) ds
−
∫ τ1
t
(gbid + ωb,bid) y
bid (s) ds−
∫ τ2
τ1
ωb,bidy
bid (s) ds
)
.
The independence of the latent factors allows us to split up the joint expectation as
Et
[
P˜ (t, τ1) · L˜b (t, τ2)
]
= Et
[
exp
(
−
∫ τ1
t
(1 + fb)x (s) ds
)
exp
(
−
∫ τ2
τ1
fbx (s) ds
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=P b(t,τ1,τ2,x;f)
·Et
[
exp
(
−
∫ τ1
t
(1 + gb) y
b (s) ds
)
exp
(
−
∫ τ2
τ1
yb (s) ds
)]
·Et
[
exp
(
−
∫ τ1
t
(gask + ωb,ask) y
ask (s) ds
)
exp
(
−
∫ τ2
τ1
ωb,asky
ask (s) ds
)]
·Et
[
exp
(
−
∫ τ1
t
(gbid + ωb,bid) y
bid (s)
)
exp
(
−
∫ τ2
τ1
ωb,bidy
bid (s) ds
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=Lb(t,τ1,τ2,y;g)
.
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Applying the law of iterated expectation, we obtain
Et
[
exp
(
−
∫ τ1
t
(1 + fb)x (s) ds
)
exp
(
−
∫ τ2
τ1
fbx (s) ds
)]
= Et
exp
(
−
∫ τ1
t
(1 + fb)x (s) ds
)
Eτ1
[
exp
(
−
∫ τ2
τ1
fbx (s) ds
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=P (τ1,τ2,x;fb)

= a1 (τ1, τ2; fb)Et
[
exp (−a2 (τ1, τ2; fb) fb x (τ1)) exp
(
−
∫ τ1
t
(1 + fb)x (s) ds
)]
,
which, by the moment-generating function of x, has the following exponential-affine solution
P (t, τ1, τ2, x; fb, 1 + fb) = a1 (τ1, τ2; fb) b1 (t, τ1, τ2; fb, 1 + fb) exp [−b2 (t, τ1, τ2; fb, 1 + fb) x (t)] ,
where φ, a1, and a2 are defined as above and
b1 (t, τ1, τ2; k1, k2) =
([
2φ (k2) exp
[
τ1 − t
2
(φ (k2) + β)
]]
·
[
σ2a2 (τ1, τ2; k1) k1 (exp [φ (k2) (τ1 − t)]− 1) + φ (k2)− β
+exp [φ (k2) (τ1 − t)] (φ (k2) + β)
]−1) 2ασ2
,
b2 (t, τ1, τ2; k1, k2) =
[
a2 (τ1, τ2; k1) k1 [φ (k2) + β + exp [φ (k2) (τ1 − t)] (φ (k2)− β)]
+2k2 (exp [φ (k2) (τ1 − t)]− 1)
]
·
[
σ2a2 (τ1, τ2; k1) k1 (exp [φ (k2) (τ1 − t)]− 1) + φ (k2)− β
+exp [φ (k2) (τ1 − t)] (φ (k2) + β)
]−1
.
Simultaneously, we obtain
Et
[
exp
(
−
∫ τ1
t
k1y
l (s) ds
)
exp
(
−
∫ τ2
τ1
k2y
l (s) ds
)]
= al3 (τ1, τ2; k2)Et
[
exp
(−al4 (τ1, τ2; k2) k2 yl (τ1)) exp(−∫ τ1
t
k1y
l (s) ds
)]
,
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which has the exponential-affine solution
Ll
(
t, τ1, τ2, y
l; k1, k2
)
= al3 (τ1, τ2; k2) b
l
3 (t, τ1, τ2; k1, k2) exp
[−bl4 (t, τ1, τ2; k1, k2) yl (t)] ,
where al3 and a
l
4 are defined as above and
bl3 (t, τ1, τ2; k1, k2) = exp
[
ηl
2
k21
6
(τ1 − t)3 + η
l2k2a
l
4 (τ1, τ2; k2)− µl
2
k1 (τ1 − t)2
+
(
ηl
2
k2a
l
4 (τ1, τ2; k2)
2
− µl
)
al4 (τ1, τ2; k2) k2 (τ1 − t)
]
,
bl4 (t, τ1, τ2; k1, k2) = a
l
4 (τ1, τ2; k2) k2 + k1 (τ1 − t) .
5.3.2 Correlation Factors for Credit Risk and Liquidity Intensities
The correlation between the changes of the credit risk intensity and the changes of the bond
liquidity intensity is given by
Cor
(
dλ (t) , dγb (t)
)
=
[
fbσ
2x (t) + gbη
b2 + gaskωb,askη
ask2 + gbidωb,bidη
bid2
]
·
[(
σ2x (t) + g2bη
b2 + g2askη
ask2 + g2bidη
bid2
)
·
(
f 2b σ
2x (t) + ηb
2
+ ω2b,askη
ask2 + ω2b,bidη
bid2
)]− 12
,
the correlation between the changes of the credit risk intensity and the changes of the CDS
bid and ask liquidity intensity are:
Cor
(
dλ (t) , dγask (t)
)
=
[
faskσ
2x (t) + gbωb,askη
b2 + gaskη
ask2 + gbidωask,bidη
bid2
]
·
[(
σ2x (t) + g2bη
b2 + g2askη
ask2 + g2bidη
bid2
)
·
(
f 2askσ
2x (t) + ω2b,askη
b2 + ηask
2
+ ω2ask,bidη
bid2
)]− 12
,
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and
Cor
(
dλ (t) , dγbid (t)
)
=
[
fbidσ
2x (t) + gbωb,bidη
b2 + gaskωask,bidη
ask2 + gbidη
bid2
]
·
[(
σ2x (t) + g2bη
b2 + g2askη
ask2 + g2bidη
bid2
)
·
(
f 2bidσ
2x (t) + ω2b,bidη
b2 + ω2ask,bidη
ask2 + ηbid
2
)]− 12
.
The correlation between the changes of the CDS ask and bid liquidity intensity equals
Cor
(
dγask (t) , dγbid (t)
)
=
[
faskfbidσ
2x (t) + ωb,askωb,bidη
b2 + ωask,bidη
ask2 + ωask,bidη
bid2
]
·
[(
f 2askσ
2x (t) + ω2b,askη
b2 + ηask
2
+ ω2ask,bidη
bid2
)
·
(
f 2bidσ
2x (t) + ω2b,bidη
b2 + ω2ask,bidη
ask2 + ηbid
2
)]− 12
,
the correlation between the changes of the bond liquidity intensity with the changes of the
CDS ask and bid liquidity intensity are given by
Cor
(
dγb (t) , dγask (t)
)
=
[
fbfaskσ
2x (t) + ωb,askη
b2 + ωb,askη
ask2 + ωb,bidωask,bidη
bid2
]
·
[(
f 2b σ
2x (t) + ηb
2
+ ω2b,askη
ask2 + ω2b,bidη
bid2
)
·
(
f 2askσ
2x (t) + ω2b,askη
b2 + ηask
2
+ ω2ask,bidη
bid2
)]− 12
,
and
Cor
(
dγb (t) , dγbid (t)
)
=
[
fbfbidσ
2x (t) + ωb,bidη
b2 + ωb,askωask,bidη
ask2 + ωb,bidη
bid2
]
·
[(
f 2b σ
2x (t) + ηb
2
+ ω2b,askη
ask2 + ω2b,bidη
bid2
)
·
(
f 2bidσ
2x (t) + ω2b,bidη
b2 + ω2ask,bidη
ask2 + ηbid
2
)]− 12
.
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5.3.3 Distribution of the Minimal Recovery Rates
For a standard beta distributed random variable R˜ which is limited between 0 and 1 with
parameters p > 0 and q > 0, the density function β is given by
β (r; p, q) =
[∫ 1
0
tp−1 (1− t)q−1 dt
]−1
rp−1 (1− r)q−1 ,
and the distribution function B is given by the incomplete beta function ratio:
B (r; p, q) =
[∫ 1
0
tp−1 (1− t)q−1 dt
]−1 ∫ r
0
tp−1 (1− t)q−1 dt,
where 0 ≤ r ≤ 1.
The expected value and the variance of R˜ are simple functions of the distribution
parameters p and q:
E
[
R˜
]
=
p
p+ q
,
V ar
[
R˜
]
=
pq
(p+ q + 1) (p+ q)2
.
For K random variables R˜k, k = 1, . . . , K, which are iid distributed with density function
β and distribution function B, it is well-known that the distribution function Bmin of R˜min =
min{R˜1 . . . , R˜K} can be written as
Bmin (r) = P
(
min{R˜1 . . . , R˜K} ≤ r
)
= P
(
−max{−R˜1 . . . ,−R˜K} ≤ r
)
= P
(
max{−R˜1 . . . ,−R˜K} > −r
)
= 1− P
(
max{−R˜1 . . . ,−R˜K} ≤ −r
)
= 1− P
(
−R˜1 ≤ −r . . . ,−R˜K ≤ −r
)
= 1− P
(
R˜1 > r . . . , R˜K > r
)
= 1− P
(
R˜1 > r
)
· . . . · P
(
R˜K > r
)
= 1− P
(
R˜1 > r
)K
= 1−
(
1− P
(
R˜1 ≤ r
))K
= 1− (1−B (r))K .
The density function βmin of R˜min follows as the derivative of the distribution function Bmin:
βmin (r) = (1−B (r))K−1 ·K · β (r) .
The expected value of R˜min is then determined numerically by computing
E
[
Rmin
]
= K ·
∫ 1
0
r · (1−B (r))K−1 · β (r) dr.
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Page after page of professional
economic journals are filled with
mathematical formulas leading
the reader from sets of more or
less plausible but entirely
arbitrary assumptions to
precisely stated but irrelevant
conclusions.
Wassiliy LeontiefChapter 6
Concluding Remarks
In this thesis, we separate bond yield spreads and CDS premia into credit risk, liquidity,
correlation, and delivery option components. Our main result is, contrary to conventional
wisdom, that CDS markets are systematically affected by liquidity premium surcharges for
protection buyers. The reason is a prevailing demand pressure that increases CDS ask premia
more strongly than bid premia. Bond and CDS liquidity premia tend to exhibit a positive
dependence on credit risk premia, but the precise behavior depends on the rating class.
The cross-market relation of the liquidity premia can be consistently interpreted by demand
relations between the bond and the CDS market, and our results are robust against the
inclusion of the delivery option in CDS contracts.
In arguing against the standard perception of clear comovements in the bond and the
CDS market, we expect to meet with criticism from skeptical readers. We thus conclude
with some qualifying remarks.
First, our empirical analysis reveals that differences between the two markets are transient
and easy to miss when weekly or monthly data is used. However, especially in deteriorating
market conditions, trading strategies that rely on the comovement of bond yield spreads and
CDS premia can result in severe and unexpected risk exposures that are canceled at a loss.
Second, our reduced-form model only allows us to determine price discount factors which
we attribute to credit and liquidity risk because of the way they affect bond prices and CDS
ask and bid premia. A shortcoming common to all reduced-form models is that it is not
possible to conclusively prove that the discount factors effectively measure credit risk or
liquidity only. Neglected risk factors automatically become subsumed in either the credit
risk or the liquidity discount factor.
Third, we point out that our approach can only measure, but not endogenously explain
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the relation of credit risk and liquidity premia and of the liquidity premia across the two
markets. The economic conclusions we draw from our results cannot be directly translated
into testable hypotheses that have a clear foundation in market microstructure theory.
This problem is especially irksome for the differences between financial and non-financial
corporate reference entities and between the investment and subinvestment grade segment.
The main accomplishment of this thesis lies in the documentation of these differences, and
we appreciate the integration of market microstructure considerations and our pricing results
as a promising area for future research.
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